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This thesis comprises a narrative exploration of the lived experience of being 
someone who has self-injured. Self-injury, like pain, emotions, sensation and social 
life, is understood and examined as inherently embodied. The thesis is intended to 
contribute to sociological approaches to the study of embodiment and to sociological 
understandings of self-injury. Twelve participants were recruited in non-clinical 
sites. The sample was heterogeneous in terms of their experience of self-injury, 
contact with medical and psychiatric services, socio-economic background, 
household type, age and sexuality. Both men and women were interviewed in an 
attempt to counter the relative neglect of men in previous research. Two interviews 
were carried out with each participant: the first was a life-story interview, while the 
second explored self-injury more directly. The approach to data collection and 
analysis was intended to be collaborative, and comprised both narrative and thematic 
techniques.  
 
The thesis demonstrates the importance of studying self-injury as an embodied, 
socially situated and socially mediated behaviour. An embodied approach underlines 
the importance of the visibility of self-injury. The existence of visible marks and 
scars created by self-injury were important aspects of the lived experience of 
participants. The ways in which these marks were negotiated in social life 
represented a key focus of analysis. My analysis reveals the importance and utility of 
attending to the practical and material aspects of self-injury in attempting to 
understand the behaviour. I highlight the diverse ways in which self-injury is 
practised, and the equally various meanings and understandings it holds for 
practitioners  A variety of complex and contradictory justifications for self-injury are 
critically examined. These justifications share a concern with pain, incarnate, 
suggesting that self-injury is: a method of transforming emotional pain into physical 
pain; a way of relieving emotional pain; painful; painless; attention-seeking; private. 
A sociological, narrative analysis illuminates the ways in which these understandings 
and justifications can be located within biographical, interpersonal and socio-cultural 
contexts. By locating these justifications within socio-cultural contexts, the 
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complexities and contradictions of the accounts become understandable. My analysis 
confirms the importance of attending to socio-cultural understandings of bodies, 




This thesis would not have been possible or even probable without the help and 
support of a number of people. Firstly, my thanks are due to Hugo Gorringe, Tom 
McGlew and Jan Webb for supporting my early forays into postgraduate study. 
Without their help and encouragement I would not have secured the funding which 
allowed this research to take place. Thank you to the ESRC for providing said 
funding. Above all, my thanks to my wonderful supervision team, Angus Bancroft 
and Steve Platt. By providing me with just the right amount of guidance, support and 
advice, they ensured that the research and writing represented in this thesis was 
academically (and grammatically) correct. Their input has been indispensable, 
though any mistakes are, of course, my own. Further thanks to my examiners, Adi 
Bharadwaj and Nick Crossley for being so supportive, engaged and interested, and 
making my viva such an unexpectedly enjoyable experience. 
 
Thanks are also due to everyone in the department, but the following colleagues in 
particular have been subjected to and listened patiently to my ramblings about 
theory, structure, babies and sleep deprivation: Heather Blenkinsop, Jennifer 
Fleetwood, Kanykey Jailobaeva, Jennifer Peet, Gethin Rees, Miriam Snellgrove and 
Fraser Stewart. Ruth Lewis and Sarah Hill deserve special mention for being such 
amazing friends and providing vital emotional and intellectual support over the last 5 
years. 
 
Thank you above all to my research participants, who so generously gave me their 
time, insights and stories.  
 
Finally, thanks to my family. Firstly, my sisters Polly, Emily and Chloe: thanks 
especially to Emily and Chloe for providing free child and cat care! Thanks to my 
parents, Jill and Mike, for listening, accepting, and quietly supporting. Thank you to 
Morpheus and Nightmare for distraction and stress relief. Thanks to Jonathan, for 
just about everything. Finally, to my son Zachary, who joined me half way through, 
 8 
gave me a reason to have a break, and who all of this (and everything else) is 
dedicated to. 
 9 
Table of contents 
Declaration          3 
Abstract          5 
Acknowledgements         7 
Table of contents         9 
List of tables and figures         14 
Key to transcriptions          15 
Glossary of Scottish dialect        15 
CHAPTER 1 - PAIN INCARNATE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Beginning          17 
1.2 Definitions: from parasuicide to body marking: why self-injury?  19 
 1.2.1 Suicidal motivations: parasuicide, non-suicidal self-injury,    19 
self-harm  
 1.2.2 Definitional confusion: deliberate self-harm, self-poisoning,   21 
self-injury 
 1.2.3 Morally charged definitions: self-mutilation to body marking  23 
1.3 Self-injury: research context       25 
 1.3.1 Prevalence of self-injury      25 
 1.3.2 Who self-injures?       27 
 1.3.3 Personal perspective       30 
1.4 Aims of the research        31 
1.5 Overview of thesis        32 
CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction         37 
2.2 Methodology         38 
2.3 Existing research literature on self-injury     40 
 2.3.1 Psychological factors, psychiatric diagnoses    42 
 2.3.2 Social and interpersonal factors      46 
 2.3.3 Functions        47 
 2.3.4 Bodies         49 
2.4 Self-injury incarnate and in social contexts: what sociology could add  53 
 10 
 2.4.1 Self-injury, bodies and embodiment     53 
 2.4.2 Corporeal materiality       54 
 2.4.3 Feeling bodies        56 
 2.4.4 Signifying bodies, signifying selves     57 
 2.4.5 Contextualising self-injury      58 
CHAPTER 3 – METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research design         63 
 3.1.1 Aims and theoretical underpinnings     63 
 3.1.2 Narrative and life-story       65 
 3.1.3 Planning the interviews       67 
 3.1.4 Ethics, health and safety      68 
3.2 Sampling and recruiting        69 
 3.2.1 Recruitment        69 
 3.2.2 The sample        71 
3.3 The interviews         73 
 3.3.1 Interview contexts       73 
 3.3.2 Who am I? Reflecting on the position of the interviewer and   75 
the effects of disclosure 
 3.3.3 Constructing a history, telling a story     78 
3.3.4 The second interviews       82 
3.3.5 Reflecting on the interviews      84 
3.4 Analysing and writing        84 
 3.4.1 Field notes and ‘the diaries’      85 
 3.4.2 Transcribing and making stories     86 
 3.4.3 Looking at the bigger picture: coding and CAQDAS   88 
3.4 The status of the accounts        91 
CHAPTER 4 - PRACTISING SELF-INJURY  
4.1 Introduction          93 
 4.1.1 Synopsis         93 
 4.1.2 Bodies and self-injury: theoretical concerns    93 
4.2 Making the wound        95 
 4.2.1 Early self-injury and the ‘first time’     95 
 11 
 4.2.2 Exploring the body and the ‘first time’     99 
 4.2.3 The injury                  103 
4.3 ‘Physical’ sensations                  105 
 4.3.1 A “pleasurable sensation”                106 
 4.3.2 ‘Physical pain’ as an aim and outcome of self-injury                        108 
 4.3.3 ‘It doesn’t hurt’: feeling nothing at all               111 
4.4 Tending the self-injured body: healing and scars               114 
 4.4.1 Healing as distraction or self-care               115 
 4.4.2 Feelings about scars                 117 
 4.4.3 Scar removal and reasons                           120 
4.5 Bodies, feelings and self-injury                 122 
CHAPTER 5 - EMOTION INCARNATE 
5.1 Introduction                   125 
5.2 Control                    125 
 5.2.1 Control over ‘feelings’                 126 
 5.2.2 Control and release                 128 
 5.2.3 Power and control                            133 
5.3 Expression and invalidation                 136 
 5.3.1 Self-injury as emotional expression               136 
 5.3.2 Emotional repression and self-injury               138 
5.3.3 Invalidation                             141 
5.4 Emotions and social life                  145 
 5.4.1 Being emotional ‘appropriately’               146 
 5.4.2 Emotional authenticity and visible pain               149 
5.5 Emotions and self-injury                             151 
CHAPTER 6 - SELF-INJURY, HELP-SEEKING AND ATTENTION 
SEEKING 
6.1 Introduction                  153 
 6.1.1 Synopsis                  153 
 6.1.2 Help-seeking and attention-seeking: problems and contradictions     154 
6.2 Routes to and forms of formal help-seeking                155 
 6.2.1 The whole person: support for the ‘self-injurer’            156 
 12 
 6.2.2 The wound: treating the injuries                   161 
6.3 Experiences of help-seeking                           166 
 6.3.1 Negotiating self-injury                           166 
 6.3.2 Horror stories                 169 
 6.3.3 More hopeful indications                                                                     172 
6.4 Attention-seeking                                                                                                173 
 6.4.1 Negative accounts of – that is ‘not me’                                               173 
 6.4.2 Accepting the charge                                                                           176 
 6.4.3 Resisting negative moral interpretations                                             179 
6.5 Contradictory narratives                                                                                     180 
CHAPTER 7 - DISPLAY AND REVELATION: SELF-INJURY IN 
INFORMAL INTERPERSONAL CONTEXTS 
7.1 Introduction                   185 
7.2 Communication about self-injury in the family              186 
 7.2.1 Supportive families, silencing atmospheres             186 
 7.2.2 Silent families                 191 
 7.2.3 Extreme negative reactions                193 
7.3 Communicating about self-injury out-with the family in informal                    194 
situations 
 7.3.1 Responding to questions about scars, marks and wounds                   195 
 7.3.2 Negotiating the (unspoken) ‘assumptions’ of others                           199 
7.4 Hiding, revealing and display                202 
 7.4.1 Deciding to reveal                203 
 7.4.2 Hiding: reasons and justifications              205 
 7.4.3 ‘Just’ revealing/displaying               207 
7.5 Power, bodies and inter-personal contexts                                                         209 
CHAPTER 8 - ACCOUNTS AND AUTHENTIC PAIN: BODY, SOCIETY 
AND SELF-INJURY 
8.1 Introduction                                                                                                        213 
8.2.1 Emotion work                  215 
 8.2.2 Examples of self-injury as (embodied) emotion work                        216 
 8.2.3 Emotion work and the body               222 
 13 
8.3.1 Authentic pain: the body as an ‘authentic site’ for the expression                  222 
of emotional pain 
 8.3.2 Self-injury and authentic pain                         224 
 8.3.3 Self-injuring authentically                                                                  226 
8.4.1 Motivation, accounts and self-injury                                                              228 
8.4.2 Accounting for self-injury               229 
8.4.3 Considering the nature and contexts of accounts                                235 
8.5 Conclusion                                                                                                          236 
CHAPTER 9 - PAIN INCARNATE: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
9.1 Introduction                                                                                                        239 
9.2 Exploring self-injured bodies: methodological reflections                                239 
9.2.1 Life stories and lived experience                                                         239 
9.2.2 Limitations                                                                                           240 
9.3 Discussion of findings                                                                                        242 
 9.3.1 The importance of practice                                                                  242 
 9.3.2 Attending to the wounds: the importance of visibility and feeling      244 
 9.3.3 Authenticity, self-injury, bodies and emotions                                    246 
9.4 Implications and future directions                                                                      247 
 9.4.1 Implications for practice                                                                      247 
 9.4.2 Future directions for research                                                              250 
9.5 An ending                                                                                                           252 
 
References                   253 
Appendices 
A: Recruitment poster                  267 
B: Consent form                  268 
C: Information sheet                             269 
D: Sample life-grid                                        270 
E: Second interview prompts                 271           





Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Overview of sample      page 72 
Figure 1: Concept map      page 89 
 
 15 
Key to transcriptions 
 
Guide to transcriptions 
 
“quotes from participants are italicised” 
 
“bold text in quotes indicates my emphasis” 
 
“underlined text in quotes indicates the participant’s emphasis” 
 
“[…]” indicates text has been cut from the quote. 
 
“……” indicates a pause in talk. 
 
“-------“ indicates unclear talk, obscured either by background noise or poor 
recording. 
 
“hehehe” and “hahaha” indicates laughter 
 
“mmm” and “mhm” and “errm” etc. indicate participants’ verbal inflections. 
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This thesis, and the research upon which it is based, concerns the narratives of people 
who self-injure. Self-injury here is defined as occurring where an individual cuts, 
burns, hits, or otherwise damages the outside of their body. Self-injury is known by 
many different names, however, and definitional confusion continues to plague 
research and writing on the matter. In particular, self-injury is often conflated with 
wider self-injurious behaviours such as self-poisoning, overdosing, eating disorders, 
and more ‘decorative’ practices like tattooing, piercing and scarification (body 
modification) (Hewitt, 1997). The term self-harm, or deliberate self-harm (DSH), is 
particularly problematic – sometimes referring to self-injury as defined in this thesis, 
while at other times used to refer to a much broader range of behaviours, especially 
self-poisoning.  
 
Behaviours that are referred to collectively as self-harm and body modification are 
certainly related. All involve some attempt to change or alter one’s body, and 
through this, perhaps, to modify one’s self. However, it is my contention that, 
although related, in order to fully comprehend these behaviours they should also be 
examined separately. I suggest that self-injury holds qualitatively different meanings 
from self-poisoning, eating disorders, and body modification. Relatedly, this thesis 
will highlight the very different material consequences and practices that are specific 
to self-injury. I will demonstrate that these various practices and consequences can 
be related to diverse meanings and understandings particular to self-injury. 
 
This thesis focuses upon the bodily and embodied aspects of the behaviour. Despite 
being a behaviour which irrevocably concerns and implicates bodies, the majority of 
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existing research has tended to overlook the corporeal aspects and practices 
associated with self-injury. In contrast, this thesis places the self-injured bodies of 
my participants, and their experiences and understandings of ‘being’ someone who 
has self-injured, at the centre of my analyses. This focus allows for a closer 
examination of self-injury within biographical, interpersonal and socio-cultural 
contexts.  
 
As has been previously established, bodies should be central to sociological analysis, 
since it is within and through our bodies that we experience social life (Shilling, 
2005; Williams & Bendelow, 1998). Our understandings of biography, life-stories 
and personal-narratives are shaped by changing bodies, aging, illness, birth and death 
(Frank, 1995; Gimlin, 2006; Smith & Sparkes, 2008; Sparkes & Smith, 2003). 
Further, in social interactions it is bodies that are at the forefront – the visible, 
sensory ‘front’ of social life (Crossley, 1995; Goffman, 1968; 1973). More than this, 
theorists have suggested that structural and cultural forces are ‘played out’ upon and 
through the body. This is understood to occur in concrete, institutional ways as in 
Foucauldian approaches,  where bodies are managed and disciplined; and also in 
more implicit ways: from, Mauss’ ‘body techniques’ (Crossley, 2007; Williams & 
Bendelow, 1998, 49-50), to Bourdieu’s (1990) habitus and ‘feel for the game’, to 
Giddens’(1991) reflexive body projects.  
 
This thesis is a narrative exploration of self-injury and embodiment. My approach is 
inspired by the classic illness narrative work of Kleinman (1988) and Frank (1995). 
Thus, I attend to the lived experience of people who self-injure, and this is accessed 
through an analysis of narratives elicited during my research interviews.   
 
In this introduction I will provide background and context to the research. I will 
elaborate upon the definitional concerns raised above, providing further justification 
for my use of the term self-injury, whilst acknowledging the limitations and 
associated problems. I then introduce some contextual information regarding current 
understandings and concerns about self-injury. This establishes the importance of the 
research presented in this thesis. Leading from this, I present the aims of the 
research, indicating the research questions that informed the early stages of my 
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research practice. Finally, I provide an overview of the chapters that comprise the 
remainder of the thesis.  
 
1.2 Definitions: from parasuicide to body marking: why self-
injury? 
 
Self-injury has also been called self-harm, self-mutilation, self-wounding, body 
marking, parasuicide, self-injurious behaviour (SIB), non-suicidal self-injurious 
behaviour (NSSI), to name just a few. These different terms are problematic for a 
variety of reasons. I begin this section by addressing those terms which attempt to 
ascribe or avoid ascription of suicidal motivations to self-injury. I then discuss in 
more detail the problems surrounding the differential application of self-harm and 
DSH. Finally I turn to debates regarding the allegedly proscriptive (Inckle, 2007) 
nature of terms such as self-mutilation and, arguably, self-injury.  
 
1.2.1 Suicidal motivations: parasuicide, non-suicidal self-injury, 
self-harm 
 
Debates continue to rage regarding the relationship between self-injury and suicide. 
Historically, self-injury and self-harm have been understood as suicidal behaviours 
(Adler & Adler, 2005). However, the exact relationship between self-injury, self-
harm and suicide is difficult to ascertain. This leads primarily from the difficulty of 
retrospectively assigning motives to behaviours, an issue which has long been a 
problem in suicide research (Bancroft et al., 1976; Hawton & Van Heeringen, 2002). 
Although in some cases self-harm (broadly) might be understood as a ‘failed’ suicide 
attempt (Jeffery, 1979); self-injury has, even in historical psychiatric literature, been 
understood as a method of avoiding suicide (Shaw, 2002). This suggestion was first 
put forward by Menninger who, from a psychoanalytic perspective, argued that self-
injury was “an attempt at self-healing, or at least self-preservation” (1935, in Shaw 
2002: 195). This understanding is also found in more recent literature which reports 
the accounts of people who self-injure, who similarly argue that their behaviour is 
 20 
categorically not suicidal: that it is life-affirming, rather than life-destroying 
(Cresswell, 2005a: 1673). 
 
However, it is likely that important social factors will be implicated in the motives 
that are provided for self-injury or self-harm. Sociological studies have demonstrated 
that motivations and justifications are reliant upon and affected by existing socio-
cultural understandings regarding appropriate and inappropriate behaviour (Mills, 
1940; Scott & Lyman, 1968). Thus, Jeffery (1979) found that patients presenting 
with self-harm in an Accident and Emergency (A&E) department were treated more 
kindly if they were thought to have ‘really’ tried to kill themselves. Similarly, 
Bancroft and colleagues (1976) suggested that patients may have actually used more 
severe methods to harm themselves in order to ensure that their behaviour was 
viewed as suicidal, and thus taken more seriously. 
 
In clinical literature there remains a split, however, between approaches to the study 
of self-injury and self-harm which view the behaviours as distinct from suicide, and 
those that examine them all as potential suicides, but seek to avoid ascribing motive. 
The terms self-harm and DSH are especially problematic in this sense. US studies 
use the terms to refer to self-injury (as defined in this thesis) ‘without suicidal intent’ 
(e.g. Gratz, 2003). However, in the UK, DSH and self-harm usually refer to any self-
harming behaviour, regardless of intent. The International Classification of Diseases 
also makes no distinction between suicidal and non-suicidal self-harm (Nock, 
2009b). There is disagreement, then, regarding: a) how far motivation can ever be 
accurately ascertained; b) whether self-harm refers to self-injury or more broadly to 
self-injury and self-poisoning; c) whether there are important differences between 
suicidal and non-suicidal self-injury. Indeed, Nock and colleagues have recently 
reignited this debate, arguing that there are important differences between suicidal 
and non-suicidal self-injury and that, regardless of the problems of ascertaining 
motivation, these should be studied as distinct behaviours (Nock, 2009b; Nock et al., 
2006; Nock & Kessler, 2006). 
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Notwithstanding the (unresolved) problems associated with attempting to ascertain 
the extent of ‘suicidal’ motivation, the suggestion that suicidal and non-suicidal self-
injury should be studied separately is also problematic because there is some 
evidence to suggest that, within individuals, the distinction is sometimes blurred. 
Solomon and Farand (1996), for instance, reported the narratives of young women 
who had self-injured. Most of the women were clear that their self-injury was not 
suicidal; however, one also noted that occasionally when she was ‘out of control’ her 
self-injury was suicidal. This example illustrates the complexity of the issue. I would 
suggest that any attempt to strictly separate off suicidal from non-suicidal self-injury 
might run the risk of silencing or overlooking the messy, multifaceted stories of 
individuals who may themselves not always be clear of their motivation, and whose 
motivation may change. These concerns are discussed further in Chapters 8 and 9, 
using Mills’ (1940) vocabularies of motive and Scott and Lyman’s (1968) work on 
accounts. My own analysis highlights the importance and necessity of sociological 
perspectives with regard to understanding motivations and constructions of suicide 
and self-injury. 
 
The relationship between self-injury and suicide is further complicated because it is 
widely reported that there is a statistical relationship between self-injury and suicide 
(Jacobson & Gould, 2007). Indeed research often highlights the importance of self-
harm as an important risk factor in completed suicide (O'Connor et al., 2009). 
However, it should be noted that a relationship between self-injury and suicide has 
only been identified in clinical samples (Nelson & Grunebaum, 1971 in Hawton et 
al., 2004, 200). As far as I know, no research has yet been carried out which attempts 
to ascertain how far untreated self-harm or self-injury might be associated with 
completed suicide.  
 
1.2.2 Definitional confusion: deliberate self-harm, self-poisoning, 
self-injury 
 
My decision to use the term self-injury rather than self-harm was influenced by my 
experience of doing research on self-harm as part of my undergraduate dissertation in 
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2003. Through doing this research I became aware of the inconsistent use of 
terminology around self-harm. In particular, I discovered that self-harm was 
sometimes used to refer to self-injury (as defined in this paper), but other times 
referred mainly to self-poisoning or overdoses. As indicated above, Jacobsen and 
Gould (2007) have since confirmed that part of this difference relates to geographical 
differences in the use of the terms self-harm and DSH. These differences persist, and 
much UK research continues to use the terms self-harm or DSH to refer to a range of 
behaviours including self-injury and self-poisoning, while US research uses the same 
terms to refer to self-injury alone. 
 
There are, however, important differences between self-injury and self-poisoning. 
These differences, I contend, will have important effects regarding the lived 
experience of those practising the behaviours. Research has consistently found that 
cases of self-harm treated in A&E departments are more likely to be self-poisoning 
(Hawton et al., 2004; Horrocks et al., 2003; Taylor & Cameron, 1998). Studies have 
found around 90% of self-harm presentations at A&E are overdoses (Rasmussen et 
al., 2010). In contrast, community based studies of self-harm have indicated that the 
majority of those reporting self-harm have self-injured. These studies tend to use 
adolescent samples and find that of the approximately 13% indicating a life-time 
history of self-harm, around 30% had overdosed, while around 65% had self-injured 
(De Leo & Heller, 2004; Hawton et al., 2002). Studies that have examined self-harm 
and self-injury in community samples found correspondingly low rates of help-
seeking. Hawton et al (2002) found that of those reporting self-harm, only 12.6% 
reported attending hospital as a result, with 23% of those who self-poisoned 
attending hospital, compared to 6% of those who reported cutting themselves. Thus, 
it is clear that although A&E statistics show self-poisoning to be the most prevalent 
form of self-harm, community samples demonstrate that self-injury is more common 
(at least in adolescent samples). Leading from the clinically conspicuous nature of 
self-poisoning, research into self-injury has been historically sidelined. Further, due 
to the definitional problems outlined above, research with samples who have self-
poisoned has been used to explain self-injury (Chandler et al., 2010).  
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I chose to use the term self-injury because, especially in the UK context in which this 
research was conducted, this was a more precise description of the behaviours in 
which I was interested: self-cutting, burning and hitting. Following Crouch and 
Wright (2004) I was clear that these behaviours were qualitatively distinct from other 
self-harming behaviours, particularly overdoses. The embodied, sociological nature 
of my approach was especially important in indicating potentially significant 
differences in the lived experiences of self-injury versus self-poisoning. While self-
poisoning and self-injury both involve damage to the body, in most cases, the 
damage caused by self-injury is far more visible and apparent. In some cases, the 
visible damage left when a person self-injures is permanent. It was my contention 
that the visibility of self-injury would lead to quite different social consequences. 
Further, the corporeal practices involved in self-injury can be seen as distinct from 
those involved in self-poisoning. When an individual self-poisons they ingest a 
substance (most often pills or tablets, though occasionally caustic poisons are 
swallowed
1
). The damage done is largely unseen (though there will of course be 
exceptions depending upon what is swallowed). When an individual injures the 
outside of their body, however, there are immediate effects, including blood, marks, 
redness, wounds and/or broken bones. Later there will be bruising, scabs, blisters and 
swelling. Later still there may be scars and even permanent disability. This thesis 
explores the embodied, lived experience of self-injury. It is my contention that this 
will differ markedly from the embodied, lived experience of self-poisoning.  
 
1.2.3 Morally charged definitions: self-mutilation to body marking  
 
The term self-mutilation is particularly common in literature from the late 20
th
 
century, and is still used in some literature (Farber et al., 2007; Hicks & Hinck, 
2008). Most prominently, some psychiatric literature continues to use the term 
(Favazza, 1996; Favazza, 1998; Nock & Prinstein, 2005; Resch et al., 2008). This is 
no doubt related to the position and description of self-injury in the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) IV (1994). In the 
                                                 
1
 In different cultural contexts forms of self-harm vary. For instance, in South Asia, self-poisoning 
using pesticides is more common (Konradsen et al 2006). In the UK, self-poisoning primarily 
involves overdoses of analgesics or psychiatric medicine (Hawton et al 2004). 
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DSM IV self-injury is referred to as self-mutilation, where it appears as one of the 
criteria for a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder (BPD).  
 
In a rather different vein, radical feminist writers have used the term self-mutilation 
more politically. Sheila Jeffreys (2000; 2006) has argued that self-injury should 
rightly be called self-mutilation, along with body modification, eating disorders, 
cosmetic surgery and the wearing of high-heels. Jeffreys contends that these 
behaviours are carried out disproportionately by women and gay men, and that they 
reflect the heterosexist and patriarchal nature of Western societies. Jeffreys’ analysis 
is problematic on a number of levels.  Most importantly, her research entirely negates 
individual agency. This leads from her research practice, which is based exclusively 
on secondary accounts and a limited reading of existing literature on self-injury. 
Jeffreys accepts, for instance, the understanding that it is almost solely a ‘female’ 
behaviour, a position I critique in section 1.3 and elsewhere (Chandler et al., 2010).  
 
Self-mutilation is a morally and politically charged term, and one I preferred to avoid 
because it implies a specific understanding of self-injury as mutilative. This was not 
a perspective I myself shared, and others have noted that it is not necessarily the way 
in which other people who self-injure view their behaviour (Adler & Adler, 2005). 
 
Inckle (2005; 2007) has argued that the term self-injury is equally proscriptive and 
limiting. She suggests that the term ‘body marking’ be used instead, as this avoids 
making assumptions about intention and distinguishing between, for instance, 
decoration or ‘injury’. This approach reflects Inckle’s concern with the similarities 
between behaviours categorised as body modification and those classed as self-
injury. Inckle’s project involved exposing normative assumptions regarding what is 
classed as ‘decoration’ and what is ‘injury’. Although Inckle’s work is instructive 
and important in challenging understandings about self-injury, my own research aims 
required a different approach. In contrast to Inckle, I was interested specifically in 
the experiences and understandings of people who had cut, burnt or hit themselves, 
and who defined this as self-injury. I would suggest that although it is important to 
highlight potential similarities between self-injury and body modification, there are 
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important differences – both in the way these are understood by those whose bodies 
are ‘marked’, but also in the way that these marks are interpreted and reacted to by 
others. These differences may not be experienced in the same way by all people; 
however, I was confident that my approach to the research would allow diverse 
understandings to be challenged and discussed.  
 
Throughout the thesis I have purposefully avoided using the terms ‘self-injurer’ or 
‘self-harmer’. This reflects my concern that these labels are similarly morally and 
politically charged. Some authors have found evidence that for some people who 
self-injure, an important aspect of their identity is that of ‘self-harmer/self-injurer’ 
(Whitlock et al., 2006b). My research is primarily concerned with the perspectives of 
people who self-injure, and is premised on the idea that these perspectives will be 
diverse. The use of labels such as ‘self-injurer’ would be problematic for a number of 
reasons: the term implies a distinct category of person; the term may lead to lazy 
theorisation, suggesting that explanations and understandings will be shared by all 
‘self-injurers’; the label may be rejected by the person it is applied to; finally, for 
some people who have self-injured, the behaviour may have been transitory and 
incidental, thus, applying a label to such a person would be particularly 
inappropriate.  
 
1.3 Self-injury: research context 
 
This section introduces aspects of existing knowledge about self-injury. In particular, 
I discuss current understandings of the prevalence of self-injury and examine 
relevant debates around which categories of people are understood to self-injure. 
Finally, I briefly discuss my own position in relation to the research. 
 
1.3.1 Prevalence of self-injury 
 
Self-injury is characterised as a ‘hidden’ behaviour (National Inquiry into Self-Harm 
Among Young People, 2006). This leads from the finding described above (Section 
1.2.2), which demonstrated that self-injury is under-represented in official hospital-
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based statistics. Self-injury is also described as being ‘secretive’ by people who self-
injure, and this aspect is readily noted in user-led support groups on the internet 
(www.firstsigns.org; www.nshn.co.uk) and in published research (Adler & Adler, 
2007; Cresswell, 2005a; Hodgson, 2004; Solomon & Farand, 1996). However, this is 
contrasted with an equally prevalent view that self-injury is an ‘attention seeking’ act 
(Jacobson & Gould, 2007). This perspective is seen more often in psychiatric 
literature (Nock & Prinstein, 2005), and the contrast between these different 
understandings (self-injury as secretive versus self-injury as attention seeking) is 
discussed at length at several points in this thesis.  
 
Despite the allegedly ‘hidden’ nature of self-injury, there are corresponding claims 
that the behaviour is increasing in prevalence, and has been since the mid 1990s 
(Adler & Adler, 2005; National Inquiry into Self-Harm Among Young People, 
2006), giving rides to greater amounts of academic and media attention. However, 
related to its ‘hidden’ nature, there are no reliable statistics regarding rates of either 
self-injury or self-harm in the general population. There are statistics relating to 
hospital admissions, but as indicated above, these are likely to record only a small 
proportion of all people who have self-injured. There has been only one study which 
has measured self-injury in a randomly sampled, general population. Briere and Gil’s 
(1998) research, carried out in the U.S., reported that 4% of their sample reported 
that they had self-injured in the previous six months. The short time-scale Briere and 
Gil attached to their question about self-injury probably resulted in a much lower rate 
than would otherwise have been found. Life-time prevalence of self-harm in school-
based studies, for instance, has been recorded at between 12% and 14% (De Leo & 
Heller, 2004; Hawton et al., 2002; Ross & Heath, 2002). In addition to these school-
based studies, others have examined the prevalence of self-injury in specific adult 
populations. Samples of college students have found rates of 17 to 20% (Croyle & 
Waltz, 2007; Whitlock et al., 2006a). Klonsky et al (2003) examined a group of 
military recruits, with 4% reporting a history of self-injury, though this study did not 
use very precise definitions.  
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Concerns regarding apparently increasing rates of self-injury are heightened due to 
the alleged relationship between self-injury and suicide. As noted above, self-harm is 
understood to be an important risk factor in predicting future suicide. This is 
formulated in the understanding that of those who have completed suicide, around 
30%-40% will have a history of self-harm (O'Connor et al., 2006). However, with 
regard to self-injury specifically, the picture is less clear. For instance, the latter 
statistic relates to clinically treated self-harm in a UK context: therefore the majority 
of such cases are likely to be self-poisoning. In fact, very little is known about the 
future suicide risk of the majority of people who self-injure, and who do not appear 
to seek help, as they will not be represented in official (hostpital-based) statistics. 
Similarly, of the 40%-50% of completed suicides with a history of self-harm, it is 
unclear whether this refers to cases of self-injury, self-poisoning or both.  
 
1.3.2 Who self-injures? 
 
Due to the dearth of information about self-injury, especially in community samples, 
there are limited understandings regarding the types of people who self-injure. There 
is a popular, though increasingly challenged, belief that self-injury is practised 
mainly or solely by women (Chandler et al., 2010). This assumption appears to lead 
from a historical tendency in psychiatry to identify and associate self-injury with 
female patients (Brickman, 2004; Chandler et al., 2010). Brickman demonstrated 
how male self-injury was downplayed or dismissed by psychiatric discourse, 
suggesting that this led from psychiatrists’ reluctance to interpret self-injury as a 
masculine, violent behaviour. Brickman showed that self-injury was instead 
reinterpreted as ‘delicate self-cutting’ and framed as a female, feminine behaviour. 
The understanding that self-injury is a largely female behaviour probably arose from 
the clinical nature of most existing studies. Clinical studies have historically been 
based upon in-patient samples, which are likely to contain more women anyway 
(Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999). Further, research has focused particularly on patients with 
BPD. As noted above, self-injury is one of the criteria for this diagnosis. However, 
BPD is also far more often identified in women (Bjorklund, 2006). Finally, the 
understanding that self-injury is a female behaviour has led to a slew of research 
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(Abrams & Gordon, 2003; Huband & Tantam, 2004; Machoian, 2001; Reece, 2005; 
Suyemoto & MacDonald, 1995) and theorisation (Kilby, 2001; Shaw, 2002) which 
focuses only on females. Thus, this understanding becomes self-perpetuating: as 
more research on self-injury is carried out with women, so it becomes a more 
entrenched understanding that the behaviour is only carried out by women. More 
recently, this view has been challenged (Gratz & Chapman, 2007; Klonsky & 
Muehlenkamp, 2007), however some recent work continues to maintain that self-
injury is a female behaviour (Jeffreys, 2006; Shaw, 2002). 
 
Community studies report different findings regarding the ratio of male to female 
self-injury. Briere and Gil (1998) found equal numbers of men and women reporting 
self-injury. Similarly, Klonsky et al (2003) found no gender difference in reporting 
of self-harm in their study of U.S. military recruits. Studies with adolescents have 
generally found more females than males reporting self-injury (Ross & Heath, 2002; 
Young et al., 2007). Information about rates in the UK tend to be problematic, since 
most record cases of self-harm (meaning self-injury and self-poisoning) and 
frequently do not include data on gender by method (e.g. Hawton et al., 2002; 
O'Connor et al., 2009). One exception to this is research carried out by Young and 
colleagues (2007) on adolescents in Scotland, which found that females were more 
likely to report both self-cutting and self-poisoning, while males were more likely to 
report self-burning and self-battery.  This parallels Ross and Heath’s (2002) 
contention that they were able to identify more males reporting self-injury because 
they included self-battery in their definition. To date, these potentially important 
gender differences in terms of methods of self-harm remain under-researched. 
Although it seems likely that more women do self-injure, most community studies 
indicate that anywhere from one third to one half of those reporting self-injury are 
male (Briere & Gil, 1998; Croyle & Waltz, 2007; Klonsky et al., 2003; Ross & 
Heath, 2002). Therefore, a continued focus on female only samples is unjustified. 
 
Self-injury is also generally understood to be practised by ‘young people’ (Chandler 
et al., 2010). Research has, with one exception, found that (in clinical samples) self-
injury begins in adolescence (Nock et al., 2006; Suyemoto & MacDonald, 1995). 
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Nijman et al (1999) found that the mean age at first self-injury in their clinical 
sample was 23. Certainly, community studies have found higher rates of self-injury 
among adolescent samples (12-14%) compared to adult samples (4%). However, as 
discussed above, studies on community samples of adults are limited, and the one 
general population sample asked about self-injury in the previous six months only 
(Briere & Gil, 1998). There are parallel concerns that self-harm is becoming 
increasingly prevalent among young people (National Inquiry into Self-Harm 
Among Young People, 2006), and some suggest that this is in part related to the 
increased awareness of the behaviour (Adler & Adler, 2007). It is difficult to 
ascertain whether this actually is the case, as there is no historical data regarding 
rates of self-injury in the community. The greater recognition of self-injury may well 
be in part related to greater awareness among lay and clinical groups or increased 
help-seeking.  
 
Information regarding rates of self-injury according to other demographic criteria is 
also limited. There does appear to be some indication that people identifying as bi-
sexual or homosexual may be more likely to self-injure (Skegg et al., 2003). Existing 
research has tended to find little difference in reporting of self-injury according to 
ethnic group (Ross & Heath, 2002). However, there have been some suggestions that 
in the UK, young women of south Asian origin may be more at risk of self-harm 
(Marshall & Yadzani, 1999). Conversely, other studies have indicated that Caucasian 
adolescents are statistically more likely to report self-injury (Hawton et al., 2002).  
 
Results regarding socio-economic group are equally contradictory. The few 
community studies that have recorded relevant information report no differences 
according to markers of socio-economic position or background. However, other 
papers argue that self-injury is more common among middle class groups (Hodgson, 
2004; Zila & Kiselica, 2001), or working class and unemployed groups (Favazza & 
Conterio, 1989). Suggestions that self-injury is practised more often by middle-class 
people tend to be made in psychoanalytic journals; while suggestions that it is 
practised more often by less affluent groups are found more often in psychiatric 
journals. It seems likely, therefore, that these different findings reflect the different 
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patient groups with which these disciplines engage (Chandler et al., 2010; Woldorf, 
2005).  
 
Self-injury, then, appears to be relatively common, with between 4% and 8% of 
people in community samples injuring themselves in the past 12 months (Briere & 
Gil, 1998; Klonsky et al., 2003). Up to 14% of adolescent samples report a lifetime 
prevalence of self-injury (Young et al., 2007). It is not clear whether rates are 
actually increasing or whether the behaviour is rather being more readily identified 
and reported. Although it has previously been understood that self-injury is carried 
out largely by women and young people, this is increasingly challenged. It is now 
generally accepted that both men and women self-injure, and that self-injury is not 
only carried out during adolescence. Nevertheless, research remains limited. Clinical 
perspectives continue to dominate, and little is known about self-injury in adult 
community samples. 
 
1.3.3 Personal perspective 
 
An important aspect of the context of this research is my own experience with self-
injury. My interest in the topic is irrevocably tied up with my personal involvement 
with, and experience of, self-injury. I self-injured both regularly and intermittently 
between the ages of 12 and 26, primarily through self-cutting, but occasionally 
through self-battery. This close relationship with the subject matter has certainly 
informed my research practice. As a result of my self-injury I have many scars, 
which at present I choose to cover. Having such scars and living with them day to 
day informed my interest in how others negotiated having such marks. My personal 
experience of making wounds, marks and scars upon my body, made me aware of 
important narratives that appeared to be missing from existing literature. The 
embodied, messy, bloody and felt aspects of self-injury were rarely discussed. These 
concerns are not particular to me, or to self-injury. Others have noted the often 
disembodied nature of academic work ostensibly about bodies (Inckle, 2007; 
Sparkes, 1999; Williams & Bendelow, 1998). Indeed, most literature has tended to 
gloss over the details of what people who self-injured actually do. My research 
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practice was further led by my knowledge of others’ self-injury. In particular, I knew 
many men who self-injured, and this made me especially critical of the absence of 
male perspectives in existing literature. 
 
In some senses, this research can be seen as offering an ‘insider’ perspective into 
self-injury. However, I am cautious about making such claims. Others have noted the 
problems associated with claiming ‘insider’ status (Merton, 1972), and I wanted to 
avoid such pitfalls as far as possible. In particular, I sought to avoid assuming 
‘sameness’ between my own and my participants’ experiences and accounts 
(Cornwall & Jewkes, 1995). Nevertheless, my own experiences with self-injury are 
highly relevant to my research practice. I discuss this point further in Chapter 3, and 
elsewhere throughout the thesis.  
 
1.4 Aims of the research 
 
The research was designed to explore the lived experience of self-injury. This was in 
response to the dearth of information and research regarding the understandings and 
experiences of people who self-injure. In particular, I aimed to investigate the lived 
experience of self-injury in a diverse group of people. Thus, I hoped to include men 
and women, from a range of socio-economic backgrounds, who had different 
experiences with both self-injury and medical and psychiatric services. The approach 
was exploratory, reflecting the lack of existing sociological work on the matter. A 
narrative approach to the research was taken, which would allow for a critical 
‘reading’ of the ways in which participants talked about their experiences with self-
injury. In this way, I was able to locate and link participants’ understandings of self-
injury with the biographical, interpersonal and socio-cultural contexts they described.  
 
Data collection focused on self-injury specifically, but was also oriented towards 
participants’ broader life-stories. This wide focus was designed to explore the 
relationships between participants’ understandings and meanings with regard to their 
self-injury, and the broader biographical, interpersonal and socio-cultural contexts in 
which their self-injury took place. The research was concerned with the practices and 
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practical aspects of self-injury, and of being someone who had self-injured. Analysis 
focused upon the ways in which each of these elements of the lived experience of 
self-injury were narrated.  
 
1.5 Overview of thesis 
 
This chapter has introduced some of the background context to this thesis. I have 
introduced my own definition of self-injury; briefly discussed the terminological 
problems associated with self-injury; and explained my reasons for using the term. I 
then provided an overview of current knowledge regarding the prevalence of self-
injury, highlighting some of the difficulties associated with attempts to assess 
prevalence and incidence in different social groups. I noted my own position with 
regard to the research. Finally, I provided an overview of the aims of the research. 
 
Chapter 2 expands upon and develops themes raised in this introduction, with a 
review of relevant literature on self-injury and self-harm. Moving on from issues 
relating to prevalence, this chapter will examine in detail some of the common 
understandings regarding self-injury and self-harm. I demonstrate that these existing 
understandings are limited, as they are based on studies which use restricted samples 
and methods. I critically discuss existing sociological work on self-injury. I then 
discuss the theoretical framework I will use for this thesis, introducing sociological 
theories relating to bodies, emotions and self.  
 
Chapter 3 presents my methodology, detailing the ways that I planned to conduct the 
research, along with what I actually did. My methodological approach was broadly 
feminist, reflecting ethical and political concerns (Stanley & Wise, 1993). I present a 
critical and reflexive discussion of my research practice. Recruitment is discussed, 
and the final sample is briefly introduced. I then critically examine the research 
interviews, detailing my changing practices. In particular, I highlight my largely 
unsuccessful attempts to engage participants in collaborative analysis. I then discuss 
how the interview data were analysed. This provides an account of the ways that my 
practice altered, and my attempts to ‘do’ both narrative and thematic analysis.  
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Chapter 4 begins to introduce the data generated by the research. This chapter serves 
to ground the remaining chapters, focusing upon participants’ narratives about the 
practical aspects of their self-injury. I examine the different stories participants told 
about the ‘first time’ they had self-injured, the ways that pain was implicated in 
participants’ narratives, and the importance of making and caring for wounds. 
Important themes emerge here, including: authenticity; bodies; and sensations. I 
suggest that the way in which some participants’ narrated their experiences with self-
injury appeared to be oriented around claims of authenticity. Bodies are shown to be 
central to participants’ experience with self-injury, and this chapter in particular 
highlights the diverse ways in which self-injury was practised. Through a focus on 
participants’ talk about pain, this chapter introduces the importance of the sensations 
that self-injury is understood to elicit. This chapter also begins to develop the 
importance of social context in understandings of self-injury. My analysis here 
strives to be sensitive to temporal aspects – self-injury is located by participants in 
their wider biography. Practices and their consequences are shown to change over 
time and through participants’ life-histories. Interpersonal considerations are also 
shown to be significant. Participants’ understandings and interpretations of their 
behaviour are developed through interactions with others. Finally, wider socio-
cultural contexts are implicated. The ways in which participants talked about their 
bodies, their self-injury and associated sensations drew on wider socio-cultural 
narratives. In particular, bio-medical models of pain were evident, and this 
discussion highlights the continued relevance of Cartesian dualism to lay 
understandings of bodies (Bendelow & Williams, 1998).  
 
Chapter 5 extends and develops themes around sensation and embodiment, through a 
focus upon participants’ talk about emotions. My analysis of participants’ narratives 
regarding emotions and self-injury contributes to existing sociological work which 
has increasingly emphasised both the embodied, socially situated and mediated 
nature of emotions (Lupton, 1998b; Williams & Bendelow, 1998). Difficulties in 
communicating or expressing emotions are shown to be an important aspect of some 
participants’ narratives. I demonstrate how participants drew upon existing socio-
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cultural models of emotions, particularly characterising emotions in terms of control 
and release, and illustrating the ways in which these understandings were used in 
their explanations of their self-injury. This chapter also suggests that self-injury can 
be understood as an embodied method of doing emotion work (Hochschild, 1979; 
1983, 2003). This concept is shown to be a useful way of exploring the ways that 
some participants described their self-injury as working practically.  
 
Chapters 6 and 7 are closely related, each addressing different aspects of 
communication about self-injury. These chapters further extend themes raised in the 
preceding chapter, emphasising the importance of interpersonal relationships and 
exchanges in the lived experience of self-injury.  
 
Chapter 6 examines participants’ narratives about formal ‘help-seeking’ and the 
related theme of ‘attention seeking’. I begin with a critical analysis of the problems 
entailed by these related terms. I highlight the difficulty of identifying ‘help seeking’, 
along with the morally charged way in which both ‘help-seeking’ and ‘attention-
seeking’ appear to be understood. With these qualifications in mind, I go on to 
examine participants’ narratives about formal ‘help-seeking’. I discuss those who 
sought help for their ‘self’ as a person who had self-injured, before turning to 
narratives around help sought specifically for the wounds created by self-injury. A 
diverse and complex picture is presented. Some participants described little or no 
formal ‘help-seeking’. Others had sought and received help from a wide and varied 
range of sources. Participants’ experiences with formal services were equally varied. 
However, in accordance with previous work, many participants report that they had 
particularly negative, even damaging, interactions with these services. My analysis of 
these narratives suggests some possible reasons why negative stories tend to 
predominate. In particular, I suggest that the complexity of socio-cultural 
understandings regarding ‘help’ and ‘attention’ seeking play an important role. This 
analysis highlights the importance of morality in understanding socio-cultural beliefs 
around ‘help-seeking’ behaviour.  
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Chapter 7 turns to communication about self-injury in more informal contexts. 
Participants’ narratives about their families were particularly significant here. 
Themes addressing emotional expression and repression, raised in Chapter 5, are 
further extended. Analysis of participants’ narratives suggests that, for most, 
communication around self-injury in their households during adolescence was 
described as problematic. I demonstrate that, even where self-injury was ‘known’ it 
was not necessarily discussed. I suggest that in such cases the lack of verbal 
communication about self-injury, and negative emotions more generally, forms a 
non-verbal signal that such behaviours and feelings are taboo. This then 
problematises existing understandings of self-injury as a ‘hidden’ behaviour. I argue 
that this is not the case: in many instances participants indicated that families and 
friends were aware of their self-injury, but that it was not mentioned. Thus, rather 
than being ‘hidden’, self-injury was more often ‘not spoken’.  This issue highlights 
the importance of the visual nature of self-injury, returning focus to the self-injured 
body and the centrality of this to the lived experience of self-injury. The second half 
of Chapter 7 analyses participants’ narratives regarding their management of these 
visual aspects of self-injury. These narratives centred upon their hiding and revealing 
practices. An examination of these narratives emphasises important differences in the 
ways that participants negotiated the marks created by their self-injury.  
 
Chapter 8 draws together themes introduced in chapters 4 – 7. I provide further 
discussion and analysis of the suggestion that self-injury may be usefully understood 
as a form of emotion work. I suggest that examining self-injury as a form of 
embodied emotion work highlights two important issues. Firstly, this understanding 
of self-injury provides an example of embodied sociology at work – demonstrating 
that the behaviour can only be fully accounted for by locating it within interpersonal 
and socio-cultural contexts. Secondly, this understanding highlights the insufficiency 
of some sociological work on emotions which continues to overlook their embodied 
nature. I then turn to the related theme of authenticity, highlighting its importance in 
participants’ narratives. I suggest that, in some cases, self-injury can be understood 
as a way of being ‘in pain’ authentically. I also suggest that authenticity is important 
to narratives of self-injury in other ways, as participants seek to injure themselves in 
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an ‘authentic’ manner, and to protect themselves against charges of inauthenticity or 
not ‘really’ self-injuring. Finally, I discuss the nature and contexts of the accounts 
that participants provided in the interviews. This draws together concerns raised 
throughout the thesis regarding the nature of accounts, and builds upon previous 
work which has highlighted the socially mediated nature of accounts of behaviour 
(Mills, 1940; Scott, 2004). 
 
Chapter 9 provides a final discussion of the methodological and theoretical concerns 
raised and discussed in the thesis. I begin by critically reflecting upon the life-story, 
narrative approach taken by the research. I then discuss some of the limitations of the 
research. In particular, I focus upon my recruitment and sampling; ethical and safety 
issues; and my attempts at doing ‘embodied’ research. Following this, I draw 
together significant themes from my findings. I suggest that the study has 
successfully demonstrated the importance and utility of investigating the practical, 
corporeal, visible and sensate nature of self-injury. Further, I note that attending to 
these aspects of self-injury enables a socially situated perspective, where the 
behaviour is both better understood and more understandable when examined within 
the biographical, interpersonal and socio-cultural contexts in which it takes place. 
Finally, I conclude the thesis with a discussion of implications of the findings for 







The purpose of this review is two-fold. Firstly, I give an overview of current 
academic understandings of self-injury. I highlight important contributions, and 
discuss some of the limitations of existing knowledge of self-injury. Secondly, I 
introduce hitherto under-used sociological perspectives which I argue should be 
central to providing a more rigorous and comprehensive approach to the study of 
self-injury. 
 
I demonstrate that current understandings of self-injury are overly dominated by 
clinical perspectives. This is problematic for a number of reasons. Clinical 
understandings are based on limited samples of medically treated patients, and 
therefore do not include the majority of people who self-injure, who are less likely to 
be in treatment. Clinical research tends to interpret self-injury individualistically and 
asocially. These interpretations obscure the impact of significant social and cultural 
influences.  
 
My discussion of existing understandings of self-injury incorporates both clinical and 
social scientific perspectives. Where relevant, I refer to studies on both self-harm and 
self-injury. This is necessary due to the lack of research explicitly about self-injury, 
and the frequently imprecise use of terminology, as a result of which it is often 
unclear exactly which behaviours are being addressed. This chapter will demonstrate 
that, due to the imprecise use of the term self-harm, understandings of self-injury and 
self-poisoning often become conflated. This is not ideal, and I maintain there are 
important differences between the two. However, this conflation is found across 
academic, grey and user-authored literature. Thus, although inexact, it is important 
that such explanations are included in this review.  
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Section 2.3 summarises existing literature and approaches to self-injury. I begin with 
psychological factors and psychiatric diagnoses associated with self-injury. I then 
turn to findings that have indicated the importance of social and interpersonal factors. 
Following this, I introduce work which has examined the functions of self-injury. 
Finally, I highlight the limited ways that bodies have been implicated in existing 
understandings.  
 
In section 2.4 I provide an overview of sociological theories which have informed 
my approach to the study of self-injury. This introduces my own perspective, as well 
as illustrating the theoretical framework that both informs and is extended by this 
thesis. In contrast to the majority of the work discussed in the first half of the 
chapter, this section highlights my concern with bodies, embodiment and identity, 
with emotions and emotionality, and with how these are located within and 
constitutive of social contexts. My approach to social context is three-fold and 
includes: the context of individuals’ life-stories; the context of their interpersonal 
relationships; and, finally, the cultural context in which these life-stories and 
relationships are played out.  
 





Identifying relevant literature was an ongoing and iterative process. At the beginning 
of the project I was aided in two important ways. Firstly I had already collected a 
good deal of literature on self-harm published prior to 2003, for my undergraduate 
dissertation. Secondly, I was given a database of literature on self-cutting among 
young people, generated by my second supervisor as part of his work for the 
National Inquiry into Self-Harm Among Young People (2006). In the early stages of 
the research (2005-6) these were supplemented by additional searches of literature 
databases, including ASSIA, Sociological Absracts, and the Social Sciences Citation 
Index. I used a variety of terms, including: self-injury, self-mutilation, self-harm, and 
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self-cutting. These searches were limited to English language, though no restrictions 
were put on the dates of publication. These initial searches quickly demonstrated the 
scarcity of sociological and social scientific work on both self-injury and self-harm. 
 
I widened the search to include clinical databases, using PsychInfo, PsychArticles 
and Medline. These searches generated far more results, a significant proportion of 
which concerned the self-injury of people with organic brain disorders. I omitted 
these papers, and restricted my attention to those papers that dealt with self-injury as 
defined in Chapter 1 (injuries to the outside of the body). As the research progressed, 
and I conducted more focused searches, I included papers that addressed either self-
harm (e.g. including self-injury and self-poisoning) or which did not specifically 
discuss methods. These focused searches were necessary as the clinical literature on 
self-injury and self-harm is vast, and has continued to grow rapidly over the five 
years since I began the research. Thus, once I began my data collection and analysis, 
I conducted further literature searches in relation to themes emerging from the 
research process (e.g. pain, impulsivity, scarring). It should also be noted that there 
have been significant changes and developments in clinical understandings of self-
injury and self-harm. I have attempted to indicate these changes where appropriate. 
 
In addition to published literature, I also monitored grey literature on self-harm and 
self-injury. My approach was wide-ranging, including monitoring news and media 
sources for reporting relating to self-injury, and conducting web searches for 
information about self-injury and self-harm. Through these searches I was able to 
identify and examine a number of websites offering support and information for self-
injury. Many of these were ‘user-led’, such as the prominent National Self-Harm 
Network (http://www.nshn.co.uk/), LifeSIGNS (http://www.firstsigns.org.uk/), and 
Recover Your Life (www.recoveryourlife.com). Many of these websites had open 
message boards where people who self-injured posted requests or offers of support, 
help and information about self-injury or associated problems. Further, some of the 
organisations involved in advocating for or raising awareness about self-injury also 
produced literature designed for a variety of audiences. These included reports, 
information leaflets and guidelines for parents, teachers, medical professionals and 
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friends and family of someone who had self-injured. Although this grey literature 
does not form a major part of the following review, where appropriate I draw on it to 
illustrate (admittedly particular and limited versions of) ‘lay’ or ‘user’ 
understandings.   
 
Literature discussed in the second half of this chapter was also located through 
various channels and wide-ranging methods. In the first instance, social scientific 
literature databases were used to identify sociological material addressing bodies, 
embodiment, emotions, communication, pain and other themes that arose throughout 
the research. I also received support and suggestions for further reading from 
colleagues at the University of Edinburgh, and at a number of national conferences I 
attended during the research.  
 
2.3 Existing research literature on self-injury 
 
Existing research literature on self-injury is overwhelmingly clinical in nature. Social 
scientific research and commentary is particularly scarce. As this review will 
demonstrate, this scarcity does not reflect the potential that social scientific 
approaches generally, and sociology specifically, have to contribute to improving 
understandings of self-injury. The continued dominance of clinical understandings 
and interpretations of self-injury is problematic. The research tends to be based on 
limited clinical samples, generally female and psychiatrically diagnosed. Such 
samples are unlikely to reflect the majority of people who self-injure who do not 
receive formal treatment. Resulting explanations tend to obscure or minimise social, 
cultural or interpersonal factors, in favour of biological
2
 or psychological factors. 
Clinical research frequently bypasses the opinions and perspectives of people who 
self-injure, relying upon doctors’ interpretations of the behaviour, or quantitative, 
restrictive and problematic clinical questionnaires. Such approaches are liable to 
result in gendered, and even sexist, explanations (Busfield, 1996; Nuckolls, 1992). 
However, clinical work on self-injury has highlighted numerous important 
                                                 
2
 By biological, I refer here to a broad range of clinical explanations originating from biological 
psychiatry and relating to, for instance, hormonal factors or neurological systems 
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explanations for self-injury. Clinical explanations do not exist separately from lay 
understandings, and there is a growing consensus between clinical and grey literature 
regarding the functions and meanings of self-injury. Despite this consensus, the 
existing research literature on self-injury can be described as fractured. There are 
numerous discrete strands of theorisation, with correspondingly different 
terminological preferences, explanations, and understandings. This is epitomised in 
the differential use of the term self-harm. However, it can also be seen in the relative 
lack of cross-referencing between different disciplines: for instance, between 
psychiatric nursing and general psychiatry, or between clinical psychological 
approaches and biological psychiatry.   
 
In this section I introduce important explanations for self-injury. Although many of 
these explanations are primarily clinical in nature, I discuss social scientific 
contributions where relevant. As indicated above, although the focus is on literature 
which describes self-injury, in many cases terminology is not consistent or precise. 
Throughout, I attend to the different terms used, highlighting these inconsistencies.  
 
My treatment of the clinical literature is critical. I view the approaches taken in some 
clinical research as limiting, potentially inaccurate, and, in some cases, unethical. My 
perspective is influenced by social scientific work which has demonstrated the 
socially constructed nature of understandings and manifestations of illness (Busfield, 
1996; Frank, 1995; Gaines, 1992; Martin, 1988; Martin, 2001; Scheper-Hughes, 
1989) and challenged the authority and power of medical and psychiatric systems 
(Goffman, 1968; Lakoff, 2005; Scheff, 1966). Many of the general concerns raised in 
these various strands of work are reflected in clinical discourse regarding self-injury, 
as Cresswell (2005a) and Brickman (2004) have established. For instance, Brickman 
(2004) mirrored Busfield’s (1996) arguments regarding the gendered nature of 
psychiatric work, demonstrating how self-injury was successfully framed as a female 
activity in psychiatric discourse, despite evidence to the contrary. Cresswell (2005b) 
has detailed the ways in which dominant psychiatric discourse on self-harm was 
challenged by user-groups such as the National Self-Harm Network (NSHN), in the 
1980s and 1990s. These groups highlighted the disjuncture between what I would 
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call the lived experience of self-harm, and the psychiatric discourse which focused 
upon a detached concern with risk factors and, especially, future risk of suicide. This 
detachment remains a feature of much clinical research. However, the 
understandings popularised by groups such as NSHN are increasingly apparent in 
clinical and non-clinical literature alike. This may well reflect the changing nature of 
clinical psychiatric practices and discourses, and a move away from traditionally 
understood power structures.  
 
2.3.1 Psychological factors, psychiatric diagnoses 
 
Self-injury is generally understood to be indicative of mental ill health or mental 
distress. In formal psychiatric diagnoses it is only present as a symptom of BPD. 
Intermittent attempts have been made to classify self-injury as a psychiatric disorder 
in itself. Muehlenkamp (2005) and Favazzza (1998) argue that it should be classified 
under the section of the DSM IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) reserved 
for impulse control disorders not otherwise classified. Hawton and colleagues 
(Hawton & Van Heeringen, 2002), who have conducted much research in the UK on 
self-harm, refer to self-injury as ‘deliberate self-harm syndrome’, first described by 
Pattison and Kahan (1983). Although Pattison and Kahan argued that deliberate self-
harm syndrome be included in a future version of the DSM, so far this has not 
occurred.  
 
Self-injury is understood to co-occur with a wide range of other psychiatric 
diagnoses, including eating disorders, depressive disorders, anxiety disorders, 
substance abuse and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Jacobson & Gould, 
2007; Klonsky & Muehlenkamp, 2007). As self-injury is one of the defining features 
of BPD, it is unsurprising that clinically treated individuals who self-injure have been 
found to have high rates of BPD (Jacobson & Gould, 2007, 140). As Jacobson and 
Gould point out, information regarding the ‘actual’ relationships between self-injury 
and these various diagnoses is unclear. Many studies lack adequate control groups, or 
are based solely on clinical inpatients. Studies frequently use different terminology 
and definitions, further complicating the picture. While Jacobson and Gould imply 
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that the ‘actual’ relationships between self-injury and psychiatric diagnoses can be 
discovered, I would suggest that this is not necessarily possible or desirable. Rather, 
these debates can be seen to highlight the socially constructed nature of psychiatric 
diagnoses, as well as understandings of self-injury.  
 
It is generally accepted, and has been found, that rates of self-injury are higher 
among psychiatric inpatients (Briere & Gil, 1998). It may be significant that self-
injury is also found in higher levels among prison populations (Marzano, 2007; 
Morgan & Hawton, 2004; Morris, 2009). This could indicate that the nature of being 
incarcerated (whether in prison or in an inpatient unit) may increase the chances of 
self-injury. Similarly it may be suggestive of the different ways that men and women 
in mental distress are treated. Busfield (1996) notes that mental illness in men and 
women is both expressed and responded to differently.  
 
It is increasingly accepted, however, that in non-clinical populations self-injury may 
occur in the absence of any definable psychiatric illness (Nock, 2009a). In one of the 
few papers to address self-injury from a sociological perspective, Adler and Adler 
(2007) make a similar claim, suggesting that self-injury is increasingly a lifestyle 
choice, rather than an indication of psychiatric illness. Their argument is slightly 
problematic. They maintain that self-injury is becoming more “popular” among non-
clinical populations, when in fact there is no reliable information regarding historical 
rates of self-injury in non-clinical populations. 
 
There is some disagreement then, in non-clinical and clinical literature alike, 
regarding the extent to which self-injury is indicative of mental illness. However, it 
seems to be widely accepted that self-injury does indicate mental distress. The ways 
in which self-injury’s status as a symptom or sign of mental illness has been 
negotiated remains unresolved. Although a detailed engagement with this matter is 
out with the scope of this thesis, the relationships between self-injury, mental illness, 
and mental distress will be discussed at relevant points throughout.  
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Apart from formal psychiatric diagnoses, many studies have attempted to measure 
relationships between self-injury and a wide range of psychological factors 
(Dougherty et al., 2009; Gratz, 2006; Murray, 2005; Whitlock et al., 2006a). Two 
consistently highlighted correlates relate to impulsivity and emotional regulation, and 
I will discuss each of these in turn. 
  
There is a widespread view that impulsivity and self-injury are related. Favazza’s 
(1998) and Muhelenkamp’s (2005) arguments for the reclassification of self-injury as 
a psychiatric disorder are based upon this understanding. However, the actual 
evidence to support this is problematic. A number of studies of non-clinical 
populations have found relationships between self-harm and measures of impulsivity 
(Croyle & Waltz, 2007; Klonsky et al., 2003; O'Connor et al., 2009). However, each 
of these studies used vague definitions of self-harm, making it unclear whether the 
relationship might actually be between self-poisoning and measures of impulsivity. 
Studies that have found a relationship between self-injury and measures of 
impulsivity are primarily clinical in nature, frequently focusing solely on people 
diagnosed with BPD (Brown et al., 2005; Dougherty et al., 2009).  
 
Impulsivity itself is a problematic concept (Gerbing et al., 1987). Elsewhere, I have 
argued that the concept may be particularly open to gendered interpretations 
(Chandler et al., 2010). It is possible that the alleged relationship between self-injury 
and impulsivity owes more to broader socio-cultural understandings. Viewing self-
injury as ‘impulsive’ might be more culturally understandable than accepting that 
some people might carefully plan to harm their body. Indeed, recent clinical research 
has found that although self-injuring patients described themselves as impulsive, this 
was not supported by laboratory tests (Janis & Nock, 2009). Further, qualitative 
research with people who self-injure, has indicated that in some cases self-injury may 
be habitual, or planned well in advance, rather than ‘impulsive’ (Adler & Adler, 
2005; Adler & Adler, 2007).  
 
As well as impulsivity, self-injury is also increasingly associated with emotional 
regulation and expression (see especially Gratz, 2007; Gratz & Chapman, 2007; 
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Gratz & Gunderson, 2006). Self-injury is viewed as related to difficulties regulating 
emotion. Thus far, this association has largely been investigated using psychological 
scales, developed to measure emotion regulation (Gratz, 2007; Gratz & Chapman, 
2007). Gratz and colleagues have found that in non-clinical college samples, emotion 
dysregulation
3
 is one of the strongest predictors of self-injury in both men and 
women (Gratz, 2006; Gratz & Chapman, 2007).  They also found that in females, 
self-injury was further related to high scores on scales measuring emotional 
inexpressivity. Gratz and colleagues’ work has been instructive in highlighting the 
important role that emotions appear to play in self-injuring behaviour, and 
particularly, in demonstrating that there appear to be important differences in how 
this is manifested in men and women. These findings have some support from 
qualitative studies, which frequently indicate that people who self-injure self-identify 
problems with emotional expression and emotional control (Abrams & Gordon, 
2003; Adler & Adler, 2007; Alexander & Clare, 2004; Machoian, 2001). This area 
offers potentially rich material for sociological investigation, especially given recent 
developments in the sociology of emotions (Bendelow, 2009). In particular, 
sociological perspectives could critically engage with the ways in which 
‘appropriate’ emotional regulation and expression are defined. These psychological 
factors are especially likely to be affected by different socio-cultural understandings, 
for instance, with regard to gender or socio-economic status.  
 
Existing literature regarding the psychiatric and psychological factors involved in 
self-injury offers some useful starting points for future research. In particular, this 
work highlights important areas to which sociology can contribute to. The ongoing 
debates and negotiations regarding the status of self-injury - as a psychiatric illness, 
evidence of a psychiatric illness, or unrelated to psychiatric illness - emphasises both 
the constructed nature of clinical knowledge, and the need for sociological 
perspectives. Psychological correlates of impulsivity and emotional regulation are 
important in existing understandings of self-injury. I have suggested that these are 
problematic, and would benefit from sociological attention. A sociological approach 
to the study of emotion and self-injury is outlined further in section 2.4.2. In the next 
                                                 
3
 An inability to ‘appropriately’ regulate emotions. 
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section, I introduce social and interpersonal factors that have been identified as 
related to self-injury in existing research. 
 
2.3.2 Social and interpersonal factors 
 
Although clinical research tends to overlook social and cultural factors, a number of 
contributions have been made to understanding the social and interpersonal 
antecedents of self-injury. These can be identified in some of the ‘risk factors’ 
examined by some studies. For instance, it has been noted that both self-harm (De 
Leo & Heller, 2004; Hawton et al., 2002) and self-injury (Nock & Prinstein, 2005) 
are correlated with knowing someone else who has self-harmed or self-injured. In the 
clinical literature, this is examined as potential evidence for ‘contagion’ effects, and 
there have been some studies which have explored the extent to which this is a 
feature of self-injury in institutional settings (Crouch & Wright, 2004; Ross, 1979). 
Similar concerns are expressed regarding suicide, in particular the effects of media 
reporting on increases in suicide and self-harm in non-clinical populations (Coleman, 
2004; Hawton & Williams, 2002; Stack, 2000a).  
 
Adler and Adler (2005) and Hodgson (2004) explored these issues from a 
sociological perspective, examining how far self-injury might be a ‘learned’ 
behaviour. Each of these papers concluded that for some, self-injury was apparently 
‘self-learned’, while, for others, it was learned from other people. Adler and Adler 
went the furthest, suggesting that from the late 1990s onwards, self-injury was more 
likely to be ‘other learned’ as knowledge regarding the behaviour was more 
widespread. This is a problematic claim, and my own research suggests that 
individual explanations for self-injury may well be mediated by moral concerns with 
being regarded as ‘authentic’ (See sections 4.2.1 and 8.3.1).  
 
There is some evidence that – as with suicide – the likelihood of self-injury is 
increased if there are adverse life events, such as parental separation or death 
(Jacobson & Gould, 2007). Due to the lack of research on general populations, the 
picture is unclear. The most prominent adverse life event that has been associated 
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with self-injury is the experience of childhood abuse, particularly sexual abuse. 
Sexual abuse has been correlated with self-injury in numerous studies, both clinical 
and non-clinical (Briere & Gil, 1998; Gratz, 2006), and physical abuse has been 
particularly correlated with male self-injury (Gratz & Chapman, 2007). However, the 
extent to which this indicates a causal relationship is debateable. Though some 
authors have unproblematically accepted that self-injury in women is caused by 
sexual abuse (e.g. Kilby, 2001), more recently a meta-review concluded that there 
was no empirical evidence to support this (Klonsky & Moyer, 2008). However, 
qualitative studies have indicated that, for some people who self-injure and have 
been sexually abused, this experience is central to their understandings of their own 
self-injury (Alexander & Clare, 2004; Harris, 2000).  
 
 Some research has examined the family dynamics of young people who self-injure. 
Yip et al (2003) found that families who were experienced as supportive appeared to 
help reduce incidences of self-injury, whereas unsupportive or overly critical families 
led to increases in self-injury. Similarly, Wedig and Nock (2007) found that parental 
criticism was strongly associated with a range of self-injurious behaviours and 
thoughts (including self-injury). Although the findings are suggestive, the data 
collection techniques used were potentially limiting. For instance, Wedig and Nock 
examined parental ‘expressed emotion’ using a psychological scale to measure this. 
There was no corresponding qualitative aspect to the study; thus the young people 
(and indeed their parents) were effectively silenced, the complex and nuanced 
emotional life of a family was reduced to a quantitative indicator of ‘expressed 
emotion’. However, although limited, these studies do highlight important areas that 




There is increasing consensus in the existing literature on the functions of self-injury. 
The most commonly identified functions are: affect/emotional regulation; a way of 
avoiding suicide; ‘attention-seeking’; sensation-seeking and self-punishment. These 
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functions are repeated in various forms across a range of clinical, non-clinical and 
grey literature.  
 
Self-injury is most often described as a form of emotional regulation. It is understood 
as being a method of releasing tension, frustration or other negative emotional states 
(Buckholdt, 2009; Klonsky, 2007a). Nock and Prinstein (2004) found that this type 
of explanation for self-injury was the most commonly endorsed in a sample of 
clinical adolescents. Support is also found in qualitative, non-clinical studies. For 
instance, in a qualitative study of self-injury among lesbian and bi-sexual women, 
Alexander and Clare (2004) found that self-injury was described as a method of 
‘releasing’ painful emotions. Similarly, Adler and Adler (2007) reported that some 
participants referred to their self-injury as a being a way of ‘expressing’ emotions. 
The ways in which self-injury is understood to operate in regulating emotions 
appears to vary. In some understandings, self-injury serves to stop painful or 
negative emotions, perhaps by enabling these to be ‘expressed’ or ‘released’. In 
others self-injury serves to control problematic or inappropriate emotions.  
 
This understanding of the function of self-injury is clearly related to those 
explanations which focus on emotional dysregulation. These interpretations of self-
injury suggest that certain individuals are unable to regulate their emotions, and thus 
‘resort’ to self-injury. How and why this occurs is not well understood. Emotional 
dysregulation is an important feature of BPD, which may well be significant given 
that much research on self-injury has focused on groups diagnosed with this 
condition. However, it is likely that understandings regarding what constitutes 
‘appropriate’ emotionality will be socially and culturally mediated. Some recent 
research has begun to investigate possible links between emotional dysregulation and 
different emotional styles in families (Buckholdt, 2009; Wedig & Nock, 2007). 
These have suggested that self-injury does appear to be associated with families 
which discourage the expression of emotion. However, the impact of broader socio-
cultural understandings and practices regarding emotional expression and regulation 
is not discussed in this existing work.  
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‘Attention-seeking’ is a particularly controversial suggested function of self-injury. 
In particular, user groups such as NSHN and the Bristol Crisis Service for Women 
have been extremely vocal in their dismissal of this understanding: 
 
“I’ll tell you what self-injury isn’t – and professionals take note. It’s not masochistic. 
It’s not attention-seeking. It’s rarely a symptom of so-called psychiatric illness. It’s 
not a suicide attempt… So what is it? It’s a silent scream. It’s about trying to make a 
sense of order out of chaos. It’s a visual manifestation of extreme distress”  
(Maggy Ross, of the Bristol Crisis Service for Women, in Cresswell, 2005b: 265) 
 
However, Nock and Prinstein (2004) found that some of the adolescents in their 
study advocated a ‘social positive’ (or attention-seeking) function for their self-
injury. Crouch and Wright (2004) explored this in a qualitative study of self-harm. 
They found that patients were unlikely to attribute an ‘attention seeking’ function to 
their own self-injury, but that they did identify it in others. Significantly, Crouch and 
Wright demonstrated self-injury, when seen as ‘attention seeking’, was viewed 
exceedingly negatively. This negative view of attention seeking and self-injury has 
also been noted in studies of the attitudes of clinical staff towards self-injury 
(McAllister et al., 2002a; McCann et al., 2006). These findings emphasise the 
significance of socio-cultural interpretations of the functions of self-injury, and again 




Although bodies are often absent from existing work on self-injury, there are three 
significant exceptions. In clinical psychiatry there have been attempts to explain self-
injury in terms of biological antecedents. In particular, these attempts have focused 
around the relationships between self-injury, pain and impulsivity. In a rather 
different manner, some papers have focused upon symbolic understandings of the 
corporeal practices involved in self-injury. Finally, Inckle (2005; 2007) has 
specifically examined self-injury and embodiment from a sociological perspective. 
 
Social scientific accounts of psychiatry have highlighted the ways in which the 
discipline has claimed authority by searching for biological, measurable bases to 
 50 
mental illness (Busfield, 1996; Lakoff, 2005; Pilgrim, 2002; Pilgrim & Bentall, 
1999). Despite a great deal of effort, however, the links between biology and mental 
illnesses remain unclear. With regard to self-injury, biology is implicated in two key 
ways: defective serotonergic systems; and the endogenous opioid system.  
 
It is suggested that people who self-injure have ‘abnormal’ serotonergic systems, and 
that this leads to their ‘impulsive’ self-injury (Favazza, 1998; Hicks & Hinck, 2008; 
New et al., 1997). The serotonergic system is increasingly implicated in a wide range 
of psychiatric disorders and symptoms, including depression, anxiety, eating 
disorders, impulsivity and suicide (Audenaert et al., 2006; Evans et al., 2000; Sher & 
Stanley, 2008; Yayura-Tobias et al., 1995). This interest has occurred alongside the 
development and popularisation of psychotropic medication such as Prozac and other 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) designed to work upon the 
serotonergic system. With regard to self-injury, studies have mainly focused upon 
patients who have been diagnosed with BPD, and the results are relatively 
inconclusive (e.g. New et al., 1997; Simeon et al., 1992). Nevertheless, this 
understanding of self-injury is repeated across a range of clinical papers (Hicks & 
Hinck, 2008; Nock, 2009a). Further, this interpretation of self-injury is used to argue 
for the use of biological treatments, such as high doses of SSRIs. Favazza (1996; 
1998) advocates this, despite acknowledging that there is little evidence to support 
such treatment. 
 
The endogenous opioid system is implicated in self-injury via attempts to explain the 
sensations, or lack of sensations, reported by people who self-injure. In particular, it 
is widely reported that people who self-injure often feel no pain as a result of their 
injuries (Hicks & Hinck, 2008; Klonsky & Muehlenkamp, 2007). Some laboratory 
studies have found that clinical patients who report little or no pain during self-injury 
similarly report less pain in laboratory tests designed to measure pain ‘objectively’ 
(Claes et al., 2006; Russ et al., 1992). Leading from these findings, some have 
theorised that this lack of pain may be related to the endogenous opioid system and 
the ‘release’ of ‘endorphins’ (Winchel & Stanley, 1991). Again, rare efforts to 
measure a relationship between self-injury and changes in the endogenous opioid 
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system have been largely unsuccessful and based solely upon clinical samples (Coid 
et al., 1983; Winchel & Stanley, 1991).  
 
Attempts to explain self-injury biologically have been generally inconclusive 
(Klonsky, 2007a). Nevertheless, biological understandings and interpretations of 
self-injury are present in some user and grey literature (Strong, 1998; Turner, 2002). 
In particular, the understanding that self-injury ‘releases endorphins’ and that these 
can contribute to a ‘high’ feeling (rather than simply a lack of pain) are particularly 
prominent, though this perspective is rarely found in clinical literature. These 
understandings were also present in the stories of my participants, and are discussed 
particularly in Chapter 4. To date, no existing work on self-injury has engaged with 
the ways in which psychiatric and clinical discourse is manifested in lay or user 
understandings. This thesis will attempt such an engagement, following similar 
social scientific work on the relationship between lay and biomedical understandings 
of depression (Stepnisky, 2007) and pain (Bendelow & Williams, 1995).  
 
Bodies are also present in several papers which address symbolic aspects of self-
injury. These include clinical work from the 1970s which presented condescending 
and sexist interpretations of self-injury as related to female sexuality, and in 
particular menstruation (Rosenthal et al., 1972; Simpson, 1980). This work has been 
unproblematically reproduced more recently (Froeschle & Moyer, 2004; Zila & 
Kiselica, 2001). Feminist theorists have produced similarly patronising, though 
certainly less sexist, interpretations (Crowe, 1996; Kilby, 2001). These papers 
suggest that the wounds created through self-injury are ‘signifiers’, attempts by 
women to communicate the “unspeakable” (Crowe, 1996) – frequently sexual abuse. 
These analyses highlight the importance of social reactions to self-injury, the 
potentially communicative nature of self-injury, and the importance of bodies and 
display. However, they are invariably limited by a focus on female self-injury and an 
assumption that self-injury is largely a response to sexual abuse. Further, these 
analyses are often based on secondary sources, with no attempt made to engage with 
the women they purport to ‘speak for’.  
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I came across the work of Kay Inckle in 2008, when I was three years into my own 
research. Inckle had completed PhD research on gender, embodiment and (as she 
terms it) body marking. She conducted in-depth interviews with women who had 
self-injured (as I term it) most of whom had also engaged in wider practices of body 
modification. Inckle’s work takes a radical and critical feminist perspective towards 
both body marking and sociological approaches to embodiment. In particular, she 
argues that gendered and marked (or otherwise ‘non-normative’, e.g. disabled) 
bodies have consequently different and differing experiences and understandings of 
self-hood. She contrasts her position with that of other sociologists ‘of the body’ 
who, she argues, tend to treat bodies as homogeneous - a position which generally 
implies that they are white, able-bodied and male (2007: 89-91).  
 
Inckle (2007) addresses several issues which also became important in my own 
analyses. In particular, she explored the importance of social reactions to scars 
created through self-injury. She discussed the ways in which her participants talked 
about negotiating various social contexts with these scars. I discuss my own 
participants’ experiences with this aspect of the lived experience of self-injury, in 
Chapter 7. Inckle also examined the significance of the corporeal materiality of 
practices of body marking; though her analysis focused on more ‘decorative’ forms, 
such as tattooing and piercing. Inckle challenges binary distinctions between injury 
and non-injury, and between mutilation and agency. She argues that: 
 
“on close examination, from a position of embodiment, there are not quantitative 
factors that make up a bodily mutilation but, rather, a combination of factors, social 
and personal, that are embodied within the individual and read off in a social 
context” (2007: 150) 
 
My own analysis, while less concerned with distinctions (however artificial) between 
decorative body modification and pathological self-injury, is nevertheless sensitive to 
the varying ways in which injuries can be interpreted. Indeed, the different ways in 
which participants talked about and understood their injuries and scars are central to 
this thesis.  
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2.4 Self-injury incarnate and in social contexts: What 
sociology could add. 
 
2.4.1 Self-injury, bodies and embodiment. 
 
Although self-injury, and self-harm more broadly, involve bodies in direct, intimate 
and sometimes extensive ways, academic work which engages with this aspect of the 
behaviours is rare. Sociology has arguably always engaged with the embodied nature 
of social life (Shilling, 2003), though this has certainly not always been explicit, and 
bodies have frequently ‘disappeared’ in much sociological work (Williams & 
Bendelow, 1998). As has been well documented, sociology has ‘rediscovered’ bodies 
over the last 30 or so years, though it is argued that there is still a long way to go 
before sociology can be said to have adequately incorporated bodies into its analyses 
(Shilling, 2007). 
 
The theoretical stance that I take towards bodies in this thesis draws on the work of a 
wide range of theorists. My approach is broadly phenomenological, following 
Merleau-Ponty (2009 (1945)), and, later Leder (1990). This perspective takes as 
central the understanding that ‘we’ experience and live both through and in bodies. 
Our bodies generate experience; we both have and are bodies. However, the ways in 
which bodies are understood and experiences interpreted are, in my view, inherently 
social. Further, bodies are not only a focus of interpretation, or a source of 
experience – they are also meaning making. Bodies ‘make up’ society. As Inckle 
(2007) noted, bodies have concrete, observable effects upon society – most obviously 
according to gender, ethnicity and dis/ability. My perspective is primarily influenced 
by the approaches of Crossley (1995) and his work on agency and intercorporeality; 
and the call by Bendelow and Williams’ (1998; Williams & Bendelow, 1998) for the 
practice of ‘embodied sociology’. These authors have demonstrated the utility of 
accounts of embodiment which acknowledge and attend to the materiality of bodies, 
but which emphasise that this materiality is socially mediated and interpreted.  
 
 54 
The question of how best to include bodies in social analysis is on-going and 
unresolved. Inckle and others (Crossley, 2001a; Howson & Inglis, 2001; Shilling, 
2007; Williams & Bendelow, 1998) have highlighted the problems associated with 
attempting to theorise about or describe bodies – a project which of necessity 
involves attempting to put into words feelings and experiences which may resist 
verbalisation. Further, and as Inckle (2007: 140-2) comprehensively demonstrated, 
sociological theories which tackle bodies tend to be ‘about’ or ‘of’ bodies rather than 
‘from’ them, ‘reading’ their signs, and speaking from a relatively ‘disembodied’ 
position. In contrast, Inckle (2007) and others (Davis, 1995; Williams & Bendelow, 
1998) advocate an embodied sociology, which attempts to avoid dualism by 
acknowledging the embodied nature of selves and societies, and with the researcher 
him/herself speaking from an embodied, empathic position. Such discussions 
highlight the centrality of bodies to social life, biographies and lived experience and I 
engage with this throughout the thesis.  
 
A theoretical position of embodiment (Inckle, 2007) is especially important for this 
study because of my own experiences with self-injury. Indeed, I would find it 
impossible to attempt to ‘objectively read’ my participants’ self-injured bodies, since 
my own body is also self-injured. This position necessitates a particular form of 
empathy with the embodied experience of being someone who has self-injured. This 
close, embodied attachment to my research topic was instructive in guiding the focus 
of my research to areas that have traditionally been overlooked or minimised. These 
include: sensations experienced during and after self-injury; practical details 
regarding wound creation, care and maintenance; and the negotiation of social life 
with the marks (permanent or otherwise) left by self-injury. Each of these areas of 
concern can be rigorously examined using sociological approaches to the study of 
embodiment. Such approaches are increasingly varied and wide-ranging. In the 
remainder of this section, I introduce the perspectives that have been most important 
in guiding my research, and this thesis. 
 
2.4.2 Corporeal materiality 
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One of my main research interests concerns how people who self-injure understand 
the practical aspects of their self-injury. That is: how do they say that they injure 
themselves; what do they describe doing with their wounds; how do they talk about 
their scars and scar management? With the exception of the work discussed above, 
these practical, material, corporeal aspects of self-injury are rarely addressed. 
Sociology has a range of useful theoretical approaches for studying and analysing 
such practices, and for engaging with the lived, corporeal and temporal nature of 
self-injury. 
 
In particular, the concept of body techniques first formulated by Mauss and later 
developed by Crossley (1995; 2007), offer a useful way of considering self-injury. 
This approach to the study of embodiment engages with the social nature of bodies 
and the socially mediated nature of what bodies do. Crossley used Mauss’ concept of 
body techniques alongside ideas Goffman introduced in his Relations in Public. In 
doing this, Crossley demonstrates the inherently social nature of action – it is always 
‘other oriented’. Examining self-injury in this way contrasts starkly with the 
individualistic manner in which it is more usually understood. However, 
understanding self-injury as ‘other-oriented’ should not be equivalent to viewing it as 
‘attention seeking’. Rather, explanations for and descriptions of self-injury should be 
understood and located within wider socio-cultural contexts and understandings. This 
is particularly relevant with regard to individuals’ scar and wound management. It is 
also pertinent to the different ways that practices of self-injury are described. Further, 
understanding self-injury as a body technique allows a more diverse interpretation of 
the behaviour than previous deviance and social learning perspectives have allowed 
(Adler & Adler, 2005; Hodgson, 2004). Viewing self-injury as an embodied, socially 
mediated body technique allows self-injury to be viewed as a more dynamic practice, 
one that can be developed, experimented with, and tested out.  
 
The corporeal materiality of self-injury can also be usefully investigated using 
narrative approaches, which highlight the temporal nature of both bodies and social 
life. Theorists working on illness narratives and time have been especially instructive 
here (Sparkes & Smith, 2003; Sparkes, 1999; Wainwright & Turner, 2006) and 
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Shilling’s corporeal realism (2005, 14) similarly emphasises the importance of 
temporality. Bodies are not static; they change, age, develop and alter. This temporal 
perspective is especially important with regard to the corporeality of self-injury. Self-
injury can effect permanent changes upon bodies, and the practice of self-injury can 
involve regular alterations to the surfaces of bodies. How these changes are 
understood, experienced and negotiated by those causing these changes remains 
under-explored. 
 
2.4.3 Feeling bodies 
 
Whilst rediscovering ‘the body’, sociology has also begun to address emotional and 
sensate aspects of social life. An examination of the lived experience of self-injury 
necessitates an approach which addresses both emotion and sensation. As discussed 
above, explanations for self-injury frequently centre upon its function as a form of 
emotional regulation (Buckholdt, 2009), its relationship to emotional problems 
(Klonsky, 2007b) and its painful or painless features . 
 
Work which addresses the embodied nature of emotions has been central to my 
analysis of self-injury. Theorisation and research by Lupton (1998a), as well as 
Williams and Bendelow (1996a; 1996b; 1998; Williams, 2001), have demonstrated 
the inherently embodied and social nature of emotions. Emotions are felt and 
experienced in and through both bodies and minds. They challenge dualist attempts 
to split off mind from body. Emotions, like bodily practices, are understood as 
intersubjective and inter-relational, they happen between as well as within people 
(Burkitt, 1997).  
 
My concern with emotions focuses on two particular issues. The first is the way in 
which emotions are talked about and understood. This leads from my narrative 
approach, which is concerned with the ways that talk is structured. Thus, in Chapter 
5 I address the different ways that emotions are described as ‘things’ which can be 
‘released’ or ‘controlled’. In particular, this emphasises the embodied nature of 
emotions. I note that participants’ narratives were frequently contradictory and 
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complex regarding ‘feelings’, viewing these as both sensate (bodily) and emotional 
(mental). Secondly, I focus upon the interactional and social aspects of 
understandings about emotions. Drawing on the work of Hochschild (1979; 
Hochschild, 2003 (1983)), I develop an understanding of self-injury as a method of 
emotion management. This extends and expands existing interpretations of self-
injury as a ‘coping mechanism’, locating this more securely within socio-cultural 
contexts. 
 
As I indicated above, distinctions between feelings, emotions and sensations were 
problematic in my participants’ narratives. Although some advocate a theoretical 
distinction between these concepts my participants’ found it difficult to separate 
descriptions of feelings, emotions and sensations. A study of participants’ 
understandings of pain and self-injury is especially illuminating here. I draw upon 
previous work by Bendelow and Williams (1995; 1998), which similarly highlighted 
both the embodied nature of pain, and the ways in which pain challenges dualist 
understandings of mind and body. I emphasise the different ways in which pain is 
discussed, suggesting that wider understandings about pain are invoked and utilised 
in narratives about self-injury.  
 
2.4.4 Signifying bodies, signifying selves 
 
Previous work on self-injury has engaged with the allegedly symbolic nature of the 
blood and wounds self-injury creates. However, little has been written (with the 
exception of Inckle) regarding the social nature of the signification of self-injury. My 
concern with this leads from Goffman’s work on performance and stigma (1968; 
1973), and more recent work that has addressed the body as a site for the 
performance of the self, that may be specific to late modern societies (Giddens, 1991; 
Gimlin, 2007; Sweetman, 2000). This attention to the visible and performative nature 
of self-injury is an important aspect of an embodied sociology. Goffman 
demonstrated the effects of both visible and invisible stigma. This is especially 
important for a study of self-injury, as self-injury can be both visible and hidden. 
However, and as Goffman noted, even where a stigma is not visible to others, that it 
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could be leads to effects on social relations. I address this idea particularly in Chapter 
7, where I examine the hiding and revealing practices of my participants. My 
analysis demonstrates the continued utility of Goffman’s approaches. 
 
Theorists have argued that in late-modern society, bodies have become ever more 
important sites for the performance of identity and self-hood: “there is a tendency for 
individuals to place ever more importance upon the appearance and presentation of 
the body as constitutive of self-identity” (Williams, 1998a: 753). Such an 
understanding emerges particularly in work which addresses bodily techniques 
similar to self-injury: cosmetic surgery (Gimlin, 2007), anorexia (Giddens, 1991) and 
body modification (Crossley, 2005; Sweetman, 2000). These analyses suggest that 
while bodies may have always been important sites for identity work, in late modern 
society the variety of techniques available for reworking bodies and identities is 
more diverse. While I do not engage overly with the historical specificity of self-
injury
4
, I do draw upon theories which emphasise the increasing preponderance of 
‘body-work’ in late-modern, especially western, socio-cultural contexts. 
 
The self-injured selves that I examine contrast starkly with those identified in the 
clinical literature. While the self-injured selves in clinical literature are composed of 
risk factors and individual proclivities towards depression, impulsivity, aggression or 
narcissism (as measured by clinical scales); the self-injured selves that I examine are 
socially situated, embodied individuals, whose life-stories reflect both socio-cultural 
contexts and inter-personal relationships. It is to these various contexts that I turn 
next.  
 
2.4.5 Contextualising self-injury 
 
Sociology as a discipline concerns itself with social relations and the social contexts 
in which these relations take place. Social contexts can take many forms, however, 
and this thesis focuses on three particular formulations of social context.  
 
                                                 
4
 Such a project is out-with the scope of the research I did, and as I discussed earlier in this chapter 
and Chapter 1, historical information about self-injury is scarce. 
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2.4.4.1: Narrating life-stories – interview and biography as context 
 
Firstly, I am concerned with the social context of individual biographies, as 
articulated through life stories recounted during research interviews (Plummer, 
2001). This is an area opened up by narrative research, which examines the ways that 
people construct and relate stories about themselves (Riessman, 1993). These stories 
are the focus of my research, and this concern is reflected in the methodology I use. 
Narrative researchers argue that examining the ways that stories about people’s lives 
are narrated can tell us important things about social life – the interview is 
understood as a particular social context in which a story is told, and the stories told 
to the interviewer are understood to be particular to that context. However, it is 
suggested that the form that these stories take will reflect wider social trends and 
tendencies.  
 
The work of Frank (1995) and Kleinmann (1988), in relation to illness narratives, is 
most instructive here and especially influenced my early decision to use a narrative 
methodology. These authors demonstrated the socially and culturally mediated ways 
in which people constructed narratives about their illnesses, arguing that these 
narrations both affect and reflect the ways in which illnesses were experienced. By 
similarly focusing upon the life stories and narratives of people who self-injure, I 
will highlight the ways that self-injury is understood and incorporated into the 
broader life-stories of the interviewees. My analysis indicates that these 
understandings may have concrete effects: both upon the ways that self-injury is 
practised, and the ways others responded to it. 
 
2.4.4.2: Social Interaction – interpersonal contexts 
 
My perspective is further influenced by sociological theories that focus upon 
interpersonal interaction (e.g. Gerth & Mills, 1965; Goffman, 1973), examining how 
this both reflects, reproduces and shapes social order and social norms. This is 
addressed in two ways. Firstly, the research interview itself is understood as a 
context in which social interaction about self-injury takes place. Reflecting my 
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narrative approach, the stories related in this context are not understood as any more 
or less ‘authentic’ simply because they are told in an ‘extraordinary’ context. Thus, 
throughout my analysis I reflect upon the ways in which stories about self-injury are 
told to me specifically. Secondly, I was interested in the different ways that 
participants talked about other social interactions in which their self-injury was a 
concern.  
 
How self-injury is managed in interactions between people outside of clinical 
settings is largely overlooked in the existing literature. There is a substantial body of 
existing research which examines the reactions and understandings of clinical staff to 
people who self-injure and self-harm (e.g. McAllister et al., 2002a; McAllister et al., 
2002b; McCann et al., 2006; Sanders, 2000), and there has been some relevant 
sociological research on this (Jeffery, 1979; May & Kelly, 1982). More recent 
research has examined the interactions between doctors and patients who self-harm, 
using interpretive phenomenological analysis (Hadfield et al., 2009). Hadfield et al’s 
work is also relevant as some members of the team that carried out the research had 
personal experience of self-injury and, like myself, included this experience in their 
analysis.  In taking cultural context, and including the body in their analysis, 
Hadfield et al’s research represents a very hopeful position for future research into 
self-injury and self-harm.  
 
Interactions in more informal settings are less well researched or documented, 
though Inckle did address this issue in her work, detailing conversations with her 
participants regarding the ‘policing’ of their bodies. Inckle’s analysis of this focused 
specifically on the fact that these were women’s bodies, suggesting that women’s 
bodies were more stringently policed than men’s. Her focus was on women who had, 
as she put it, ‘non-normative’ bodies (2007, 103):  
 
“it is perhaps no surprise that women who have engaged with body-marking 
practices have experiences of their bodies being rigidly policed, and that this policing 




Inckle’s contention is certainly relevant to this research. However, as I discuss in 
Chapter 6, her distinction between normative and non-normative bodies can be 
challenged. 
 
My analysis of the social interactions participants described happening around and 
about their self-injury is guided by Goffman’s (1968) work on stigma. Self-injury is 
understood as a potentially stigmatising behaviour. In particular, Goffman’s 
approach is useful as it highlights the different ways that stigma can be negotiated by 
individuals. Stigma can be hidden, or it might be revealed. My analysis focuses 
especially on this aspect of self-injury. Goffman’s approach allows for an analysis of 
the visibility of self-injury. This further emphasises the importance of embodiment in 
analysing social life and social interaction. 
 
 
2.4.4.3 Socio-cultural contexts 
 
Both narrative and interactionist analyses highlight the ways in which forms of 
telling, behaving and communicating reflect wider social and cultural practices or 
beliefs. This represents the third and final level of my own analysis of the social 
contexts in which self-injury takes place. Although ‘culture’ has been found to be 
significant in sociological studies of suicide, there is less work on the way that this is 
reflected in individual understandings and practices (Stack, 2000a; Stack, 2000b).  
For instance, although levels of religious belief and divorce rates have been shown to 
be related to rates of suicide, how these broad cultural factors are actually implicated 
in behaviour is less well understood (Scourfield, 2005).  
 
My analysis has led me to a concern with the cultural contexts of self-injury, in the 
form of common stories about self-injury, as well as shared understandings and 
meanings regarding the behaviour. When I talk about culture, I am referring to social 
practices and understandings that are transmitted or otherwise learned. This 
transmission occurs on many levels, including socialisation in families, media, 
schooling and so on. My interest is not so much in the methods of transmission, but 
in how social practices and understandings manifest themselves in the narratives and 
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behaviours of people who self-injure. In particular, this focus includes psychiatric 
and medical discourse as an aspect of socio-cultural context. This reflects my 
methodological approach, whereby participants’ narratives and life-stories are seen 
as reflective of wider socio-cultural understandings (Plummer, 2001; Riessman, 
1993). This is discussed further in the following chapter, where I describe and 






In this chapter I present a critical description of my research methods and practice. 
Section 3.1 will provide a discussion of the background to the research design. 
Section 3.2 describes my recruitment strategies and my final sample. Section 3.3 
discusses the data collection process, addressing the strengths and weaknesses of my 
changing interview practices. Section 3.4 describes my approach to analysis. Finally, 
section 3.5 reflects upon the ‘status’ of the accounts that this research generated. The 
process of ‘doing’ this research was a long and steep learning curve for me. 
Therefore, throughout the chapter I attempt to reflect upon the changing nature of my 
research design and practice.  
 
3.1 Research design 
3.1.1 Aims and theoretical underpinnings 
 
The research was designed to address several significant gaps in knowledge about 
self-injury. Most importantly, my review of the literature highlighted the dearth of 
sociologically informed research on self-harm and self-injury, as well as the limited 
nature of the few sociological studies that did exist. Therefore, my primary research 
aim was to develop a sociological understanding of self-injury, one that moved on 
from the deviance perspectives of Adler and Adler (2005) and Hodgson (2004). 
Alongside this, the research was designed to explore the understandings that people 
who self-injured had for their behaviour, and the social contexts that self-injury was 
described as occurring in. These aims reflected ethical and epistemological concerns 
I had with what was lacking or obscured in much existing work on self-injury: 
principally, the perspectives of people who self-injure. Informing my research aims 
was a strong belief in the socially situated, socially mediated nature of self-injury. I 
felt that self-injury could only be fully understood by engaging with the perspectives 
of those practising the behaviour, and attempting to examine how both the actor and 
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their self-injury are located within interpersonal, biographical and socio-cultural 
contexts. These aims can be summarised as a concern with the lived experience of 
people who self-injure.  
 
My approach to addressing these aims was informed ethically and practically by 
feminist (Oakley, 1981; Stanley & Wise, 1993), and narrative or ‘life-story’ (Elliot, 
2005; McCormack, 2004; Plummer, 2001; Riessman, 1993; Riessman, 2000) 
methodologies. Feminist methodological work has highlighted the sometimes 
exploitative manner in which social research has been carried out (Finch, 1984). 
Especially given the ‘sensitive’ (Lee, 1993) nature of my research topic, I was 
especially keen to address these concerns. Narrative methodological approaches can 
be seen to offer a solution to many of the problems highlighted by feminist theorists. 
Often, narrative or life-story methods encourage participatory or collaborative 
research (Plummer, 2001) and can be viewed as an attempt to tackle the often 
unequal, and potentially damaging, balances of power that occur in research 
relationships.  
 
My theoretical concerns with bodies and embodiment especially force me to 
acknowledge the limits of strong constructionist approaches when it comes to 
studying corporeal bodies (Shilling, 2005). Self-injury has tangible, visible and 
sometimes fatal consequences. However, in both my research theory and practice I 
engage with and acknowledge the possibility of multiple and conflicting 
interpretations of reality. My epistemological and ontological approaches are similar 
to what Stanley and Wise (2006: 2.14) have termed Feminist Fractured 
Foundationalism: 
 
“Because different collectivities of people understand realities and facts from where 
[…] they are situated, everyday fractures of understanding and meaning – reality 
disjunctures – frequently arise; however, these are negotiated […] around the shared 
premise that there is real meaning, facts and truth […] a social reality – to be arrived 
at”  
 
Stanley and Wise argue that social research can ‘have it all’ – accepting the existence 
of a shared ‘reality’ whilst simultaneously acknowledging that this will be interpreted 
 65 
differently by individuals. This perspective makes the social and biographical 
position of the researcher of paramount importance. Throughout my research I have 
attempted to engage in self-reflexivity (Plummer, 2001: 206). This approach involves 
acknowledging the ways in which my own social position and biography impact 
upon my research practice: from research design, to data collection and analysis. The 
practice of self-reflexivity offers an answer to the problem whereby multiple and 
conflicting interpretations of reality problematise the claims made by social scientific 
research. Such an understanding may lead to a situation whereby each individual can 
only ever present their own version of the world, potentially crippling researchers’ 
attempts to understand and report upon the lives of ‘others’. Stanley and Wise 
suggest, however, that “[t]he best alternative is that researchers should present 
analytic accounts of how and why we think we know what we do about research 
situations and the people in them” (Stanley & Wise, 1993: 166). The remainder of 
this chapter represents my most explicit attempt to do this.  
 
3.1.2 Narrative and life-story 
 
In this section I will elaborate upon what I mean by narrative and life-story. 
Narrative is understood as “the most basic way humans have of apprehending the 
world” (Plummer, 2001: 185). Despite this, there is no one definition of what a 
narrative actually is (ibid). Narratives are frequently conflated with the more 
mundane sounding ‘stories’. Indeed, many writers (and I include myself in this) use 
the terms interchangeably. In practice it seems that stories and narratives are 
irrevocably linked. Stanley (2008: 437) defines a story as:  
 
“an account of things that have happened (usually, to some people), which has a 
beginning, middle and end, although not necessarily in this order; which involves 
some form of emplotment so that the story develops or at least has an end; it is 
produced for an audience, whether implicitly or explicitly; and it is a motivated or 
moral account because it represents a particular point of view or encourages a 
measure of understanding or empathy from the audience; and it works by being 




Narrative offers another layer to this mode of relating. Narrative represents the way 
that a story is told, and how this connects with wider socio-cultural practices and 
understandings (Stanley, 2008: 436). In this sense, narrative research addresses 
central sociological concerns regarding the interactions and relationships between 
individuals and broader socio-cultural structures and processes.  
 
Narrative approaches serve to focus analytic attention on form as well as content. 
This reflects epistemological concerns regarding the nature of the ‘data’ elicited 
through interviewing. Rather than viewing participants as vessels of untapped 
‘knowledge’, narrative approaches emphasise the mutual meaning-making that 
occurs in interviews (Elliot, 2005: 22). Recognition is given to the specific context of 
the interview itself as a site for this meaning-making, and the role of the interviewer 
in mediating, encouraging or limiting this process (Riessman, 1993).  
 
Narrative methodology advocates a more interactive, if not egalitarian, approach to 
data collection. In narrative interviews, research participants are encouraged to 
engage in meaning-making. Life-story interviews in particular provide opportunities 
for participants to focus upon areas in which they are interested, rather than being 
guided by interviewer-led topic guides (Elliot, 2005, 22). These approaches are 
frequently accompanied by participatory, collaborative research practices, in 
particular ‘checking back’ with participants during analysis (e.g. McCormack, 2004). 
Given my ethical and epistemological concerns (detailed above), I felt that these 
techniques offered a way of doing research that was both ethical and valid. As I 
discuss later in this chapter, my attempts at collaboration were largely unsuccessful. 
Only later in the research did I fully engage with more cautionary perspectives 
regarding this type of collaboration (Barbour, 2001; McCormack, 2004; Stanley & 
Wise, 1993). 
 
Life-stories, and the ways in which they are narrated, offer a way of linking 
individual stories with broader socio-cultural understandings (Elliot, 2005: 28; 
Plummer, 2001; Riessman, 1993: 3). Narrative and life-story approaches are closely 
related, and my early interest in narrative methodology led directly to my decision to 
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focus upon life-stories in my research. Life-story is distinguished here from life-
history, following Angrosino (1989: 3). My focus on life-stories represented an 
orientation towards life ‘in general’, rather than a concern with recording a ‘life-
history’. I hoped that this approach would enable me to gain some sense of the social 
and biographical contexts in which participants’ self-injury occurred.  
 
3.1.3 Planning the interviews 
 
I made the decision early on in the research that, ideally, I would conduct more than 
one interview with each participant. Methodological literature suggested that repeat 
interviewing was desirable, if not essential in narrative research (Elliot, 2005: 32; 
Plummer, 2001). This decision was also inspired by my wish to carry out 
collaborative research. Having at least two interviews with each participant would 
allow the time and space necessary for this endeavour. Following ethical review, it 
was decided that interviews would be limited to two, in order to avoid intruding into 
participant’s lives more than necessary. 
 
Having settled on conducting two interviews with each participant, I decided to use 
the first interview to focus upon the life-story of each participant (Plummer, 2001). 
This would serve several purposes: it would avoid over-privileging the position of 
self-injury in the participant’s life; it would enable me to get some sense of the 
biographical, interpersonal and cultural context of each participant’s life; it allowed 
the participant and myself to develop a research relationship prior to any requirement 
for them to discuss their self-injury. Finally, it would help the participant to 
understand my research aims and interests, by emphasising the importance I was 
placing on their life in general, rather than their self-injury specifically. 
 
Conducting the data collection in two stages allowed me to attempt to engage 
participants in my analysis. Although my actual practice regarding this altered as the 
research progressed, I initially planned to provide each participant with a short, 
written summary of the first interview. They would then be encouraged to read the 
summary critically, and challenge it where necessary. This would be discussed in the 
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second interview, at which point we would also discuss self-injury more specifically, 
along with themes raised either in the first interview, or arising from the research 
more generally. In this way I hoped to involve participants in a mutual co-
construction and analysis of our understandings of self-injury. 
 
3.1.4 Ethics, health and safety 
 
In part due to my close relationship to the topic of research, but also as part of more 
general ‘best practice’ in conducting social research, several ethical, health and 
safety concerns were monitored and addressed throughout the course of the project. 
 
The safety of my participants was central to my research practice. Care was taken at 
all stages of the research to ensure that participants were informed about the nature 
of the study, and the potential for negative effects. I was highly sensitive to the fact 
that talking about past events and current behaviour, along with the focus on self-
injury itself, could well cause participants upset and distress (Lee, 1993; 
McCormack, 2004; Plummer, 2001; Shaw, 2005). As far as possible I alerted 
participants to this, to ensure that their consent was as informed as possible (Crow et 
al., 2006). The two-stage nature of data collection helped in part to monitor 
participants’ well-being, as I was able to check with them how the research process 
was affecting them. In most cases, participants reported that the experience was 
‘strange’ but not negatively so, and in many instances participants assured me that 
the research had been a positive experience.  
 
In order to address my personal health and safety, it was agreed that I would see a 
counsellor during the fieldwork. This would allow me a weekly outlet for any 
problems or challenges I faced in my personal life, which might be exacerbated by 
my researching self-injury. I felt that it was particularly important to do this during 
the fieldwork stage of the research, since I would be closely involved with the lives 
of people who had self-injured, and sharing stories with them which could potentially 
be upsetting and difficult for me to deal with. The support I received from the weekly 
counselling was supplemented by meetings and talks with my PhD supervisors. I was 
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lucky to have a supportive supervisory team, which enabled me to manage the 
research and my workload in a way which, together with the counselling, avoided 
any major upset during the course of the project. 
 
Finally, my attempts to involve participants in data analysis were firmly rooted in 
ethical concerns. These ethical concerns were related in turn to concerns about the 
validity of any claims I would make on the basis of the research. At the beginning of 
the research, I was especially concerned that my analyses of the interview data would 
be invalid, that I might interpret the words of my participants in ways that they 
would not agree with, or in ways that they did not intend. Throughout the course of 
the research I reassessed these concerns, especially following a re-reading of Stanley 
and Wise’s (1993: 168) arguments regarding the necessity (or not) of attempting to 
engage research participants in analysis. Nevertheless, my early anxieties concerning 
the impact of my research on my participants were central to my initial decision to 
use collaborative research techniques.  
 
3.2 Sampling and recruiting 
3.2.1 Recruitment 
 
I was keen to avoid the sampling biases of most existing work on self-injury. As 
described in Chapter 1, previous work has focused overly on female, clinical 
samples, thus I hoped to recruit equal numbers of men and women. In addition, I 
hoped to recruit people from a range of socio-economic backgrounds. Much existing 
qualitative work on self-injury appears to privilege middle-class voices (e.g. Adler & 
Adler, 2007). In order to maximise my chances of recruiting a diverse sample, my 
recruitment strategies were varied, and my sampling both theoretical and purposive. I 
wanted to speak to a broad range of men and women who had self-injured, from a 
variety of socio-economic backgrounds, who had different levels of involvement in 
medical and psychiatric services. Such a sample would allow me to explore 
understandings of self-injury in diverse social contexts. 
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I planned to recruit primarily through community sites in order to attempt to involve 
at least some people who had not used services. In the first instance, I placed posters 
advertising the study (Appendix A) in four community centres located in less 
affluent areas of Edinburgh. I hoped that this would help me to reach participants 
from lower socio-economic backgrounds. Staff at the community centres put up the 
posters for me, and I also provided them with flyers that could be placed near the 
posters for people to take away. In addition, I began placing weekly adverts on an 
online community website. The research was also advertised to a voluntary service 
network I was involved in. In order to facilitate recruitment, I set up a website 
dedicated to the research. All of my advertisements included a link to the website, 
and the site provided details about the type of research I was planning, information 
about self-injury, contact details for me, as well as links to further information and 
support for self-injury (www.tardis.ed.ac.uk/~amy). The website also allowed me to 
set up an email account for the research (self-injury@tardis.ed.ac.uk).  
 
In addition to advertisements, I also recruited informally through a variety of 
personal networks I had in the university; voluntary sector; and through non-
academic employment I was involved in. In these cases, recruitment was not active, 
and I was approached by individuals who heard about my research and wanted to 
take part. Finally, part of my eventual sample was a result of snowballing from 
existing participants. Again, this aspect of recruitment was not solicited by me – 
rather, participants offered to pass on details of the study to other people they knew 
who had self-injured. I decided it was better to accept all offers of help, as informal 
concerns were frequently raised as to how successful I would be in recruiting 
anyone, especially men, who had self-injured. Although I was fairly confident about 
recruiting participants, I was aware that self-injury was viewed as a ‘secretive’ 
activity, and that people might be reluctant to come forward and talk about the 
behaviour.   
 
Recruitment took place in two phases. During the first phase, between April and 
October 2007 I interviewed ten people, seven female and three male. I then stopped 
recruiting for six months, in order to conduct early analysis and complete 
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transcription. I recommenced recruitment in April 2008, and changed my 
advertisements so that they focused only on involving male participants. I was able 
to recruit a further two male participants during this time, so my final sample was 
made up of five men and seven women. Overall I was contacted by eleven males and 
nine females (including those who did eventually get involved) about involvement in 
the study. Five men who contacted me about involvement dropped out at various 
stages of the early recruitment process, either after receiving an information pack, or 
just prior to an arranged interview. One man who contacted me lived too far away 
from the research site to travel for an interview. Two women contacted me late on in 
the research about involvement, at a point where I had switched recruitment to men 
only in an attempt to achieve a gender balanced sample. My success with recruitment 
points to the importance and practical possibility of aiming for a gender balanced 
sample in research on self-injury. 
 
In the early stages of the research planning, it was agreed that recruitment should be 
purposive and continue until ‘saturation’ occurred. Following work by Guest et al 
(2006), I provisionally suggested a sample size of 12 and this was agreed as a 
minimum. Although recruitment was largely successful, and could have continued, I 
decided to stop recruiting at 12. This was partly reflective of my belief that data 
saturation was indeed occurring, but was also related to my health and safety. At that 
point in the research I did not feel comfortable involving further people in the 
research, a situation which was exacerbated by my pregnancy and impending 
maternity leave. Further, by this stage, my weekly counselling had ceased. Despite 
receiving the counselling at a relatively low cost which was covered by my research 
funds, I had reached a point where I could no longer justify the expense.  
3.2.2 The sample 
 
The table below gives a very brief overview of the sample, roughly in the order in 
which I interviewed them. In the examined version of this thesis more biographical 
details were provided. It was agreed that to further protect confidentiality, these 
details would be removed in the final version. All of the names are pseudonyms.  
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Table 1: Overview of Sample 
 












Belinda (21) Clerical   SC; SBa. 
(16-present) 
Hostel. 




Dinah (32) Charity   SC; SB; SBu 
 (13-24) 
Partner, one 
child under 3.  
Emma (37) Retired/incapacity   SC 
 (15-35) 
Alone. 
Harriet (26) Incapacity   SC 
(16-present) 
Alone. 
Milly (28) Student (UG)  SC  
 (16-20). 
Shared flat. 
Robert (33) Student (UG)  SC  
(23-present). 
Communal/hall 
Rease (28) Student (UG)  SC; SBu 
(15-early/mid 20s) 
Partner  
Mark (33) Teacher   SC 
(17-20) 
Shared flat 
Francis (25) Student (PG)  SBu; SC 
(19-22) 
Partner  
Justin (28) Tradesperson  Self-cutting 
8 years (16-23) 
Alone 
 
                                                 
5
 SBa = self-battery; SC = self-cutting; SBu = self-burning. 
6
 Ages from-to in brackets. Does not indicate periods of abstinence. 
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Although necessarily simplified, the table gives an overall picture of the sample. It 
demonstrates their differing involvement in self-injury; and their various household 
types. In addition, the sample was also diverse in terms of sexuality, with a 
significant proportion describing themselves as homosexual (Belinda, Emma, Robert, 
Milly) or bisexual, (Rease). 
 
The sample was less diverse in terms of ethnicity and nationality. All but two of the 
participants were white and British (3 English and 7 Scottish).The exceptions were 
Belinda who was white and Australian, and Harriet who was Scottish and of East 
Asian ethnicity. A significant proportion of the sample were students. This feature of 
the sample is partly a result of the snowball section of the sample, most of whom 
were students (Robert, Milly and Rease). The section on occupation is designed to 
indicate socio-economic status; however, it largely obscures the particulars of the 
diverse socio-economic backgrounds of the participants. For instance, some of the 
students (Robert and Rease) were from lower socio-economic backgrounds; Harriet, 
although currently on incapacity benefits, had a relatively affluent background. 
Finally, although in Belinda and Emma I had a younger (21) and an older (37) 
participant, most were aged between 26 and 33. This no doubt led from my 
recruitment strategies, which were dependent upon my personal networks, those of 
existing participants, and upon the internet, a resource which might be more well-
used by relatively younger people. 
 
3.3 The interviews 
 
3.3.1 Interview contexts 
 
Most of the participants initially contacted me by email; therefore most of the 
negotiations regarding how the interviews would be conducted were carried out via 
this medium. I offered to meet all participants informally in the first instance, to give 
them a better insight into the research, who I was, and whether they really did want 
to get involved. Belinda, Dinah, and Justin took up this offer, and hopefully this 
helped them to make a more informed decision about involvement in the research. 
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This practice also helped to ease some of the tension of the first interview, as it 
would not also be a first meeting. 
 
In all cases, participants were asked to indicate where they would like the interview 
carried out. I had expected most to prefer to be interviewed at home; however, the 
majority of the interviews were actually conducted in my office at the University. 
Perhaps because of the subject matter, participants seemed to prefer to talk 
somewhere away from where they lived. My office provided a more neutral space, 
not too private, or public. A minority of participants were interviewed in cafés 
(Rease) or bars (Mark and Francis). Harriet’s first interview was conducted at the 
University, whereas for her second I went to her flat, this being the only instance 
where I interviewed a participant in their home.  
 
Most of the interviews proceeded in a casual, relaxed and informal manner. At the 
start of each first interview I discussed the aims of the research with the participant, 
and we signed a consent form together (Appendix B). I felt that it was ethically 
important to make the consent as ‘informed’ as possible, having reflected upon the 
problems of incorrectly assuming tacit knowledge about research practices (Cordon 
& Sainsbury, 2006). Therefore the consent form covered both the participant’s 
consent to be part of the study, the recording of the interview, and included a section 
on my future use of verbatim transcriptions and quotes. This gave participants the 
option not to be quoted verbatim. In practice all participants gave their consent for 
this. However, I maintain that highlighting this aspect of the research to participants 
will have improved their understanding of what happens to the data after the 
interview. 
 
The interviews took between forty-five minutes and three hours, with most taking 
around two hours. Following one particularly long interview with Milly, I began 
negotiating the length of the interview at the beginning. I believe this was helpful for 
both myself and the participant in setting boundaries and expectations.  
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3.3.2 Who am I? Reflecting on the position of the interviewer and 
the effects of disclosure. 
 
It is increasingly accepted that the ‘position/s’ of the interviewer should be 
acknowledged and engaged with throughout social research, as part of good research 
practice (Abell et al., 2006; Reinharz, 1997; Stanley & Wise, 1993). The ways in 
which the researcher may be perceived by those they are researching should be 
integral to both practice and analysis. This stance rejects attempts at ‘researcher 
objectivity’ and takes the subjective and changeable positions (or ‘selves’) of the 
researcher and the researched as essential analytical foci. The interview is viewed as 
a process of mutual meaning-making and co-production of knowledge (Bondi, 2005; 
Holstein & Gubrium, 1995). As one of the ‘selves’ I would present in the research 
was someone who had also self-injured, this orientation towards the possible effects 
and influences of the position of the researcher was of special importance to this 
study.  
 
Although I was always quite clear that my own self-injury would have to be 
disclosed to participants, the issue was carefully discussed and debated throughout 
the early stages of the research. Ethically, I felt that it was important to be honest 
with participants about my own experiences. This followed from feminist 
methodological work which highlighted the unethical, and indeed impractical nature 
of attempts at interviewer objectivity and reticence (Oakley, 1981; Ryan, 2006). 
Early moves in academia towards more ethical research practices tended to focus 
around finding similarities and common ground between researcher and researched 
(Abell et al., 2006). This would be a problematic endeavour, and I maintained that 
my disclosure would be designed to explore both similarities and differences 
between myself and the interviewee, and that this approach would strengthen the 
quality of the research (Stanley & Wise, 1993: 59). I  was also conscious that my 
disclosure might not always be welcomed by participants (Abell et al., 2006).  
 
The decision to disclose my self-injury to participants was not easy, nor was it taken 
lightly. In general, my self-injury was and is kept hidden and I had concerns about 
the emotional effects and safety of my disclosure, as well as the extent to which this 
 76 
might then lead to disclosure in more formal professional settings such as published 
work and conference papers. These concerns were tackled in two ways. Primarily, 
the matter was addressed through support and discussion with my supervisors. This 
led to the decision to keep disclosure minimal – that is, my self-injury would only be 
disclosed to people other than research participants if it was strictly necessary and 
not as a rule. Secondly, I was able to monitor, discuss and explore the issue in my 
weekly counselling sessions.  
 
With participants, I disclosed my self-injury routinely in the early stages of the 
research relationship. My self-injury was mentioned in the research information 
leaflets and handouts that I provided, in most cases prior to meeting participants 
(Appendix C). I took an open approach to my self-injury during meetings and 
interviews with participants – making it clear that I was happy to answer any 
questions that they had for me, as well as offering information about myself and my 
self-injury if I felt this would be well received.  
 
In general, this approach worked well on several levels. It helped me to clarify 
certain points and understandings during the interviews, tackling whether and how 
far meanings were shared or contrasting. It also helped to encourage and inform 
participants as to the level of disclosure and the type of talk I expected from them. 
Though I tried as far as possible to let the participant set these levels, it is quite likely 
that participants were led to an extent by the way that I talked about my own 
behaviour. Sharing my own experiences was also integral to fostering a research 
relationship and interview tone that was supportive and permissive. Some 
participants explicitly said that they enjoyed this feature of the interviews, 
contrasting it favourably with experiences they had had with clinicians or counsellors 
who remained silent and unresponsive.  
 
Overall, the decision to disclose my self-injury had positive effects upon the 
research. However, there were some challenges and limitations. Firstly, at times the 
interview became unbalanced, and I disclosed ‘too much’ limiting the time available 
for my participants to share their own stories. This could be seen as a necessary 
downside to my approach, however in future research I would be more conscious of 
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this and therefore limit and monitor my input more closely. Secondly, and as I noted 
above, my disclosure no doubt guided and potentially limited what participants felt 
able to say. As far as possible I have engaged with these limitations in my analysis. 
Ultimately, such engagement is a strength of this approach rather than a weakness, as 
it allows such ‘interviewer effects’ to be acknowledged rather than ignored. 
 
My status as ‘someone who had self-injured’ was only one ‘self’ that was implicated 
in my research practice. I tried as far as possible to be sensitive to the effects of my 
gender, age, social class and background, and my position as a ‘researcher’ or 
‘researcher in training’ in my analysis. For my last two interviews (Francis and 
Justin) there was the further layer of my pregnancy, and therefore my position as a 
future mother (see Hallowell et al., 2005 for similar experiences). This became an 
important issue in my interviews with Justin especially, throwing into relief our 
different perspectives on families and intimacy. Justin described himself as 
commitment phobic, and particularly ‘scared’ of the idea of marriage and children. I 
chose to disclose my (at that point not overly noticeable) pregnancy. Although at the 
time I was conscious that my disclosure could have limited this conversation, in 
practice it allowed an honest and open conversation, with both parties being clearer 
about the position of the other.  
 
Another important aspect of my self that had a significant impact on some interviews 
was my ‘alternative’ physical appearance
7
. As I discuss further in Chapters 4 and 7, 
several of my participants engaged in discussion around body modification and 
‘alternative’ subcultures. It is highly likely that my own appearance had some 
influence here also, indeed, in some interviews participants referred directly to my 
own body modifications. 
 
Finally, and as I discuss further in the following sections, my position as a 
‘researcher’ appeared to have a significant impact on the interviews. Despite my 
attempts at encouraging participants to challenge my versions of their stories, few 
took up this challenge. Indeed, in most cases participants appeared to accept and 
                                                 
7
 I have several visible facial piercings and wear a lot of black. 
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affirm my interpretations of their lives. It is possible that their ready acceptance was 
related to a view of me as an ‘expert’ or ‘professional’, a situation which may well 
have been exacerbated by the University setting in which most interviews took place. 
 
3.3.3 Constructing a history, telling a story. 
 
The first interview was designed to focus around the participant’s ‘life-story’. By co-
constructing a ‘life-story’ with participants I was able to locate self-injury temporally 
in the participants’ life, as well as getting an impression of the contexts of the inter-
personal relationships through which this life-story was played out. 
 
In my pilot interview (Anna) the life-story was developed through the use of prompts 
taken from Plummer (2001: 125). In the actual interview, we only discussed three of 
these, as Anna talked quite freely and we did not have time to cover all of them: 
 
1. Tell me about your life, in about twenty minutes or so if you can. Begin 
where you like and include whatever you wish. 
2. What were the most important turning points in your life? 
3. Tell me about the happiest moments in your life/ 
 
However, despite Anna’s willingness to talk, I felt the interview lacked direction and 
that both Anna and myself were frequently unsure how much depth to go into, or 
what aspects of her life to focus on. Anna was of course aware of the focus of my 
research, and it was therefore her self-injury and mental health which were the 
dominant themes. This lack of structure and purpose led, at least indirectly, to the 
interview turning quickly to very sensitive areas (suicide) which I was not entirely 
ready to deal with. Anna was also aware that she was my pilot interviewee; therefore 
a lot of potentially awkward or tense moments were dissipated with self-deprecating 
humour on my part, Anna’s patience, and mutual laughter.  
 
In order to avoid this directionless quality, and also to refocus participants to their 
life ‘in general’ (rather than their mental health or self-injury specifically), I used a 
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life grid in the subsequent interviews (Appendix D). I developed this through 
attendance at a seminar on the use of the life-grid in sensitive research
8
, and some 
published work on the matter (Bell, 2005). During those interviews where I used the 
life-grid, I carried out the writing, while the participant talked. I encouraged each 
participant to start wherever they wanted to on the grid; though in practice most 
followed the grid chronologically. It is possible that participants may have engaged 
with the grid differently had I suggested they fill it in themselves. However, 
practically, I felt that it was better that I filled in the grid. This meant that I would be 
able to read my own hand-writing and also emphasised the co-construction of the 
grid.  
 
Participants used the grid to varying degrees. For instance Rease, said that she did 
not want to use it at all. Others used the grid initially, but as the interview progressed 
referred to it less frequently. Conversely, participants such as Milly and Justin 
engaged closely and rigorously with the grid, attempting to be precise regarding 
dates, times and situations. In these cases, I tried to reassure participants that the grid 
was there to prompt talk, rather than comprehensively record a life-history.  
 
I found the life-grid to be a useful tool in most cases. The grid gave participants a 
better idea of the types of subjects I was interested in, as well as giving us a joint 
‘project’ to work upon during the interview. This dissipated or avoided many 
potentially awkward silences by giving us something to focus upon. Finally, the way 
in which participants tended to use the grid (moving from top to bottom) meant that 
self-injury was usually addressed towards the end of the first interview, when the 
participant reached the final subject cell of ‘health and ill health’.  
 
As discussed above, I originally intended to offer participants the chance to become 
actively involved in the process of analysis and in the construction of their ‘life-
story’. I felt this would be a more ethical and valid way of generating data, avoiding 
as far as possible my ‘imposing’ potentially unwanted or unintended meanings or 
structures upon participant’s words. However, subsequently, I have become aware of 
                                                 
8
 At the Centre for Research on Families and Relationships, Edinburgh University.  
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other perspectives, which criticise collaborative approaches, warning that they can 
potentially “exploitative or distressing” (Barbour, 2001: 1117). Indeed, in practice, 
this strategy proved hugely problematic. For instance, Anna, my pilot interviewee, 
was quite clear that she was not interested in doing this; she did not want to read 
either a transcript or a summary of the interview, telling me “do what you want with 
it” (Fieldnotes, April 2007). Belinda, my second interviewee, was living in a hostel 
when I spoke with her, with limited access to a computer, so it would have been 
difficult for me to send a summary, and I was concerned about how much privacy 
she would have had to read one had I sent it.  
 
The next few respondents were interested in engaging with the research, and I was 
practically more able to provide them with summaries since they had access to email. 
For Dinah, Craig, Emma, and Milly I wrote up a short two or three page summary of 
what we discussed in the first interview, and sent it to them via email prior to the 
second interview so that they had time to read and reflect upon it. It was then my 
intention to begin the second interview with a discussion about the summary, and to 
encourage them to comment upon or challenge what I had written. At the end of the 
summary I also indicated four or five themes or issues that I had felt were significant, 
and encouraged the participants to add any further themes that they felt were 
important. 
 
Dinah was the first person I did this with, and the process did not run entirely 
smoothly. I sent Dinah the summary a few days before the second interview. 
Although she had looked at it already, she brought her copy of the summary with her 
to the interview, while I had not printed a copy out for myself. The following is from 
the interview transcript: 
 
[Notes on interview: I really should have printed out two versions of this (the 
summary) so we both had a hard copy – I can feel the awkwardness of me sitting 
there and watching her] 
  
Dinah - you’ve not said anything that was inaccurate, or anything like that… 
……………………… . [massive pause]…… ………… ………………[cut] I didn’t find 
it, it was a bit strange, but I didn’t find it difficult to read what you’d written, I think 
its helpful, its helpful to have it like that  
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The interview proceeded in a rather stilted manner, although there were sections 
where talk was more relaxed. Markedly, Dinah did not engage with the summary a 
great deal, nor did she challenge anything that I had written. I had hoped that the 
summary would encourage further reflection and elaboration. In practice, the 
summary seemed to have served to fix the ‘story’. Despite this problematic first 
experience I persisted and provided Craig, Emma and Milly with summaries as well. 
In each case, although the stilted nature of my second interview with Dinah was not 
repeated, participants similarly tended to accept my summary with almost no 
qualifications.  
 
The process of writing the summaries was also difficult. I found it immensely 
stressful as, given the subject matter of the first interview, in most cases I was trying 
to summarise the participant’s entire life. Others have noted the problems and 
stresses involved in presenting research findings to respondents (Hoskins & Stoltz, 
2005). Further, in many ways the process was counter-intuitive. In my desire to 
encourage co-production of narrative it seemed I was simultaneously cementing the 
‘stories’ of participants, and, worse, they were accepting this! Eventually, and 
following consultation with my supervisors, it was decided that the process of 
writing the summaries was not having the intended effects – and indeed appeared to 
be limiting rather than expanding discussion in some cases – was creating extra work 
and emotional strain for me, and should therefore stop.  
 
There was one slight exception to this, however, in Rease who requested the entire 
transcripts of both of her interviews. Rease was particularly interested in my attempts 
at a more power-neutral methodology, and was keen to see what the transcripts 
looked like. However, despite her interest and willingness to engage, she too 
accepted what was written relatively unproblematically. She did make one request, 
that a negative phrase she had used to describe someone close to her be toned down, 
but that was all. This process of experimentation with attempting to engage research 
participants in the process of knowledge production was instructive. Following 
Cornwall and Jewkes (1995) and McCormack (2004), I discovered that participants 
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themselves are not always willing partners in this process. They do not necessarily 
share the same concerns as researchers regarding the perceived power disparities in 
research relationships, or the potentially different ways of telling and interpreting 
stories.    
 
3.3.4 The second interviews. 
 
For the first few interviews, while I was providing participants with a summary of 
the first interview, the second interview served two purposes. Firstly, it allowed 
myself and the participant to discuss both the first interview and my summary of it, 
checking that we had a similar understanding regarding what had been discussed, and 
what the key themes had been. As discussed above, in practice, my version of events 
was rarely challenged. Although this led to me deciding not to produce summaries 
for later participants, in the later interviews I still spent the first portion of the second 
interview going over the life grid verbally with participants. This served as an 
introduction into the second interview, and gave participants an opportunity to 
amend or add to what we had written in the life grid in the first interview. 
Occasionally, participants did take this opportunity to add to what had been said, 
though more frequently they agreed with everything. Again, this had the slightly 
uncomfortable outcome of seeming to fix the participant’s initial narrative, rather 
than destabilising or questioning it. This raised questions about the utility of my own 
position as a reflexive, interpretive researcher, working as I was with people who did 
not necessarily share my concerns with the constructed and changeable nature of 
reality! Despite these challenges, I felt that it was ethically appropriate to at least 
give participants the chance to question or amend their earlier account, even if they 
rarely took up this opportunity.  
 
The second interview was also designed to prompt further discussion around key 
themes that had been raised either in the first interview, or that had arisen from the 
research more generally. In the earlier interviews where I provided participants with 
summaries, I also indicated themes that I was interested in talking about further, as 
well as inviting participants to add their own themes. In the later interviews, I still 
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prepared a written list of themes, but this was produced at the beginning of the 
second interview rather than prior to it. Once we had discussed the first interview, we 
generally then moved on to discuss the themes, usually in the order that I had written 
them, although I tried to encourage the participants to address the themes in 
whichever order they preferred.  
 
The themes that I identified for participants reflected areas of the participant’s 
interview that I was particularly interested in. These themes lead inductively from a 
close reading of the interview transcript, as well as my wider reading around the 
topic. In some instances, the themes reflected what participants appeared to have 
highlighted as important factors in their self-injury. In the later interviews, I also 
raised broader themes that were emerging from the research more generally. 
Appendix E details the changing nature of the themes that I highlighted with each 
participant. This highlights my early and enduring interest in certain aspects of the 
lived experience of self-injury. In particular, pain, emotions, practical aspects of self-
injury, and the influence of ‘other people’ on self-injury were raised with most 
participants. Some themes that arose with several participants are not addressed in 
this thesis. Guilt, responsibility and alcohol appeared to be important issues for 
several participants. Ultimately, this thesis can only address so many issues, and is 
not intended to be a comprehensive reflection of all of the concerns raised in the 
interviews. This identification of ‘important’ themes between the first and second 
interviews represented an early, yet instructive, level of my analysis. In hindsight, it 
is clear that even at this stage I was ordering the data according to wider research 
interests – developed from the process of doing the interviews, as well as my more 
general reading and thinking on the topic.   
 
Like my other attempts to encourage greater participation in the construction of the 
interview data, my suggestion that participants come up with themes of their own 
was also rarely taken up. In fact, only Milly introduced her own additional theme. 
Participants did engage with the themes I had produced, however, discussing them in 
terms of relative importance – though never dismissing them entirely. Again, this 
raises questions regarding the impact and influence of the research process and my 
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research practice in fixing theories and explanations about self-injury rather than 
challenging them. 
 
3.3.5 Reflecting on the interviews. 
 
Although conducting two interviews may not have increased the validity of my 
research, the very fact of having more time with each participant increased the 
amount of data I was able to collect from each participant. Conducting the first 
interview around the life-story of participants was generally successful in allowing 
me to develop a sense of the contexts in which their self-injury occurred. The two-
stage data collection also helped with the development of rapport between myself 
and the interviewee, with the second interview in most cases being a more relaxed, 
and in some cases more informative event.  
 
My attempts at involving participants more fully in the co-production of research 
data were generally unsuccessful. It is possible that I could have done more to 
facilitate participants’ engagement with this aspect of the research, perhaps by being 
more explicit about my own understandings about the flexible and changeable nature 
of interpretation and understanding. However, equally, it could be that my position as 
researcher prevented the level of engagement I sought. Participants could have felt 
unable to challenge my interpretations, either because I was viewed as an ‘expert’ or 
because I had also self-injured. If participants thought I had no experience with self-
injury, they may have felt more able to challenge me. Finally, as I noted above, some 
participants were simply unwilling or unable to engage with the research out-with 
participating in the interview. In these instances, it would have been unethical to 
press for greater involvement. Indeed, as a final reflection, I am now unsure as to 
whether it is more ethical to offer this opportunity at all. 
 
3.4 Analysing and writing 
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I was clear from the beginning of my research that analysis was not a bounded, 
limited part of research, but rather “a pervasive activity throughout the life of a 
research project” (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996: 10-11, in Silverman, 2005: 149). 
Although this section focuses explicitly on the more prominent aspects of analysis – 
my writing and formal analysis – I have tried to acknowledge throughout the links 
between my research practice, analysis and theory.  
 
3.4.1 Field notes and ‘the diaries’. 
 
From the beginning of the research I kept regular ‘field notes’, mostly in the form of 
an electronic diary, but including hand written notebooks. These notes and diaries 
allowed me to think through (or write out) emerging and developing ideas and 
theories throughout the course of the research. They also served as a platform for my 
own reflexive practice with regard to the research. Due in part to my personal 
relationship with the research topic, but mainly as an aspect of good research 
practice, having space to work through and develop my position with regard to the 
research was essential. Regularly updating and reviewing these notes allowed me to 
track common ideas, developing theories, and to record and highlight my emergent 
analyses. 
 
The diaries also served as a record of my relationships with participants outside of 
the formal, recorded interviews. I met with Belinda, Dinah, Emma and Rease on at 
least one, and sometimes several, occasions to chat informally about the research. 
Rease in particular was interested in my developing theories and read and 
commented upon versions of papers I presented at conferences. I also used the 
diaries to reflect on my research practice, taking care to write notes following each 
interview in order to record details about the contexts of the interviews.  
 
In particular, the diaries were useful during formal analysis. Writing and recording 
my thought processes during this stage of the research served two primary purposes. 
Firstly, writing about analysis at the time enabled me to work through complex ideas, 
weighing up different ways of viewing the data and testing my understanding of the 
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codes that I developed. Secondly, this writing has been central to my ability to write 
this chapter, serving as a reminder of what I actually did. As I discuss further in the 
remainder of this section, my analytic practices altered, developed and (I hope) 
improved during the research. 
 
3.4.2 Transcribing and making stories. 
 
Transcription can be seen as an early stage in analysis, as choosing certain 
transcription practices is a first step in beginning to organise (analyse) data. In my 
early research practice, due to the time constraints of having to produce summaries 
for participants in relatively short periods of time, I initially transcribed interviews in 
summary form. This gave me an overview of what was said in the interview, but 
gave less indication as to how talk was structured. The summaries tended to obscure 
pauses, inflections, and often my own words. After the first four interviews, I began 
to space the interviews more favourably
9
, which gave me more time to produce 
detailed transcriptions. I later went back and re-transcribed the earlier interviews I 
had initially summarised.  
 
When it came to my later analysis the interviews had been transcribed verbatim. 
Although be no means as detailed or precise
10
 as they could have been, the 
transcriptions indicated pauses, included inflections (such as um, err etc.), and 
importantly, included my own interjections and questions in full. As far as possible I 
attempted to reflect the feel of participant’s speech by using any dialect or vernacular 
language that they used.  
 
My practice of writing and providing summaries for participants in the early stages 
of the research was another stage of analysis. As I discuss above, this process was 
stressful. The summaries I was constructing were not just for my use analytically, but 
were written for participants. Thus, whilst writing, I was painfully aware of how I 
was constructing and summarising the ‘life story’ that had been developed in the 
                                                 
9
 I interviewed Belinda, Craig and Dinah concurrently, sometimes on consecutive days.  
10
 By this I mean that I did not time pauses, or work to strict transcription rules such as those used in 
e.g. conversation analysis.  
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interview. I was very careful in how I wrote the summaries, as I was conscious that 
the reading of the summary for some could have been traumatic or painful. At the 
same time, I wanted to present as accurate a picture as I could of what had been 
discussed in the first interview. In some cases this left me in a difficult position, 
whereby I wanted to present a positive picture of the participant’s life, but 
simultaneously had to report, of course, more negative aspects. The process of 
writing the summaries was a difficult balancing act between competing and 
conflicting aims, and, ultimately, the process was not helpful. However, the practice 
of writing out such summaries certainly highlighted the potentially diverse ways that 
the ‘same’ story could be written. 
 
I also wrote summaries of interviews that were explicitly constructed for the 
purposes of analysis. As these would not be read by participants, they were less 
problematic to write. The practice of writing summaries, both of individual 
interviews and later of individual ‘cases’ (consisting of both interviews from one 
participant) helped me to develop my understanding and interpretations of 
participants’ stories. I used techniques developed from narrative analysis in this 
process, a paper by McCormack (2004) being particularly helpful in directing my 
writing. At this stage I also began to compare cases, examining similarities and 
differences in both the form and content of the interviews and cases. 
 
As comparison progressed and I accumulated more and more summaries, the data 
began to feel more and more overwhelming. At this stage, the decision was taken to 
attempt more structured comparisons by beginning to code the data using computer 
aided qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). I was initially wary of using 
coding or computer programmes to aid analysis. I was highly conscious of the 
potential that coding had to ‘fracture’ participants’ responses, and for splinters of 
data to be taken out of context resulting in potentially problematic and invalid 
analyses (Riessman, 1993; Ritchie et al., 2003, 229). CAQDAS specifically had been 
similarly critiqued, with some raising concerns that the use of such forms of data 
management could lead to formulaic and restricted analysis (Coffey et al., 1996). 
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These concerns were important, as they suggested features which ran counter to my 
exploratory, theory-building aims.  
 
I decided, however, to take a pragmatic approach to the use of coding and CAQDAS. 
With twenty-four lengthy interviews, I needed some method of managing the data, 
and coding and CAQDAS offered this. I felt that so long as I remained sensitive to 
their potentially restrictive aspects, these methods could be beneficial.  
 
3.4.3 Looking at the bigger picture: coding and CAQDAS 
 
My use of coding and CAQDAS altered as analysis progressed. Initially I set about 
coding using an approach influenced by grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). I 
commenced detailed reading of the transcripts, coding all aspects of the interview, 
developing new codes constantly. This resulted in huge lists of codes for each of the 
interviews I treated in this manner. However, I felt uncomfortable with this method 
of coding. It was designed to allow me to highlight ‘important’ themes from the 
interviews, and these themes would apparently ‘emerge’ through the process of 
coding. I felt that this approach was disingenuous. Firstly, it tended to privilege a 
quantitative approach to the themes – importance being related to the number of 
times a theme came up, rather than its qualitative importance – either to me or the 
participant. Secondly, I was highly conscious that the themes were not ‘emerging’ 
out of the data. I was privileging subjects and themes that I was already interested in: 
I was not an ‘objective’ research instrument.  
 
These concerns were amplified because in the early stages of the research I had 
already identified three broad themes that I was interested in pursuing. These themes 
had developed during the course of the interviews, my reading around the topic of 
self-injury, and my theoretical interests. I began to reflect upon the necessity of 
coding in this ‘bottom up’ manner, when I already had ‘top level’ themes that I was 
interested in exploring. My research aims were exploratory in nature, and the 
‘bottom up’ approach to coding was not the only way for me to address these aims. It 
became evident that it might be more fruitful to code in a ‘top down’ manner – 
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searching for and allocating pre-set themes in the interview data, rather than 
pretending that I was identifying them ‘objectively’, only to discard those I was less 
interested in anyway. 
 
I began, then, to recode all of the transcripts using just three broad codes, reflecting 
my theoretical concerns: bodies; emotions; and communication (Figure 1). This 
process was helpful in forcing me to interrogate and assess what I meant by each of 
these themes. There were numerous and multiple overlaps, and this served to confirm 
and develop my theoretical perspectives. Throughout most of the coding process I 
viewed the three themes as triangular, each influencing, and being influenced by the 









EMOTION            COMMUNICATION 
 
 
As my writing and analysis progressed, however, I began to assign greater 
importance to the theme of bodies. This decision was partly pragmatic, allowing me 
to focus my analysis (and the thesis!) more clearly. However it also reflected my 
increasing theoretical concerns with the importance of material, corporeal bodies in 
understandings of self-injury.  
 
Whilst coding the interview transcripts using these broad themes I reflected carefully 
upon how I was assigning different types of talk to the codes. Frequently, sections 
were coded with all three themes, and this reflected their inter-related nature. 
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Nonetheless, I found it useful to code the data in this manner, giving me a way of 
organising my analytical work as well as challenging my assumptions and 
understandings about each of the themes. My research diary was especially important 
at this stage, recording and giving space for a reflexive attitude towards my research 
practice. This entailed asking questions of myself, and interrogating the coding 
decisions I was making.  
 
Once most of the interviews had been coded with the three themes I began to develop 
sub-codes. I went about doing this in two distinct ways. In the first instance, I 
developed theoretically driven sub-codes. These were developed for pragmatic 
reasons, for papers I needed to write for conferences. Thus, I was interested in 
developing a sub-code on emotion work because I had already written a paper on 
this, and the process of doing so convinced me that this was a matter I wanted to 
investigate further. This code was located within the broad code of emotions. I had 
also produced a paper on self-injury and attention seeking, which had entailed me 
developing a sub-code of attention-seeking which I located within the broader code 
of communication. Finally, I presented a paper on self-injury and pain, for which I 
developed a sub-code of pain, within the broader code of bodies. The practice of 
reading through the transcripts, conducting key word searches, and developing and 
refining these sub-codes helped to improve my familiarity with the data set. These 
sub-codes represented important theoretical interests that I held.  
 
Alongside this, I was concerned that, thus far, my analysis had been guided mainly 
by my theoretical and intellectual interests. I decided that at least some of the 
analytical work should try to identify codes in a less directive manner. In doing so, I 
remained sceptical about how far this process would be objective. I would still be 
identifying themes I was more interested in (for theoretical, intellectual and even 
biographical reasons). However, by coding in this more open manner, I was able to 
systematically organise the data into manageable themes. This process also forced 
me to look at the data closely, to see what was ‘there’.   
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Therefore, I recommenced sub-coding the broad codes, but with a more open 
attitude. To do this, I carried out detailed readings of each code. Whilst doing this I 
highlighted sections of text, and made brief notes in the margins. This generated a 
series of initial themes. Themes were created by identifying subjects that arose 
frequently, or which I subjectively felt were important (either to me or to the 
participants). I then began to sub-code using the initial themes. During this process, 
the themes were streamlined, altered and adapted. The final sub-codes that I 
generated through analysis can be found in Appendix F.   
 
3.5 The status of the accounts 
 
I want to conclude this chapter with some reflections on the ‘status’ of the accounts. 
This issue first arose in the early stages of the research design process, when I was 
deciding how many interviews to do with each participant. I initially felt that I would 
get more ‘depth’ and perhaps more ‘truth’ if I conducted multiple interviews with 
each participant. My review of the literature along with my monitoring of online 
resources about self-injury suggested that certain explanations were relatively 
common. I was interested in exploring how far these explanations were ‘true’ and I 
felt that repeat interviewing would be more likely to elicit different explanations. 
However, as previously discussed, ethically this approach was more difficult to 
justify. Further, throughout the course of the research, I began to question how I 
could make assessments as to the ‘truthfulness’ of different types of accounts.  
 
The participants in my study provided very different types and forms of account, as I 
discuss in detail in Chapter 8. For some participants, such as Anna, Harriet, Emma 
and Milly, telling their ‘life-story’ was not unusual; they had been involved in 
counselling, psychology, psychiatry, or writing an auto-biography in Emma’s case: 
activities which had required such self-reflection time and again. For other 
participants, Justin in particular, the process of talking about their life in an interview 
was entirely uncharted territory. The interview required them to engage in a type of 
talk that was relatively unfamiliar. With regard to self-injury itself, participants again 
had different levels of experience with talking about the issue. Justin maintained that 
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he had never spoken to anyone apart from me about his self-injury, Anna was clear 
that her self-injury was discussed with very few other people. In contrast, other 
participants, such as Milly, Harriet and Rease, were far more open about their 
behaviour, and as such described talking with others about their self-injury far more 
often. The types of accounts that the research produced then were various. In 
particular, some were more practiced than others, and I felt that it was important to 
address these differences. 
 
Scott and Lyman (1968) and Mills (1940) highlight the problems of studying 
motivation, and the unhelpful assumptions that can lead from such studies. Following 
Mead, Mills maintains that a sociological study of motives should treat them as 
originating from situations rather than from ‘within’ individuals (1940: 906). This 
perspective offers the possibility of answers, whereas attempting to discover what a 
person ‘really’ means is, as Mills points out, impossible (p. 909). These debates 
resonate with late-modern concerns with authenticity (Giddens, 1991), an issue 
which I returned to throughout my analysis. 
 
I addressed the problem of the ‘status’ of the accounts by focusing on what Mills 
termed ‘vocabularies of motive’ and what Scott and Lyman called ‘accounts’. This 
approach was ethically more justifiable as it avoided having to make (impossible) 
claims regarding the ‘truth’ of participant’s explanations. Instead, my analysis 
considered the forms of participant’s explanations, and attempted to relate these 
explanations to the social and cultural contexts in which they were manifested. These 
contexts included, of course, the context in which they were put to me – the 











This chapter will focus on the physical, bodily aspects of self-injury through a focus 
on the corporeal practices involved in self-injury. I will begin by briefly discussing 
what I mean by ‘bodies’, expanding upon theoretical issues raised in Chapter 2 and 
addressed throughout the thesis. I then move on to discussing the ways that 
participants implicated (their) bodies when talking about their self-injury. First, I 
examine the ways that participants talked about the methods they used to self-injure, 
focusing particularly on participants’ descriptions of their early self-injury through 
an examination of stories about the ‘first time’ that they self-injured. I then move on 
to the ways that participants talked about the physical sensations that their self-injury 
elicited, both pleasurable and painful. Finally I turn to participants’ talk about 
tending to their injuries and scars. I examine their discussions about healing, before 
discussing participants’ orientation towards their scars.  
 
4.1.2 Bodies and self-injury: theoretical concerns 
 
Although this chapter focuses on ‘bodies’ I am clear that ‘bodies’ are theoretically 
and conceptually problematic. They cannot be easily separated from emotions or 
minds, as represented in problematic dualist understandings (Crossley, 2001b; 
Williams & Bendelow, 1998). The ways that ‘bodies’ are understood and 
experienced by people are intimately related to the social contexts they inhabit: these 
understandings are linked to wider socio-cultural discourse regarding what bodies 
are, what they should do, and how they should feel. This understanding of the close 
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inter-relationships between bodies and emotions, and how these are expressed in 
socio-cultural beliefs and discourse informs the structure and central arguments of 
the thesis. This chapter focuses on bodies, through an examination of those aspects of 
self-injury which are most evidently material and, to a lesser extent, visible. This 
distinction is not easy or straight-forward – there are aspects of both emotions and 
communication which can also be understood as material and visible. Certainly, 
emotions are (as I will discuss in Chapter 5) inherently embodied (Williams & 
Bendelow, 1996a). Similarly, communication happens through and between bodies 
(Burkitt, 1997). Finally, as I argue in Chapters 6 and 7, an examination of the inter-
relationships between bodies, emotions and communication is especially useful in 
examining self-injury.  
 
As well as being an attempt to separate out the corporeal, carnal aspects of an 
embodied behaviour, this chapter necessarily addresses the attempts my participants 
and I made to put into words ideas and experiences which often resist verbal 
expression: the consistently unresolved question of how to ‘talk about bodies’. I am 
conscious that by attempting to talk about ‘bodies’ in this manner I may well be 
propagating a Cartesian vision of a disconnected body and mind which has been 
criticised by some (Crossley, 2001b; Williams & Bendelow, 1998). I maintain, 
however, that focusing on bodies, emotions and communication in turn will highlight 
rather than minimise the close inter-relationships between these analytic themes. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, my approach to bodies acknowledges their material, 
corporeal nature. This view emphasises the need for a “temporal element to social 
analysis” (Shilling, 2005: 12), which reflects my concern with the changes in the 
self-injured/self-injuring body over time. This concern with the temporality of bodies 
and embodiment is central to some of the ideas I present in this chapter. Self-injury 
in some cases (where visible, permanent marks are left on the body) represents a 
rather particular behaviour whereby memory of a ‘bodily event’ is likely influenced 
by the permanent marks themselves (Burnett & Holmes, 2001). While other 
behaviours which are less visibly permanent might more readily recede into the past, 
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for the self-injured body, the memory may be kept ‘fresh’ as it were by the continued 
existence of scarring.  
 
Finally, my perspective follows phenomenological theorists in locating the body as a 
key site for ‘lived experience’ (Crossley, 1995; Leder, 1990; Merleau-Ponty, 2009 
(1945)). We experience and perceive through the body: we are in the body and we 
are bodies. Self-injury is a behaviour which especially highlights this, as it involves 
acting upon bodies, and through bodies: the body of the person self-injuring is both 
actor and acted upon. Thus, I argue that any attempt to understand self-injury must 
attend to the bodily aspects of the behaviour, as it is a behaviour which inherently 
involves, implicates and affects the body. To date, the bodily nature of self-injury has 
been almost completely overlooked
11
. This chapter will demonstrate the importance 
of attending to the corporeal practices involved in self-injury, enacted upon and by 
the bodies of those who self-injure.  
 
4.2 Making the wound 
 
In this section I will introduce the ways that participants described injuring 
themselves, the tools and methods that they used. I then move on to descriptions of 
the immediate ‘aftermath’ of self-injury – the blood; the injury/wound; the 
participants’ reaction to these. Participants described a range of self-injurious 
behaviours. They had cut, burnt, scratched, picked at and hit their bodies, using a 
variety of tools, and “concentrating” on almost all areas of the body that were 
accessible. They related these activities to me in different ways: matter-of-factly; as 
part of their ‘life-story’; or sometimes as a separate and well defined narrative 
regarding a particular act. In particular, the ‘first time’ that participants had self-
injured was a key narrative for some.  
 
4.2.1 Early self-injury and the ‘first time’ 
 
                                                 
11
 A key exception to this, as previously noted, is Kay Inckle’s (2005, 2007) work. 
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For some participants, the ‘first time’ that they had injured themselves was a well-
remembered, perhaps well rehearsed, story. Those who could remember their ‘first 
time’ frequently related this to me in some detail. For Anna the first time that she 
self-injured was “way, way back” when she was aged 14. Like several other 
participants, she located the beginning of her self-injury in a quite distant past: 
 
“and….. I spose as far as the self-harm went like….. that ..that started when I was 14 
so this goes back like way, way back em and I star… I broke my wrist. First time, I 
did anything I broke my wrist. Got a hammer, and I just smashed it till it literally 
till it smashed I broke both bones in my wrist……. and I did that again and I did it 
again, I did it three times. Em…… and then….like it kindae progressed from there 
and I just started hitting myself with things so I would just have bruises and ….. 
and it wisnae….. … ah…it probably wasnae till I had Brandon that I started actually 
cutting myself…” 
 
Anna is rather matter-of fact here she “just” smashed her wrist, with a hammer, until 
the bones broke. This method of self-injury – self-battery – is discussed less often 
than self-cutting in existing literature. For Anna, it was the main way she injured 
herself from the age of 14 to her early 20s. She described how, after initially 
breaking her wrist, she went on to bruise herself regularly (using a rolling pin), 
sometimes breaking more bones: “I’d broken my wrists […] I’d broke toes, fingers, 
ribs everythin….”. Belinda and Dinah also described hitting themselves. Belinda 
described doing this just once, as a way to avoid cutting herself. While Dinah 
described self-battery (and burning) similarly – as being ways of avoiding self-
cutting – though she said that she had done this often whilst she was self-injuring: “I 
was still cutting, […] well I was still, like doing stuff, like trying to avoid it, just like 
burning myself, like doing, like hitting my head and stuff”. So while Belinda, and 
especially Dinah, described using self-battery and self-burning in order to avoid self-
cutting, this differed from Anna, who had initially used self-battery as her primary 
form of self-injury. For Anna, self-cutting only started after the birth of her first son 
when she was 28, following a break of several years where she did not injure herself 
at all. 
 
Anna’s location of her ‘first time’ in her (distant) past was similar to the stories told 
by Milly, Francis, Dinah and Mark, who all indicated that their self-injury could be 
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traced back to much earlier childhood behaviour which, although they did not name 
this as ‘self-injury’ they clearly described as ‘self-injurious’. These participants 
therefore had several stories of their ‘first time’ – the early self-injurious behaviour, 
and then the “actual self-harm” (Milly). These narratives indicate that for these 
participants, their later self-injury may have led them to engage in post-hoc 
rationalisations of earlier behaviour, re-categorising it as ‘pathological’. In doing 
this, they claimed continuity between different self-injuring behaviours carried out at 
different points in their life-story.  
 
Mark talked about his childhood eczema and explicitly linked the sensations and 
bodily aspects that he associated with his eczema to his later self-injury: 
 
“I guess it’s linked to eczema, I’ve always had eczema as a kid, really bad eczema. 
My sister has it worse, mine’s pretty much cleared up, but certainly as a kid – 
scratching, incredibly satisfying, you know that feeling…. Em… which mum, did 
everything to stop us, and she’s right, cos we would scratch until we bled. Em… 
and that would always have that positive association with bleeding, cos it went 
with, release of pain, you know pain relief. So if you’re, you’d scratch and scratch 
and scratch and scratch, and eventually you’d break the skin, and, and, it would 
stop, it would heal over and it would be worse that ever, you know – ahhh! Em… 
probably the scratching, and the cutting always felt just like that, em, … only, … 
more acute… em…. Yeah ----- effective? --- in terms of you’d feel the skin ……” 
 
This passage highlights the intensely corporeal/bodily aspects of both Mark’s 
memories of eczema, and his association of this with his later self-injury. A feature 
which Mark highlighted as important in his practice of self-injury was that it was a 
practical method of ‘doing something’ when he was faced with situations where he 
felt powerless. The material, embodied body is central to this – it is both an ‘object’ 
to be acted towards, but more than this, when the body is acted towards the effects 
(with self-injury) are instant, dramatic and immediately felt. 
 
Milly similarly described early childhood skin complaints, though in her case, she 
emphasised that these were not a ‘condition’ of any kind, but related directly to her 
own practice of “picking” at her skin. This was only one of a range of early self-
injurious behaviours that Milly described:  
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“Em… .. self-harm. I used to bang my head off the wall, when I was younger. I 
don’t know why, I don’t know why at all. And I always, had an immense problem 
with picking spots, any cuts, or grazes, I would pick at, and I would pick at till they 
got infected. And when I was little my mum used to put mitts on me, in bed, big 
massive gauze things, and micro pore. I don’t know how my mum and dad coped 
with the frustration of me doing this. So much so, and I don’t know if this was when I 
was about 10 or 11, because my body was trying to fight the infection, I used to get 
these little nodules on my head, almost like glandular, cos they’re obviously trying to 
combat all this stuff. So I’ve got a lot of scars, of just me being stupid when I was 
little, and picking at my spots….. em… and yeah I used to bang my head on the wall. 
I don’t know when, the… actual self-harm started….” 
 
These early skin-picking and head-banging behaviours were just the beginning; 
Milly went on to describe further self-injurious behaviour at the age of 13. The 
following excerpt demonstrates how Milly traces this behaviour through to when the 
“actual” self-harm started, before further detailing how this led on to “the proper 
stuff” when she was 17: 
 
“But, .. my first distinct memory, of knowing, and this is only looking back, and 
giving it a label, was when I used to do my paper round, when I was 13, and I used 
to walk home, and I used to scrape my arm along the wall, until it was grazed, 
completely grazed, and I would tell people I had fallen over. And I’d do the same 
thing with nail files, usually on my arms… and yeah, it was odd. And just give myself 
these grazes, and burns, and that kind of thing. And it wasn’t until, I was about 16 or 
17, that there was a girl at school, who was very open about her self-harm, and she 
used to do it with razor blades. And it wasn’t that I thought it was cool, or maybe I 
did, with mindset….. em, … she was making a statement, and I was just like wow, 
that’s a fucking amazing statement to make. And, … I can’t even remember the first 
time I did it, in fact yes I do. I did it on my knee, I picked a razor blade out of a Bic 
razor, and Jesus Christ they’re fucking difficult to get out hehehe … em, and, … 
yeah, I did it on my knee, and then I did it on my leg.. and… didn’t think anything of 
it, at all. I think I possibly told a couple of my mates, and they were just like, oh 
you’re just being daft. And the proper stuff, like the really deep stuff, probably 
kicked off when I was 17” 
 
Milly describes her self-injury as progressing in stages which can be traced back to 
her very early childhood. This seems to be an attempt to ‘naturalise’ her self-injury, 
that is, she is suggesting that the desire/motivation to injure herself had existed from 
a very young age. Dinah similarly described herself as always being covered in scabs 
and cuts as a child and also talked about having an “obsession” with blood and 
bleeding from a young age. 
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Locating self-injury in early childhood might serve a number of purposes. In Mark’s 
case, his proposed link between his early eczema and his later self-cutting, seemed to 
focus on providing an explanation. This explanation focused on the similarity of the 
physical sensations and corporeal materiality of both his eczema and self-cutting: this 
emphasised the importance of the ‘release’ felt when scratching and cutting skin, as 
well as the ‘release’ of blood witnessed and experienced when scratching or cutting 
the skin. In contrast, Milly and Dinah’s description of their early self-injurious 
behaviour seemed to have been employed to testify to the authenticity of their later 
self-injury. This was particularly the case with Milly, as she was clear that she had 
not begun to cut herself until after she saw a girl at school doing this. Milly 
emphasised that she had “certainly claimed it as my own” though she had evidently 
struggled with the issue of whether and how far she had been “copying” the girl at 
school through whom she found out about self-cutting: 
 
“the girl, that I was friends with, at school, turned round and told me that I was 
being an idiot because I was copying her. And at the time, I was like – shit… this 
kind of……scraping the arm up the wall thing, it had been there for a long time, 
and I’d not been able to manifest it in this cutting way before, and yes – if I hadn’t 
met her or hadn’t seen what she’d done, then I might not have gone along that 
route at all….” 
 
For Milly, then, and perhaps for Dinah and Mark also, the location of self-injury in 
early self-injurious behaviours remembered from childhood, was an important part of 
both explaining and justifying their later “actual” self-injury. These bodily practices 
were important aspects of these participants’ understandings and explanations for 
their later self-injury. 
 
4.2.2 Exploring the body and the ‘first time’ 
 
Francis also remembered early self-injurious behaviour from primary school, though 
he largely dismissed this as not relevant. Francis did, however, have a careful and 
well defined story about the ‘first time’ that he had self-injured: 
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 “That’s right, first time I did it I think I was ironing a shirt, (A – ok) and I, I sort of 
burnt myself with the iron on purpose, it was sort of, em, just put the iron against 
my skin, I, and it was just sort of like, it wasn’t particularly, I wasn’t feeling 
distraught or, or I didn’t think I was, you know, and on the surface I  wasn’t feeling, 
particularly distraught or, or any- you know, hysterical or anything, it was just, I 
was wondering what it would do, I was wondering what it would do to my skin, how 
much would hurt, and em, … so I, sort of had this burn mark on my skin for a little 
while, and yeah it was easy to just, if pe-someone noticed it, it was easy to say, oh 
yeah I accidentally burnt myself with the iron.”  
 
Francis suggests here that (at least on the “surface”) he was not feeling any 
particularly negative feelings, his self-injury was more oriented towards a curiosity 
regarding what putting the iron on his skin might do – how it might feel and the 
effects it might have. The idea that self-injury might incorporate curiosity, 
experimentation and even playfulness regarding the body was something that Francis 
suggested was a key aspect of his own self-injury: “I think part of it is just 
investigating your own body, like investigating your own senses”. This sentiment was 
also reflected in some of the other participants’ stories, particularly Mark, Dinah and 
Rease who described self-injury in more positive terms. 
 
For instance, Rease, like Robert, described self-injury as being something that she 
“discovered” by ‘accident.’ Following this discovery, Rease said that she went on to 
try out (or experiment with) different methods of cutting herself: 
 
“Yeah but the first time I did it, I didn’t actually know self-harm existed. Which 
sounds really odd. But em, I’d sort of accidentally cut my finger with, eh, a pair of 
scissors? And, kinda went, hey that felt good. You know.---- bemused by that so 
kinda, mental thought to self- do that again later and see how it feels y’know! Heh. 
So later on I kinda went and did it on purpose. Just on my finger a little. Then, again 
later on. I was downstairs in ------[…]------ it was all very ,very, controlled, I’d got 
all the kitchen knives out, in a row, and sort of, cut my wrists. And it sounds like a 
total fucked up thing to do, but it, kinda, was a really positive thing, it really made 
me feel better. ….” 
 
This excerpt in particular contrasts starkly with the out-of-control, ‘impulsive’ self-
injury described in much of the clinical literature, as discussed in Chapter 2. After 
accidentally injuring herself and realising that it “felt good,” Rease went on to 
experiment with self-injury in a similar manner to Francis. After initially trying 
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various kitchen knives, Rease described ‘moving on’ to razor blades, this stage also 
involved some experimentation, which again Rease framed in very positive terms: 
 
“so, em, … it was even, .. I cut my leg and, I was just sort of pressed onto the leg, 
and was about to pull it across, but, it was so sharp because it was new, that the 
skin just burst, and, was really deep, so I went into shock, which is a really odd 
feeling, but, again this is fucked up again, it was one of the best feelings I’ve ever 
experienced. So, em… but I also realised at the time though, that I needed to be 
more careful, cos I realised how dangerous it could be, that I had to be a bit more, 
controlled about it, and know what I was doing.”  
 
Despite injuring herself quite severely, and going into “shock”, Rease still maintains 
that this was a positive experience, a positive feeling. Further, she frames the episode 
as a lesson, where she realised that she needed to “be more careful”. This theme of 
experimentation, play, and lessons learnt demonstrates that the way that self-injury is 
practised relates closely to the individual’s interactions with their bodies.  
 
Robert’s story of his ‘first time’ also resonated with the theme of exploration and 
experimentation on and with ‘the body’: 
 
“(A - So do you remember the first time?) I do actually, aye, em. It was with, em, one 
of they wee, em, plastic fan things …. Eh, its like ken (A - the little? Oh ok, ok) the 
face ones, well my mum and dad used to have, em, like ones with the hard blades, 
you know how they’ve got the soft blades now (A - oh right yeah) well years ago they 
had the hard, the right hard plastic blades, and, I took it, em, and it was, I was just 
actually I, it was quite, it was actually quite a warm day, (A – mhm) and I thought 
ken I need something to cool myself down, eh, and it was like right, and I had 
actually like, it was near my face, and I thought, I wonder what that would feel like 
ken, like for me actually, just to cut my skin with it (A – mm) em, and that was it (A 
– mhm) ken what I mean and I just sorta like cut it, and it was like, it was that one 
there, fact actually no it was that one (A – mhm) cos I done about, three or four of 
them, (A – yeah) at the same time, em, and I just, ken, done that . …………. So that 
was pretty much, that was the first one.” 
 
As with Francis and Rease’s narratives, Robert describes his self-injury as leading 
from a curiosity regarding how a cut might feel. Robert’s narrative is similar to 
Francis’ in that neither refers directly to any ‘emotional’ feelings, but rather to a 
concern with ‘physical’ feelings and the effects of an injurious interaction with an 
inanimate object (plastic fan; iron). 
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These excerpts emphasise the centrality of participants’ bodies to their practice of 
self-injury. The feelings that self-injury is understood to elicit as well as the 
material/corporeal effects of using various tools (hot irons, hammers, knives, 
scissors, razors) on the surface of the body. These narratives also suggest that the 
ways that people who self-injure talk about/remember how their self-injury started 
hints at broader issues regarding the ways that people experience and relate ‘living in 
their bodies’. Francis highlights the importance of experimentation and learning 
about/discovering the body, seeing his self-injury, at least in part, as being an aspect 
of this – a ‘normal’ part of growing up. Similarly, Rease described her self-injury as 
a positive act, which enabled her to become both familiar, comfortable and in control 
of her body during a difficult adolescence. These optimistic accounts contrast with 
previous literature that frames self-injury as a negative, damaging response to 
equally ‘pathological’ (albeit ultimately ‘normal’) happenings such as menstruation 
and puberty (e.g. Froeschle & Moyer, 2004; Zila & Kiselica, 2001).   
 
 The matter of having known already about self-injury before starting is important to 
note here. Some participants, especially Rease, but also Robert and Justin, 
emphasised that self-injury was something they ‘discovered’. In contrast, others were 
clear they had ‘learnt’ it from someone else, Milly in particular. Still others, such as 
Mark and Francis, initially described discovering it themselves, but later retracted 
this. For instance when I initially asked Mark if he had come across self-injury prior 
to starting he replied “absolutely not”. However, both Mark and Francis decided 
during their interviews that they had been aware of self-injury before they began self-
injuring, and that this may well have informed their own behaviour. This followed 
initial claims by both that they had never come across self-injury prior to starting. 
Authenticity is important then in the stories and claims that Francis and Mark made. 
In Mark’s case this was ironically highlighted by the case of Richey Edwards
12
, who 
was himself struggling with accusations of inauthenticity. I explore this further in 
Chapter 8.  
 
                                                 
12
 Erstwhile member of the band the Manic Street Preachers who famously carved “4 Real” into his 
arm, following accusations of fakery from a music journalist.  
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4.2.3 The injury 
 
Some participants provided quite graphic descriptions of certain wounds or injuries 
they had created through self-injury. These descriptions oriented around the terms 
deep and bad. The concern in most of these narratives appeared to be to suggest that 
the wound had been bad (deep) or not that bad (‘just’ scratches). These stories about 
wounds also served the purpose of demonstrating how their self-injury had 
“progressed” over time, invariably getting more and more “severe” (Anna). 
 
Both Craig and Harriet, for instance, described their self-injury as developing out of 
‘scratches’ inflicted when they were teenagers. Craig said that he thought his self-
injury began by “just scratching yourself with a compass at school or something, but 
I can’t remember the first time, there was anything serious.” Harriet told a similar 
story about how her self-injury “just like started off like using like scissors and stuff 
like, to scratch my arms and thing and then, kinda like progressed to using blades.” 
Like Craig, Harriet said that she could not remember a specific ‘first time’. Although 
Anna’s self-cutting did not begin until she was much older, she too described this as 
developing from “like scratches, ken just superficial cuts with things, then deeper 
cuts.” 
 
Craig and Anna each emphasised the severity of their later wounds thorough relating 
specific instances of self-injury. Craig related an episode where he had been out 
drinking and woken up at a friend’s house: 
 
“…woke up and was basically stuck to the mattress, with blood hehehe cos what I 
figured out, was I just sort of serrated bread knife and I just slashed my leg, I’ve got 
three scars, and erm, you can see, I’m not anatomist so I’m not quite sure but… 
tubes and stuff like that inside and erm, I actually ended up sewing it up, myself” 
 
Craig showed me the scar that this incident had left on his leg describing the incident 
as “the pinnacle of it, that was the worst thing”. Although he did emphasise the 
‘stupidity’ of not seeking medical help, and noted that the scar continued to cause 
him physical discomfort, he evidently had some degree of pride regarding the 
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incident, joking that “sewing your own leg up’s pretty hardcore!” Craig is also 
perhaps making a claim here regarding his control and mastery over his body.  
 
In contrast, Anna’s descriptions of the severity of her wounds were told in a more 
serious tone. Anna was still injuring herself when I spoke to her, and though Craig’s 
‘worst’ example had been one of his last acts of self-injury, for Anna, her self-injury 
was an on-going behaviour, and one which she was evidently concerned about. In 
describing the later progression of her injuries, she said: “Then it [the self-injury] 
was doon here [lower arm] and then it got closer to the wrist and then it got like 
deeper, and its just getting mair and mair dangerous.”  
 
In contrast, Milly and Mark, like Craig, described some of their final acts of self-
injury as being particularly deep or severe. In each of these cases, the production of a 
particularly “bad” wound was understood to have contributed to the participant 
ceasing self-injury. Mark was especially clear about this, suggesting that had he not 
cut himself badly on that occasion, he would likely have ended up cutting himself 
much more often, but less severely.  
 
While Milly, Mark and Craig suggested that producing a deep cut had contributed to 
them stopping self-injury, a contrasting theme in other participant’s descriptions of 
their wounds was the continued need to make ‘deep enough’ wounds. Anna in 
particular illustrated this issue graphically: 
 
 “Em, and last week, the week before, whenever it was when I cut myself last. It was 
pretty scary I have to say. Because I cut myself, there was like half a dozen or so on 
this arm, and I was like ohhh… noo, its no worked its nooo… and I went back and I 
did one, and then I did another one and it just went – whoohhhe. It opened up and it 
was deep, ken it was like right in deep.” 
 
This issue was also raised by Rease, who talked about her self-injury increasingly 
“not working” which had led, she felt, to an overdose, and fantasies about cutting off 
some of her limbs. The idea that self-injury might sometimes ‘not work’ also came 
up in a discussion I had with Harriet: 
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“I found, it’s a lot easier, to cut my leg, than it is to cut my arms, I can go deeper 
on my legs, for some reason, […] yeah, you can like totally like, ----- go into it. Its 
like, trying to cut my wrists is like a nightmare its like – it doesn’t work!! (A – 
heheh) hehe, you’re like ‘grrrr why won’t it work?’ and I found that you’re wrist, it, 
closes up straight away (A - yeah ok) you cut and, within like, half an hour its closed 
itself up […] (A - so is it sometimes, kind of, do you feel sometimes that you need to 
go to a certain deepness, do you know what I mean?) yeah (A - like, ok…)  
sometimes, you just get your blade and go like that and that’s it (A – mm) and 
sometimes I would just go like tiny little scratches all on my arm its just like, it just 
act, like, drawing that blade across your arm its like, it feels good, but they’re like, 
they fade away really so its like, when you’ve done it its like you’ll feel these little 
lines, but then it just disappears” 
 
This passage highlights the different ways that self-injury can be experienced and 
practiced. It demonstrates that, for Harriet, an aim of self-injury is sometimes to 
produce ‘deep’ cuts, and that she is sometimes unable to do this. Harriet suggests that 
this is a combination of different tools used (she described finding razor blades the 
‘best’ tool to use, whereas knives did not “work”), and cutting different areas of the 
body – unlike Anna, she described having difficulty making ‘deep’ cuts on her 
wrists.  
 
The ways in which participants described their wounds varied in important ways. 
Depth and badness were important concepts, though in different ways. For some 
participants a deep or bad wound was described as a signal to stop; for other 
participants the aim of self-injury was to create a deep or bad wound. These different 
orientations towards the depth or badness of wounds are significant and imply quite 
different methods and understandings of self-injury. Importantly, the different ways 
in which participants described their wounds resists simple or straightforward 
explanation.  
 
4.3 ‘Physical’ sensations 
 
The feelings associated with self-injury were of central importance to some 
participant’s explanations. Feelings are perhaps the most obvious point at which any 
perceived boundaries between ‘bodies’ and ‘minds’ must dissolve. The word 
‘feeling’ itself is used to refer both to ‘physical’ sensation and ‘emotions’ and 
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emotionality (Lupton, 1998a: 41). Participants talked about the ‘physical feelings’ 
associated with the act of self-injury in two main ways. Several participants 
emphasised the positive feelings and sensations that self-injury elicited. Most 
participants also referred to pain and self-injury. Understandings regarding the 
relationship between pain and self-injury are addressed in detail as there are 
contradictory discourses around this in existing literature, and these are reflected in 
the narratives of the participants. In particular, this discussion focuses around the 
question of whether or not self-injury hurts.  
 
4.3.1 A “pleasurable sensation” 
 
Mark, Rease, Francis and Justin all emphasised the positive feelings and sensations 
that they associated with self-injury. Mark, Rease and Justin all implied that these 
positive or ‘pleasurable’ sensations were the result of bio-chemical changes in their 
bodies, brought about by their self-injury. Mark suggested that “whatever, … neuro-
receptors are open, it, fills them, satisfies them”. Later in the same interview, Mark 
considered whether similar injuries, occurring in different contexts, might ‘feel’ the 
same. He compared his own self-injury with the experience of a friend whose arm 
had been cut in quite different circumstances: 
 
“but I was just wondering if the physical sensation is probably the same (A - yeah, I 
guess…) em,…… I mean both of them you’ve got endorphins flowing if you’ve, if 
you’ve got up the nerve to pick up a knife and cut yourself or you’re being thrown 
out of a club by a bouncer you’re, the adrenaline is flowing and all the rest of it (A 
– yeah) so the physical sensation I think is probably pretty much the same – I don’t 
think Edward even noticed” 
 
Mark suggests then that although the contexts are different, both self-injury and 
other-injury have the same chemical or physical effects, the “adrenaline is flowing”. 
This leads to what Mark categorises as similar sensations: these are experienced as 
satisfying in the case of self-injury, and yet led his friend Edward to perhaps not even 
notice he had been injured. The adrenaline, in Mark’s understanding, is the important 
factor, though the context apparently mediates how this is experienced: satisfying or 
anaesthetising. 
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Participants’ definitions of the ‘pleasurable’ aspects of self-injury were often related 
to their understandings of pain. Here Mark’s conclusion that the physical sensation 
must be the same was related to his understandings of bio-chemistry. The physical 
sensation to which Mark refers is one that is pleasant, but still painful. Mark 
struggled with definitions of pain and pleasure, especially concerned with distancing 
his behaviour and feelings from what he termed “masochism.” 
 
“you know, you take an area, rub it with a ----- em, …. You do that with a r---- with a 
sharpened or, or –[pointed?]-- implement, yeah, I mean that’s not painful. …… and I 
don’t think, ….. Its not masochist, … or my understanding of masochism, is that it is 
the pain, and its not, but its not there, cos its, it is a pleasurable sensation, cos its so 
its, yeah, sorry! Heh. It does hurt the next day though.” 
 
The issue of masochism was also raised by Craig (“I’m not really masochistic in any, 
kind of way”) and Rease, who suggested that self-injury was seen by others as 
masochistic for women and but not for men. She argued that this could not be the 
case, as self-injury for her was not painful and in fact that it actually felt “good”. 
Both Rease and Mark’s discussions highlight the complex and contradictory nature 
of wider understandings regarding the pain/pleasure dichotomy.  
 
Like Mark, Rease also suggested that ‘endorphins’ might play a part in explaining 
why self-injury felt so “good”. She was particularly emphatic about the pleasurable 
aspects of self-injury, for instance describing cigarette burns as feeling “wonderful, 
like bubbles”. Similarly, Justin described his earlier episodes of self-injury as being 
mainly carried out in order to feel a “rush”, a “buzz” or “good”. Justin associated 
these feelings with “seeing the blood” and returned to this idea several times in the 
interview: 
 
“I definitely remember kind of, you know, getting sort of a rush, from it, you know if 
you were feeling a bit down and you kind of just, you know, saw the blood and then 
you’d be like, […] give you a kind of rush […] I guess like, just sort of seeing the 
blood kind of always made me feel a bit kind of, like, …. good” 
 
Justin also associated these feelings, in part, with bio-chemical understandings of the 
body, implicating “adrenaline.” However, he particularly associated these feelings 
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with the material, visible blood that was revealed or released when he cut himself. 
Mark and Rease also talked positively about the more visible bodily aspects of their 
behaviour. Indeed, Rease suggested that one of the reasons that self-injury was so 
difficult to stop, was because she could think of nothing that was really comparable 
in terms of bodily sensations and effects: 
 
“I think its, its really difficult to get somebody to, sort of, use alternatives, because 
its such a powerful, em, thing and because it involves the body so strongly and, … 
but its, you know like the, … the actual cutting and the, the blood thing and, there’s 
not much else that can kind of, stand in for that really” 
 
The idea that self-injury can be pleasurable, it can feel good, was an important 
feature of Rease, Mark and Justin’s explanations for their self-injury, and was also 
mentioned by Harriet. It is perhaps significant that although the other participants did 
not talk in such positive terms about the feelings associated with self-injury, none 
mentioned any particularly negative feelings or sensations. Even those who said that 
they did feel some pain during their self-injury did not describe this as a negative 
experience. This was put most clearly by Francis, who said that self-injury caused 
him pain, but that this was “a good pain, not a bad pain.” I will discuss the issue of 
pain further in the next section, however I want to emphasise here that attending to 
the pleasurable and positive aspects of the practice of self-injury – an issue which is 
only really accessed by attending to the embodied nature of self-injury – could help 
to explain why, once started, people continue to self-injure, and why they might find 
it difficult to stop.  
 
4.3.2 ‘Physical pain’ as an aim and outcome of self-injury 
 
For some participants, the experience of ‘physical’ pain was central to their practice 
of self-injury. Francis, Milly, Craig, Harriet and Belinda all talked about self-injury 
being a way of masking or changing ‘emotional pain’ with or into ‘physical pain’. 
The idea that self-injury is a functional method of coping with ‘emotional pain’ by 
either converting or transforming it into ‘physical pain’ is common, and can be seen 
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in existing clinical and academic literature (Jacobson & Gould, 2007; Solomon & 
Farand, 1996) as well as in lay discourse on the internet (LifeSIGNS, 2005).  
 
Participants used this explanation in subtly different ways. Harriet, for instance 
described self-injury as “masking” the “other pain” saying “you’d forget about the 
other pain you were in cos you’re like – oh, my arm hurts or whatever.” Craig made 
a similar suggestion, though he also invoked the idea of control: “if your arm’s 
hurting for whatever reason, then that gives you something more to con- to worry 
about, and something that you can probably control.” For both Craig and Harriet, the 
physical pain of self-injury acted as a distraction from ‘other’ pain, or worry. In 
contrast, Milly suggested that physical pain was easier to deal with: 
 
“but, again what I was saying about the …. …. … … em, … … the having something 
physical, to, .. deal with (A – mhm) … .. rather than dealing with, the kinda 
metaphorical stuff (A - yeah) but having something physical, and having .. having a 
physical pain, to deal with, was easier than dealing with, the, the pain that you 
couldn’t put your finger on (A - mm, yeah, yeah) so --- not that it took it away, but, it 
was still really helpful” 
 
As I discuss further in Chapter 5, participants frequently appeared to have difficulty 
naming the problematic emotional or mental states that their self-injury was 
apparently addressing. In the excerpt above, Milly explicitly suggests that the 
physical aspects of self-injury, and the physical pain of self-injury, were easier to 
deal with and that this was helpful. This could be seen as similar to the distraction 
idea suggested by Craig and Harriet, but it draws out more clearly that orienting 
towards physical wounds, and physical pain, was experienced by Milly as being 
easier than dealing with the “pain that you couldn’t put a finger on”. It may be 
significant that Milly is able to name this feeling as ‘pain’ or ‘painful’ – despite also 
describing it as metaphorical. This may suggest that feelings that are experienced as 
metaphorical (Milly), confusing (Belinda), or otherwise difficult to categorise, are 
viewed as painful. Further, this indicates the dual-purpose nature of pain as a concept 
in these narratives, referring to both physical and emotional sensations. In many 




Francis and Belinda each talked about the physical pain of self-injury being a way of 
feeling something rather than ‘numb’ (Francis) or ‘confused’ (Belinda). When 
Francis was self-injuring, he told me that he felt as though he “should” be feeling 
“things” but that he felt “incapable” of doing so: 
 
“that got to me, after a while, that I felt I was incapable of feeling anything, you 
know incapable of emotion and…. Em…. I didn’t like that, I wanted to be able to feel 
I wanted to, you know, live or experience stuff or. …….. and so, self-harming was, 
you know a way of, feeling, pain, you know feeling pain cos it was something (A - 
yeah, yeah) it was like, a strong feeling, em, whereas you know, up to that, around 
that time I felt like I was in, cotton wool or something you know, just all like muffled, 
and em, nothing was getting to me, nothing was affecting me” 
 
 
In contrast to Milly, Harriet and Craig, who described physical pain as being a 
distraction from negative or amorphous feelings; for Francis, the physical pain of 
self-injury was a way of feeling “something” rather than “nothing.” Again this points 
to the impossibility of separating out body, mind, emotion and feeling from one 
another. Francis describes ‘feeling incapable of feeling’, referring particularly to an 
inability to experience emotions; this lack of emotional feeling is replaced, through 
self-injury, by a physical feeling of pain. This explanation shares with the others the 
orientation that this is preferable: the pain experienced through self-injury is 
preferable to (or ‘better than’) both un-nameable ‘feelings’ and an absence of 
‘feeling’.  
 
Belinda similarly emphasised that self-injury, both the pain and the physical 
materiality of the wound, was preferable to her mental state, or “whatever’s in my 
head”: 
 
“I, need to feel something, just for a little bit, not always, just for a little bit, 
something that I know is real and its there and its concrete and its, this is, this, and 
that’s that, and its real and its just, sort of more black and white (A – yeah) my arm 
hurts its bleeding, it’s a feeling, instead of just confusion and… not understanding 
things and, … … and just, yeah not understanding…………mm… it’s a big thing for 
me ----[very quiet, unclear] ---- and trying to make something of, whatever’s in my 
head, to make it into something understandable and manageable – manageable” 
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In the above excerpt Belinda combines several themes raised in this section. She 
emphasises that the physical pain, and the corporeal materiality of self-injury can act 
as a way of managing otherwise confusing ‘feelings’. This further emphasises the 
interrelated nature of bodies and emotions, as well as the importance of ‘the body’ as 
a site for ‘reality’. Certainly for Belinda, bodily injuries are experienced as more 
tangible and therefore ‘better’ than ‘confusing’ emotional feelings.  
 
4.3.3 ‘It doesn’t hurt’: feeling nothing at all. 
 
In contrast to those accounts where physical pain played an important part in 
participant’s descriptions of their practice of self-injury, some participants claimed 
that they did not feel pain during self-injury. This reflected another dominant theme 
in existing understandings of self-injury, also present in both academic and clinical 
literature as well as user/lay discourse (Jacobson & Gould, 2007; Murray, 2005; 
Solomon & Farand, 1996). Some of the participants described their self-injury as 
both a way of experiencing physical pain and as something which caused them little 
or no pain. Further, even for those participants who did say that they felt pain during 
self-injury, several were clear that this was not ‘bad pain’ – it was manageable, or 
even ‘good’. These contradictory understandings are seen in the literature as well and 
point to the intensely subjective nature of pain. This highlights the situated nature of 
narratives. Participants’ memories of pain are mediated by the purpose and context in 
which they are relating the memory: in this case an interview about their self-injury. 
What is important is what participants say about the relationship between pain and 
self-injury, rather than the inaccessible matter of what self-injury ‘actually’ felt like.  
 
Anna was the most clear that she felt no pain at all during her self-injury – and this 
applied both to her cutting and her earlier self-battery. In clinical literature, 
experiencing no pain during self-injury is generally attributed to dissociation or 
depersonalisation, which Anna said was a term she had only recently heard when I 
asked her about it. Dissociation is particularly raised in the clinical literature as being 
associated with self-injury and sexual abuse (Brodsky et al., 1995). Broadly, it refers 
to an individual feeling disconnected from their body or self, in extreme cases this is 
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likened to an out of body experience. Anna herself talked about being in a different 
“mental state” when she cut herself, suggesting that this affected how much it hurt: 
 
“So, there is definitely a difference between… I dunno whether it is as I say if it’s a 
situation or… mental state, or whatever, but there is definitely a difference, 
between…. like being cut or being hurt or whatever…and and, cutting yourself, 
definitely… I mean and there’s some difference in the pain threshold” 
 
Anna and I discussed this further, contrasting self-injury with other accidental 
injuries. I suggested that self-injury might hurt less because it was an expected 
injury, but this idea was rejected by Anna: 
 
“…because if you were sitting like now, calm and kinda fine, to take, a razor blade to 
your arm… or or wherever, I bet you wouldnae be able to do it… whereas… I 
dunno… like, it’s like you go into this zone or something I just… I always say that, 
like when I cut myself there’s something inside me and it has to I have to get it out… 
and that’s the only way I ken of to get it out, it’s like there’s evil, in me. That sounds 
so bizarre, but…….. heh and its like a battle for control between me and th th this 
whatever’s in me and that’s the only way I can get it out and so its definitely 
……………….. I dunno….. ----[unclear]---- I’d say yer in a different – state, 
different place, whatever mentally………..” 
 
Anna emphasised again the ‘different state’ – suggesting that self-injury would be 
impossible for someone who was calm. Anna goes on to invoke the idea that 
something ‘inside’ needs to be ‘got out’, although she uses terminology (evil; battle) 
which is particularly dramatic (and would no doubt be labelled quite differently from 
a psychiatric perspective), the same sentiment is reflected in less dramatic terms by 
other participants when talking about ‘release’. This is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Harriet used the term dissociation without prompting from me, saying that she felt no 
pain at all when she self-injured whilst dissociating, but that she felt some pain if she 
self-injured when she was not dissociating. Harriet also implicated biochemical 
explanations in order to account for her lack of pain: 
 
 “I think its different at different times, cos sometimes, … I’ve just, totally out of it, 
and I’m dissociating a lot, I don’t feel it. But other times, I do (A – ok) so it just 
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varies but, I think like, sometimes you don’t, you don’t feel as much pain as you’d 
think you do (A – yeah) its like, cos like when I was trying to explain it to a group of, 
of like school kids
13
 I was like, explaining about how like there was like, like all these 
chemicals in your brain that get released (A – mm) so that it acts as like as a pain 
killer (A – mhm) when you’re, when you’re doing it so you don’t, you don’t actually 
feel the pain that you think you would 
  
So even where Harriet was not dissociating, she said that the pain was not as much as 
you would expect, and she attributed this to “chemicals” in her brain. This is similar 
to the suggestions put forward by Mark and Rease in order to explain why self-injury 
felt good. The ‘release’ metaphor is again employed here, in this case to describe the 
‘release’ of chemicals from the brain. Mark, Francis and Rease all echoed Harriet’s 
claim that the pain felt during self-injury was not as expected. Francis saying it was 
“manageable” and a “good pain” whilst Rease said that she “didn’t feel pain, as, 
other people would feel the pain.” Mark said that it “certainly wasn’t painful, not in 
the sense that you think of pain as being something that you want to avoid”. These 
discussions highlight the difficulty faced when attempting to account for and 
describe pain. As others have demonstrated, lay understandings of pain are related to 
dominant cultural discourses which reflect bio-medical interpretations of the body, 
but also hint at moral messages regarding appropriate and inappropriate feelings and 
responses (Bendelow & Williams, 1998). With regard to self-injury, individuals must 
account for their engagement in a behaviour which is objectively ‘painful’. In most 
cases, my participants justified this (Scott & Lyman, 1968), claiming that the pain 
was different for them, or that it simply did not exist.  
 
Robert also said that he did not feel pain when he self-injured, and his description 
and explanation of this could also be interpreted as dissociation, although he did not 
use the term himself: 
 
“it was like there was just no pain whatsoever but its like, I mean, like I say I mean I 
have low pain threshold, but, like, sec- I stuck the Stanley knife and stuff into my arm 
it was like, there was just nothing – there was no pain (A – mhm) it was like, it was 
like as if I had kinda removed myself from my body, em, and it was just like, it was 
like as if I was sorta standing behind myself watching myself, actually doing it, but I 
                                                 
13
 Harriet had been involved in awareness raising about self-harm in high schools, this included giving 
presentations to high school students.  
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didnae actually feel any pain (A – mhm) and it was like, I could see the blood and 
stuff eh, but it was just like there was no pain whatsoever, em, because I kinda done 
all sorta five of them at the one time eh? (A – yeah) em, so it was kinda like, it was 
just kinda weird. So there was just nae pain eh, or at least, there just seemed like 
there was nae pain, at all”  
 
Like Harriet, Robert described his self-injury as causing no pain at all, but elsewhere 
in his interviews he suggested that it did cause pain. For instance, when describing 
how he began to self-injure he said:  
 
“I kinda thought well if I keep doing this, then, every time I’m emotional, or, 
emotional pain, then, I’ll give myself a wee bit a pain for a couple of minutes and 
then it’ll just be that’ll be it it’ll be gone” 
 
 
The inconsistencies around the issue of pain in Harriet and Robert’s narratives could 
be interpreted in a number of ways. It may indicate that self-injury is experienced 
and practised differently by individuals at different times: as Harriet suggested, when 
she dissociated she did not feel pain, whereas when she was not dissociating she did 
feel pain. It is also possible that in these narratives, contradictory existing discourses 
around self-injury (that it does not hurt; that it transforms mental/emotional pain into 
physical pain) are being employed relatively unreflexively by participants. It could 
be that ‘pain’ is sometimes used to describe an injury, rather than the actual sensation 
or feeling caused by the injury (for instance when Robert talked about ‘giving 
himself a bit of pain’ or when participants talked about ‘hurting’ themselves). 
Finally, it is more than possible that these inconsistencies reflect the constructed and 
evolving nature of understandings about self-injury. Participants did seem to use the 
interview in some cases as a way of exploring possible explanations and possible 
understandings regarding their behaviour, and I certainly tried to encourage this 
exploration. 
 
4.4 Tending the self-injured body: Healing and Scars 
 
In the minutes, hours, days, weeks, months and years following an act of self-injury, 
the self-injured body generally carries some form of mark or scar, as the skin heals. 
 115 
Examining this aspect of self-injury was particularly important to some of my 
participants’ descriptions of their practice of self-injury, and to their understandings 
regarding what self-injury meant to them. The marks and scars created by self-injury 
must be addressed on a daily basis, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the 
injury, especially if it is severe. I deal more closely with issues of hiding or revealing 
these marks and scars in Chapter 7. In this section I will detail the ways that 
participants talked about caring for their healing wounds, moving on to the ways they 
discussed their scars and marks. 
 
4.4.1 Healing as distraction or self-care 
 
Several participants emphasised the importance of caring for the wounds they created 
on their bodies through self-injury. For some, the acts of caring and tending for 
wounds appeared to be related to the more general aim of distraction from negative 
mood states. Milly, for example, said: 
 
“I had this coping mechanism that I could use to stop, everything, because then I 
could concentrate on, you know cleaning up wounds, and you know feeling that 
throbbing pain in your arm, your like, I’m alright, I’m still alive kind of thing” 
 
She also later emphasised the importance of the “physicality of having something, to 
tend to and, and watching something physically heal” which was “a comfort, 
because then the mood was forgotten about.” This related to Milly’s contention that 
dealing with self-inflicted physical injuries was easier than dealing with her 
emotions, but also, as she added here, self-injury wounds were easier to deal with 
than the “incidental stuff that’s happening around you.” This relates more generally 
to issues of control which were brought up frequently by participants. For Milly, and 
for other participants, self-injury was something which was more easily controlled 
than either emotions or other people, and therefore when either emotions or other 
people were getting ‘out of control’ self-injury offered a way of feeling ‘in control’ 
as well as distracting and comforting the self. That self-injury left wounds which 
healed was an important aspect of this for some. 
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Rease also talked about the importance of healing, and tending to self-injury wounds 
and scars as being a way of looking after the ‘self’: 
 
“the healing, the sort of self-healing, and I think a lot of people have said about that, 
that em, about the emotions that you, can’t sort of see them, or, or feel them, and, 
deal with the pain of them, but, when you have like, scars and they’re healing’s like, 
you’re looking after yourself, you’re looking after the sort of mental stress that 
you’re going through but in a, very, em, physical and ---- symbolic way that’s a bit 
more, real, I suppose” 
 
Rease emphasises the importance of the physicality of the healing – suggesting that 
this was more ‘real’. As Rease herself suggests, this indicates a particularly symbolic 
understanding of the body. This could also relate to broader theoretical ideas which 
suggest that the body is increasingly seen as the only ‘real’ site for the expression of 
an authentic self (Riley & Cahill, 2005; Sweetman, 2000).  
 
In contrast, Francis and Dinah both talked about interfering with the healing of the 
wounds left by their self-injury, indicating that this was an important aspect of how 
they practised self-injury. Dinah related this explicitly to control: 
 
“and there’s also I suppose I made it harder when I was self- when I was cutting 
myself as well cos I was like, oh, like this might have healed much much quicker if 
I’d, you know, left it alone, know what I mean? [----unclear, very quiet----] trying to 
exercise self-control over things” 
 
 
Similarly, Francis said that he had tended to scratch off scabs formed following his 
self-burning, as soon as they began to heal. So for some participants, the healing of 
the wounds left by self-injury offered a way of ‘symbolically’ healing themselves, or 
caring for themselves. For others, interfering with this healing process (by picking 
scabs off) was a part of their practice of self-injury. 
 
Participants’ talk about the healing of wounds, and tending their own wounds was 
quite different from that of other participants who described the care that other 
people gave their wounds. Anna and Emma each related harrowing experiences in 
A&E departments, where their wounds were treated in a much more negative 
manner. These narratives are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, but I introduce 
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them briefly here. In Anna’s case, a doctor attempted to apply steri-strips to a wound 
which had “severed an artery”. Following this experience (Anna was sent home with 
the wound still bleeding, it became infected and she got septicaemia), Anna 
maintained that she would no longer go to A&E to get her wounds treated. Instead, 
she had a stockpile of dressings and bandages at home. She said that she would 
“rather die, seriously would rather just die, I wouldnae go through that again for 
anybody. It was, horrendous.” Similarly, Emma described having staples applied to a 
wound on her stomach, with no local anaesthetic. The treatment Emma and Anna 
described receiving in A&E contrasts starkly with the care that other participants 
described giving their own wounds. This comparison demonstrates that the tending 
to and treating of the wounds left by self-injury has the potential to be experienced as 
a positive and nurturing, as well as negative and damaging.  
 
4.4.2 Feelings about scars 
 
Participants expressed a range of opinions regarding their scars. For some, they were 
experienced as positive ‘marks’ upon the body; whereas other participants were 
much more ambivalent about their scars, going to some lengths to conceal or remove 
them. With the notable exceptions of Rease and Mark, most other participants 
referred to their scars using the oppositional terms big/little and good/bad. 
 
Rease was particularly positive about her scars, reflecting her generally positive 
attitude towards self-injury. She described her scars as “beautiful” and felt that they 
were a part of her “story”: 
 
“it is about adornment and celebration, so, yeah. And in a way my scars are as well 
actually, cos I do think they’re really beautiful, and, they’re like a part of my, my 
experience, my history. And I very much believe about, em, your experience – written 
on the body, and the body telling a story. So. It pisses me off that, in this society its 
all about keeping the body clean” 
 
Rease contrasted her own, relatively upbeat understanding of her scars with that of 
“other people” who she knew “hated” their scars. As I discuss below, only a couple 
of participants in this research might be described as hating their scars, with most 
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appearing to have more neutral opinions. Mark however, expressed a similarly 
affirmative understanding of his scars. He described one scar in particular as acting 
like a “badge”. This scar had been created during a significant event, and Mark felt 
that if this had not happened, his self-injury may have taken a different course: 
 
“But, because that one was so bad, em, … it almost serves as, as a  -----unclear--- I 
don’t need to cut, I’ve got that […] Its like er, its like a badge. […] I think if I hadn’t 
done that, my arm would have been a lot more – covered in small cuts” 
 
Mark felt that the existence of one scar in particular, acted as a permanent reminder 
that he did not “need to cut”. That scars could act as a reminder of past experiences, 
good or bad, was indicated by a number of participants. Anna and Robert expressed 
much less positive opinions regarding this. Anna, for instance, felt that the existence 
of her scars represented a reason not to stop cutting: 
 
“the scars are there for, forever now, so………… I think that’s kinda a bad thing 
though, because it, … see if its something that faded over time, you might sorta go, 
oh well, it all faded so, that’s it I’ll no bother. But I’ve got these scars now, they’re 
there now, the damage is done, I just cut on top eh scars now, just, covered… totally 
utterly covered…….. so its like, phew……..what’s the point, of stopping” 
 
Anna’s orientation towards her body was markedly negative, and this extended to her 
descriptions of some of her scars, which she said were “horrible”. Robert’s view of 
his scars was also rather negative, although for different reasons, relating more to 
memories evoked by the scars.  
 
“ I do know, em, that, that some people, are actually, do have like, more scars on 
their arms than what I do […] ken what I mean so its like, but I mean obviously 
they’re there, em, and they’re kinda remind me (A – mm) yeah, sorta like a place that 
I was, which wasnae very nice but” 
 
Like Mark, Robert’s scars acted as a reminder, however Robert interpreted this more 
negatively, suggesting they reminded him of time and place that had not been 
pleasant. The different orientations of these participants towards their scars indicates 
the importance of attending to individual understandings regarding the scarring that 
self-injury can leave. The highly different ways in which scars were interpreted can 
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also be seen to relate to widely diverse understandings about future actions. While 
Mark and Rease had both stopped injuring themselves, Anna and Robert both 
continued to do so. Most significantly, while Mark used his understanding of his 
scars to justify his avoidance of self-injury, Anna saw her scars as a reason to 
continue.  
 
Other participants talked about their scars more neutrally, even when they used 
prescriptive descriptions such as good/bad. In most cases, I would suggest that a scar 
is given these labels according to how obvious or noticeable it would be to other 
people. For most participants, bad and big referred to scars that could be easily 
identified by others as self-inflicted, or which drew attention and comments if they 
were seen. In contrast, scars that were “little” were not easily identified and/or were 
easier to cover. Although Mark, Rease and Francis all talked about scars as being 
positive in some ways, only Belinda described a scar as ‘good’ saying that her “wrist 
didn’t scar very good”. Belinda seemed to use the word scar differently from other 
participants, however, with scar seeming to mean the initial wound rather than the 
mark left once the wound had healed. Belinda’s description does imply that a “little” 
scar is not necessarily also a “good” scar however. This may relate to the finding 
discussed in section 4.2.3 where some participants suggested that for self-injury to be 
successful a certain amount of damage had to be inflicted – the wound had to be 
“deep” enough.  
 
It is possible that there is a gendered dimension to participants’ understandings of 
their scars. Rease was particularly explicit about her own struggles with normative 
understandings of gender and bodies, and she suggested that in some ways her self-
injury had been an overt challenge to dominant discourse regarding ‘clean’ or 
‘perfect’ (female) bodies. Further, both Mark and Francis talked more generally 
about men “liking” scars (whatever their origin), and viewing them as “cool”. 
However, with regards to participants’ understandings of their scars from self-injury, 
there was no clear difference in the ways that the men and women appeared to 
understand them. As discussed further in the next section and extended in Chapter 7, 
most participants described some form of scar minimisation or concealment, 
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suggesting that even for the men I spoke to, the scars left by self-injury were not 
unproblematic. This points to the problem of conducting analysis along the lines of 
gender alone, issues relating to class, ethnicity, age, sexuality and one’s status as a 
current or past ‘self-injurer’ are all just as likely to play a part in understandings 
regarding scars.  
 
4.4.3 Scar removal and reasons 
 
Several participants had made some attempts to minimise, conceal or otherwise 
remove their scars permanently. In Chapter 7 I discuss the ways in which participants 
described hiding and revealing scars temporarily. Anna described trying to minimise 
some of her scars using ‘bio-oil’ a product marketed for reducing scars and stretch 
marks. However, she said that it had not worked well “it kinda does fade them, but, 
‘fraid I think I’ve got too many big, deep, …. kinda big scars now that it just, it 
wouldnae work”. Anna suggested then, that her scars were too severe to be removed. 
This attitude reflected her generally pessimistic orientation towards her body and her 
future, reflected further in her interpretation of her scars as being a reason to carry on 
self-injuring, rather than (as with other participants) a reason to stop. 
 
Harriet also referred to some of her scars as “really bad”. Harriet had gone to 
perhaps the most extreme lengths of all of the participants to remove her scars, 
getting plastic surgery to minimise and reduce the scarring on her arms: 
 
“Eventually I managed to get like, like, went to the plastic surgeon got the injections, 
and, a lot of people were quite angry, that I was able to get that help, because their 
scars are untreatable (A – oh) H - and also, because I was still self-harming, and, .. 
they’re like, but I got told, we have to, you have to wait 2 years before you’ll get 
treatment, but the thing is, all the scars on my arm are so old, they’re like, years and 
years old, that they, that, the doctors, didnae have a – [clue]” 
 
Harriet describes getting the plastic surgery on the understanding that she had 
stopped self-injuring. In fact, this was not the case, and Harriet was still injuring 
herself, though largely elsewhere on her body. Harriet said that some people, others 
she knew who self-injured, had been angry about her getting treatment when she was 
 121 
still injuring herself. She justified what had happened by emphasising that the scars 
on her arms were “old”. Although Harriet did describe her scars as “really bad” 
however, she did not describe them in as negative a manner as either Anna or Robert. 
Indeed, she also went on to tell me that she did continue to cut her wrists, but 
restricted this to areas she could cover up with a watch. It is possible, then, that 
Harriet’s feelings about her scars were not necessarily that negative, and that her 
reasons for getting them removed by plastic surgery lay more in her concern with the 
feelings of others about her scars. 
 
Justin described having had some success in minimising and concealing his scars. He 
had tried a gel pad treatment designed to minimise ‘bumpy’ scars:   
 
“I also looked into like you know, trying to see, er, ways of kind of you know, making 
scar, tissue look less, obvious and stuff erm, … I got this quite interesting stuff that 
was like em, … kind of like em, a gel pad, a silicone gel pad (A – right) that kind of, 
comp- and actually, made hu- you know you had to wear it, like every night (A – 
right) and then, like it consistently kind of pushed it down (A – ok) but then if you 
don’t keep using it you know it sort of, they sort of show more (A – right) and you 
end up kinda going back to the, state (A - ok, ok) but, em, that flattened it off, (A - so 
were they quite raised before that?) yeah, yeah …erm… so, em, …. … so that, you 
know that was again, kind of, you know trying to kind of, get to the point where you 
don’t feel kind of worried about kind of…” 
 
He followed this treatment by getting a tattoo over the worst of his scarring, in an 
explicit attempt to cover up the scars so that he would feel more ‘comfortable’ 
wearing short sleeves. These practices, then, were again oriented particularly towards 
minimising scars for the benefit of other people. Justin had undertaken these scar 
minimisation techniques (the gel pad and tattoo) in preparation for a holiday where 
he felt he would have to wear clothes that would reveal his scars. 
 
Emma and Dinah also described getting tattoos in order to cover up some of their 
‘worst’ scars. Dinah especially said that she felt getting tattoos had helped her to 
become more comfortable about her scars, particularly about other people seeing 
them. She had got one particularly “bad” scar covered up by a tattoo because she was 
“fed up of people asking about it”. Although Emma said that she was not 
embarrassed about scars, she did express some ambivalence about how many she had 
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and her continued inability to ‘show them’ to her parents. These concerns are 
discussed and expanded upon in Chapter 7, where I more explicitly address the 
different ways in which participants negotiated social life with their scars.  
 
With the notable exceptions of Anna and Robert, who appeared to view the scars 
themselves negatively, and Mark and Rease, who seemed to view their scars 
particularly positively, most other participants were more ambivalent. In most cases, 
scars were only problematic when they could be noticed by other people.  
 
4.5 Bodies, feelings and self-injury 
 
 
This chapter has introduced some of the material, corporeal aspects of self-injury by 
examining the narratives participants had around ‘what they did’ when they self-
injured. Section 4.2 examined participants’ narratives around the ‘first time’ that they 
self-injured. This analysis suggests that for some participants, self-injury was 
understood as something deeply rooted in their past, early in their biography. I have 
suggested that by locating their self-injury in their early history, participants may be 
claiming that the behaviour is authentic, comprising a part of their essential self. 
Even where participants did describe learning the behaviour from others, they were 
often reluctant to admit this, and provided justifications to explain this learning. 
These explanations were similarly oriented towards claiming that their practice of 
self-injury was authentic. Other participants describe self-injury as an almost 
‘normal’ aspect of growing up and exploring their body’s limits. These narratives 
tended to suggest that self-injury had been largely self-learned. Concerns with 
authenticity were also relevant here, with some participants being initially reluctant 
to identify their prior knowledge of self-injury. Despite this, two participants did re-
categorise their self-injury from self-learned to other-learned during the course of the 
research.  
 
Section 4.2.3 discussed participants’ descriptions of their actual practice of self-
injury. This analysis suggested that for some participants, self-injury was oriented 
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towards creating “deep” enough wounds; that injuries had to be a certain severity for 
the self-injury to have “worked”. Several participants suggested that their self-injury 
had progressed over time, from superficial cuts to deeper cuts. For some participants, 
this increasing severity was on-going. For others, self-injury reached a “pinnacle”, 
whereupon a particularly “severe” injury was a catalyst in their ceasing the behaviour 
entirely. 
 
Section 4.3 began to introduce the feelings that participants described associating 
with self-injury. I demonstrated that for some participants self-injury was explicitly 
associated with pleasurable feelings. Further, participants’ narratives around pain and 
self-injury suggest that for most participants, self-injury elicited physical sensations 
that were not negative. Even where they were labelled as ‘painful’ this was 
manageable or good pain, not “bad” pain. I noted that narratives around pain did 
seem to mirror lay and clinical understandings of self-injury as a behaviour which 
transformed physical pain into mental pain; yet simultaneously did not hurt. My 
analysis of this issue suggests that this complex and contradictory matter reflects 
dominant dualist models and understandings of body/mind and pleasure/pain. 
Participants’ discussions around the (physical) sensations elicited by self-injury 
demonstrate that these matters are not either/or. 
 
Finally, section 4.4 turned to the material consequences of self-injury: wounds, scars, 
and participants’ orientations towards them. I showed that for some participants, the 
care of their wounds was an integral aspect of their self-injuring behaviour. Physical 
healing acted as a metaphor or symbol for mental/emotional healing, or more 
mundanely, the care of wounds offered a distraction from other concerns. This 
contrasted starkly with the punitive and damaging ‘care’ participants described 
receiving in medical settings, an issue I take up further in Chapter 6.  
 
Participants’ feelings about their scars were then addressed. I demonstrated that 
opinions about scars varied widely. However, I suggested that for most participants, 
scars were viewed relatively neutrally, and that they only became ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
when visible to others. Indeed, as section 4.4.3 showed, most participants who had 
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attempted or succeeded in permanently removing scars (through plastic surgery, 
tattoos, or other means) did so in order to avoid the comments of others, rather than 
any intrinsic dislike of their scars.  
 
This chapter has illustrated a number of ways in which the bodily, visible, material 
aspects of self-injury can be usefully analysed. The embodied nature of self-injury 
will remain central to the following chapters and I will continue to demonstrate that 
this is essential to a full understanding of self-injury. This chapter has also begun to 
show the importance of biographical, interpersonal and cultural contexts in 
participants’ understandings of self-injury. The location of self-injury within 
individual biographies is important in understanding how self-injury is understood 
and the meanings it has. The way in which the self-injured person negotiates social 
life and the opinions or comments of others about their body has similarly been 
shown to be important, mediating participants’ practice of self-injury as well as their 
understandings. Finally, this chapter has shown that participants draw on wider 
understandings about self-injury in order to structure their narratives about their own 
behaviour. Clinical and lay interpretations of what self-injury is thought to ‘do’ are 
important, as are wider understandings about bodies and what it means to be 
authentic. In the next chapter, I turn to the more emotional aspects of self-injury 
discussed by participants. Although the focus is upon emotions, however, the 








In this chapter, I will focus on the more explicitly ‘emotional’ themes and issues 
raised in the interviews. Several existing explanations for self-injury centre on such 
emotional aspects – suggesting that self-injury serves to ‘release’ tension; to ‘relieve’ 
negative mental states; to express feelings. However, existing understandings tend to 
view emotions as disembodied, purely mental states with the feeling individual 
frequently divorced from socio-cultural contexts. As noted earlier, my own analysis 
of emotions is both embodied and interactionist. Thus, this chapter will engage with 
the emotional explanations that participants had for their self-injury and attempt to 
relocate these explanations within socio-cultural contexts and understandings. I 
critically assess the ways in which participants used concepts of (emotional) control, 
expression and invalidation. Throughout these discussions, I suggest that accounting 
for the embodied nature of emotions makes these explanations more meaningful and 
understandable. Further, this chapter suggests that participants’ narratives around 
emotional control, expression and invalidation reflect broader concerns with both 




One of the ways that self-injury is currently understood in a variety of existing 
literature is that it is a form of ‘tension release’. A number of my participants also 
drew upon this idea when explaining their self-injury to me. Closely related to the 
concept of release is that of control. These concepts have been shown to be important 




It is important to bear in mind here that in some of the interviews, these issues were 
not linked explicitly to emotion. In fact, what exactly is being controlled or released 
through the act of self-injury was not often named. Anna, for instance, talked about 
her self-injury as something she did when “things” or “it” got out of control. 
However, with regard to the theoretical literature, these concepts are apparently 
regarded as emotional, and certainly for some of my participants this appeared to be 
the case. I want to be clear before I present this data, then, that my labelling of these 
issues as ‘emotional’ is not always entirely satisfactory. It is possible that this relates 
to the more generalised problems some participants seemed to have with naming and 
talking about emotions. These problems further relate to the inter-connected nature 
of bodies and emotions. The metaphor of control and release in particular lends itself 
well to an embodied (rather than purely emotional/purely bodily) understanding.  
 
Participants used the concept of control in a number of different ways. I have tried to 
separate these into themes. Firstly, I will introduce the ways that participants 
described self-injury as being a way of controlling feelings. I then move on to the 
specific metaphor of control and release which was used by some participants. 
Finally I problematise the use of the term control by contrasting this with the few 
instances where participants used the word power instead.  
 
5.2.1 Control over ‘feelings’ 
 
Several participants described self-injury as being a method of controlling, or feeling 
as though they had control, over their ‘feelings’. The term ‘feeling’ is often used in 
contradictory ways – to refer to either opinion and/or a physical sensation; Lupton, 
for instance, found that ‘emotions’ were frequently defined as ‘feelings’ (1998, 41). 
To some extent this can be seen in the narratives of my participants. However, I 
would argue that this is not necessarily contradictory, but rather reflects the complex 
and embodied nature of experience and being: opinions, emotions, bodily sensations 
are all ‘felt’, and it may be difficult – or even impossible -  to identify or separate 
these concepts.  
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Belinda said that her self-injury was “something that I sort of have control over 
feeling”. She contrasted the “concrete” feelings she felt through self-injury with the 
confusion of what she described as her “inside”. Belinda seemed to suggest that she 
had little or no control over the “inside” of her self – she described this ‘inner’ state 
vividly, using the metaphor of a busy, traffic-logged city on two separate occasions: 
 
“… in my head and in my body its like a huge, like, em, London traffic where like, 
just, its so busy and there’s cars and there’s people and its so busy and so noisy 
sometimes, its just so confusing, and you can’t hear yourself think, or get anything 
straight or just make everything stop and slow […] its all over the place” 
 
Self-injury, Belinda maintained, felt more concrete, and this was a preferable feeling. 
Craig echoed this idea when he suggested that the feelings (embodied, emotional) 
from self-injury might be experienced as more easily controlled than other emotional 
states. For both Craig and Belinda then, there appears to be some element of 
distraction – self-injury serves to distract from undesirable emotional or mental states 
– from worries or ‘internal busyness’. In part this is related to the ‘feeling’ of pain, as 
discussed in Chapter 4. However, the issue of control was also important – self-
injury felt more ‘solid’ but it was also experienced as something which was more 
readily controlled than these ‘inner’ feelings. This clearly relates to the embodied 
nature of self-injury – this solidity appears to be associated with material 
corporeality. 
 
Rease stated that she preferred “outside things”, and that “inside things… freaked 
[her] out”. She related this through two stories about overdoses she had taken. In 
each case, she was clear that this was a distinct experience from self-injury, and that 
if she had not been so ‘desperate’ self-injury would have remained her preferred 
activity: 
 
“there was one night that I couldn’t sleep, and I was feeling really panicked, and I 
self-harmed and I didn’t feel better, and I just kinda lost it so I started rummaging 
about and found all the pills that I keep in the house, and just downed them all. And 
then I got a bit hysterical and kinda lost it a bit, cos- I freaked out at what I had 
done. Em. And also I don’t really like, inside things? It sounds a bit nutty but, like, 
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the self-harm is on the outside, and it’s controllable, but obviously I didn’t know 
what these pills were doing to me, so, I was really freaked out about that” 
 
Rease was “freaked out” by her overdose particularly because she did not know what 
the effects would be – they were unknown. In contrast, self-injury, being on the 
outside, is more controllable. I would suggest that this difference is largely due to the 
relative visibility of the two behaviours – self-injury can be controlled more easily 
because it can be seen. This suggests a potentially important difference between self-
injury and overdoses in terms of motivation and actual effects. Indeed, Rease implies 
that the overdose itself was more an ‘out of control’ act: she “lost it a bit”. This 
contrasts with her descriptions of her self-cutting and burning which she suggested 
were more measured and planned. 
 
It is possible that the concept of control may offer a partial explanation as to why 
some people self-injure: that is, the experience of self-injury is understood as 
something more ‘concrete’ over which they feel they have more control – this is 
contrasted with seemingly uncontrollable ‘internal’ emotional/mental states. Of 
course, this is partial and will not apply to all people. For Belinda, Craig and Rease, 
however, ‘control over feelings’ does seem to have been understood as playing an 
important role in their self-injuring behaviour. Importantly, this control is enacted 
through and upon the body – again indicating the inter-relatedness of bodies and 
emotions.  
  
5.2.2 Control and release 
 
Related to the idea of ‘control over feelings’ is that of ‘control and release’. These 
concepts were used by some participants to describe how self-injury ‘worked’ or 
functioned. Robert, Milly, Craig and Rease all referred to the concept of ‘release’ 
while Anna and Harriet both referred explicitly to ‘release’ as a form of control – 
though in slightly different ways.  
 
In her second interview, Milly said she now saw crying as a “release…in the same 
way I used to see self-harm as a release”. Similarly, Craig talked about various 
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activities enabling ‘release’, particularly drinking, but also exercise. Craig described 
his self-injury as “trying to get some kind of overload of emotion out”. He felt that 
drinking also helped with this, and suggested that if he had not also drunk alcohol 
then his self-injury might have been “less, frequent […] and it may have been more, 
violent, …. Because I think it would’ve tended to build up […] until it got completely, 
impossible to deal with”. These conceptualisations of emotions in terms of ‘build up’ 
and ‘release’ are consistent with themes identified in sociological literature on 
emotions (Lupton 1998), along with the idea that emotional ‘release’ is healthy. For 
Craig, managing this ‘release’ was important, and he stated that his concern when he 
had self-injured was that if he did not hurt himself he might hurt other people: “… I 
don’t have anything […] still only have a few outlets for it […] it has to come out 
somewhere […] and I’d rather injure meself than other people”. 
 
The concept of release is closely related to that of expression, which I discuss in 
more detail below. For instance, in explaining why she had at one point planned to 
cut off her own hand, Rease said: “I felt like I need that – catharsis – you know I felt 
really coiled up inside, and this massive rage, and didn’t know how to deal with it, 
and I wasn’t allowed to express it”. Although Rease differs slightly in that she names 
the emotion (rage) that was inside and needed to be expressed (let out), this 
sentiment appears to be similar to other participants in that something ‘inside’ is 
experienced as overwhelming and as ‘needing’ to come out. In particular, this 
description could be seen as similar to Anna’s talk of “evil” which needed to come 
out, discussed previously in Chapter 4. Rease and Craig’s narratives both hint at the 
potential danger of this internal state being ignored. Craig was concerned that he 
might hurt someone else, while Rease felt that things had got so bad that she was 
contemplating cutting off a limb. At that time, she felt that her self-cutting was no 
longer “working”. That this need for ‘release’ might lead to more severe self-injury is 
also reflected in Anna’s narrative, and evident in the extract reproduced below (p. 
121) – whereby the ‘release’ does not come from the “crappy cuts” but the later, 
more severe cut: “that’s the one”.  
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Robert also used the concept of release when describing his self-injury. He said that 
he had first experienced this when he cut himself by accident. Robert described this 
release as being something that removed emotional pain. He also described this as a 
‘cleansing’ – “it was just sorta like releasing it, clean myself out […..] I thought well 
if I do that then that kinda is a release, … em, it like kinda took away all the sorta 
emotional pain”. Robert also suggested that without self-injury he might have killed 
himself: the belief that self-injury might keep a person alive, by providing a ‘lesser’ 
release, compared to the more final release of suicide, was also expressed by Rease, 
and similar findings have been reported elsewhere (Solomon & Farand, 1996). 
 
Anna and Harriet both used the concept of release alongside that of control. Anna’s 
narrative was significant in that she did not relate these concepts explicitly to 
emotion at any point during the two interviews. Further, Anna’s use of ‘control’ was 
generally very positive. She described herself as a “control freak”, but she seemed to 
take some pride in this – control appeared to be a positive state, something to aspire 
towards:  
 
“Em and it was like right, regain control, this is what I‘m gonna do, I’m gonna cut 
myself,  well it wasnae as calculated as that.. but cut myself… and I cut myself, my 
right arm I cut myself and it just wasnae,…. it wasnae deep it was just ken what I 
mean it was just, crappy cuts.. this is gonna sound so bad em, … and so I covered it 
up…and I was like ah,  no…. ken, its not happening, so I got my blade and I cut my 
other arm and .. it…. Was, literally like I could feel it and hear it sortae like tearing 
open, but it was like it was happening to somebody else but, that was it that was the 
one, it was like , its worked this time that fine, d’you know what I mean? But its… its 
like, its like being there but not being there… … its like, its like being there but not 
being there… and its, like, releasing something… and then when that whatever it is 
is released then your sortae regaining control………… s’what its all about, its all 
about, control” 
 
For Anna, control was something to be strived for, and self-injury, by ‘releasing’ 
something, was a tool which enabled her to ‘regain’ control when she felt she was 
“losing it”. This use of the concept of control contradicts Simon Williams’ more 
negative interpretation, where control is framed as ‘not pleasure’ (1998b, 442). 
Further, Lupton’s work suggests that there is a widespread belief that too much 
emotional control is “potentially damaging” (1998, 70). Lupton demonstrated that 
this understanding existed alongside the contradictory view that control over one’s 
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emotions was desirable. Indeed, for Anna, it appeared that a loss of control was 
dangerous and potentially damaging. Similarly, for Rease, in her description of her 
overdose compared to her self-injury, a loss of control was similarly viewed as more 
hazardous. These complex understandings of release and control, the simultaneous 
‘need’ for control over and release of emotions, reflect more widespread 
contradictory views regarding appropriate or healthy emotions. These ideas are 
closely related to issues of emotional expression, discussed in section 5.3.   
 
Like Anna, Dinah and Francis also described themselves as desiring control, liking 
control, or preferring to be in control. This applied with regard to situations 
generally, but more pointedly, to control over their own lives and selves. Francis 
described feeling especially unsettled by his drinking when he felt “out of control” 
and Dinah noted that control was “definitely a big, big factor […] when you cut 
yourself, you control that and you control how much it bleeds”. For Dinah, then, self-
injury enabled her to do something that she was in control of. However, Dinah also 
described injuring herself in a more ‘out of control’ manner, relating how she was 
taken to A&E by friends on a number of occasions when she had not been “careful” 
and had been discovered. This suggests that within individuals, reasons and 
motivations for self-injury will vary according to time and context.  
 
In Dinah’s case, for instance, her ‘out of control’ injury occurred when she had been 
drinking. This parallels Craig’s narrative about his ‘worst’ injury, also carried out 
when he had been drinking heavily. Alcohol was significant in several participants’ 
narratives. However, equally, alcohol was expressly not a part of other participants’ 
stories. Anna, for instance, claimed to hardly drink at all as she hated being out of 
control, and alcohol was not mentioned at all by either Belinda or Harriet. This 
diverse picture reflects existing literature and discourse, whereby in some cases self-
injury has been found to be correlated with alcohol and drug abuse (Hasking et al., 
2008); whereas other research has indicated that levels of alcohol consumption do 




Harriet did also discuss ‘release’ alongside ‘control’. She described her self-injury as 
being a way of “releasing tension”. In particular, she emphasised that this meant 
relieving the “physical feelings of anxiety and stress” such as “tension headaches”. It 
is possible that Harriet’s emphasis on the physical symptoms of her distress is related 
to the problems she described regarding having her inner feelings recognised or 
validated, discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. Like Belinda and Rease, this appears to 
reflect a preference for ‘outer’ as opposed to ‘inner’. I would argue that Harriet’s 
emphasis on her physical symptoms could be related to her desire to affirm the 
authenticity of her feelings, relating to wider socio-cultural tendencies that privilege 
physical health over mental health (Bendelow, 2009). I extend this discussion further 
in Chapter 8. As regards control, in her second interview, Harriet described how she 
cut herself “earlier” as a way of gaining control: 
 
“I need to do it, just to, kind of relieve that tension inside and I’m like, and the 
longer I kind of put it off, like, I know its gonna be worse, whereas if I kind of like do 
it, earlier, then its like, … its, I can take control. [….]Whereas if I kinda leave it, it 
gets like, out of control more” 
 
There are similarities here with the undercurrent of danger that featured in other 
participants’ narratives – the concern about what might happen if the tension is not 
relieved, or ‘let out’. Further, this is similar to Craig’s suggestion that he might have 
self-injured more severely but less regularly had he not also had the ‘release’ of 
drinking, accompanied by more frequent acts of minor self-injury.  
 
There are subtle differences between Harriet and Anna in their use of the concepts of 
release and control. For Anna, self-injury causes a release which enables her to take 
control, whereas Harriet ‘takes control’ by choosing to injure herself, and therefore 
relieve tension earlier, than she otherwise might. What is similar in all of the 
narratives that used the concept of release, however, is a concern with what might 
happen if whatever is experienced as ‘inside’ is not ‘let out’. These accounts can be 
interpreted, following Scott and Lyman (1968), as justifications for self-injury. 
Tacitly, they accept that self-injury is not ideal, but by invoking the potential danger 
of not ‘releasing’ they attempt to affirm self-injury as an acceptable, even 
responsible, course of action. Self-injury is further justified by drawing on more 
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widely held socio-cultural beliefs about the need for both emotional control and 
release (Lupton, 1998a). In this way, self-injury is framed as being understandable 
and logical.  
 
5.2.3 Power and control 
 
Control and power are closely related concepts and theoretically they are important 
to studies of bodies and embodiment. Foucault used the concept of power to suggest 
ways in which bodies are disciplined and controlled by institutional and ideological 
means (Williams & Bendelow, 1998). While Giddens has suggested that individual 
control and power over the body is an integral part of the ‘reflexive project’ 
(Williams & Bendelow, 1998, 34). My use of power and control here is more 
mundane, however, and I focus on the ways that these terms were employed in the 
narratives of my participants. I suggest that in different contexts and for different 
people, the terms power and control are used in different ways. In this section I will 
provide some evidence regarding the ways that the concepts were used in relation to 
self-injury. I will also discuss the concept of impulsivity, which I will argue can be 
understood as signifying a ‘lack of power’.  
 
A key feature of the use of the terms in my research is that the term control was used 
far more often than power. Indeed, only two participants used the term power when 
talking about their self-injury (Francis and Rease), while the term “powerless” was 
used by Mark when he was considering why self-injury was so effective: 
 
“… so, yeah I guess, pain and body, pain isn’t what its about blood isn’t what its 
about […] its, it’s the controlling aspect […] its about, actually, doing something 
which you actually, can feel the results of straight away […] which I guess if you’re 
feeling quite helpless and powerless and, …” 
 
This resonates with the other narratives which refer only to control – the notion that 
self-injury can be a way of feeling control or power for people who are otherwise 
powerless or lacking in control. Milly for instance said that “if you can’t control 
something, you’ll give yourself something that you can” and Harriet expressed a 
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similar sentiment. Francis referred more directly to the idea of self-injury being 
evidence of power or mastery over the body: 
 
“…maybe its just sort of, part of.. you know reali- realising your own powers, or, 
realising your own control over your body or control over, you know sort of, you 
know if you wanted to you can…. […] … you can, affect yourself, you can sort of 
affect change you can, do things to yourself, you have power, this is yours, this is my 
body, I’m, I own it, I’m in control of it, and, … I can, do what I like with it …” 
 
Finally, Rease said that self-injury actually made her feel ‘powerful’ and she 
explicitly put this in the context of feeling like a ‘victim’ and otherwise powerless. 
The idea that self-injury might relate to power is highlighted by Plante, who 
suggested, rather dramatically, that “[t]here is a terrible power wielded by an 
adolescent who self-injures” (2007, 55). However, this acknowledgement that self-
injury can be powerful is rare, and perhaps more markedly, it may not be readily 
identified by those who are actually self-injuring.  
 
Some of the people I spoke to were clear that at times their self-injury was 
‘impulsive’ – something they felt they had little control or power over. This was 
particularly the case with Belinda and Harriet. Belinda described her earlier self-
injury as being “impulsive”. She contrasted this with her more recent self-injury 
which she felt was more controlled, and more ‘rational’: “… it’s changed over time 
[…] from, …. An intense impulsive need, to something that I want to do, but I think 
about it more carefully and, think, I don’t know I feel more in control of it”. Harriet 
described her self-injury as being something that she continued to experience as an 
‘urge’ or an ‘impulse’. She talked about this particularly in relation to some of the 
psychotropic medication that she took which, she told me, was supposed to help to 
‘control the urges’:  
 
“… cos like the medication that I’m on before like, controls the urges to self-harm 
[…] and I -  coming off it I was like, I was like wanting to hurt myself because I 




Both Harriet and Belinda associated impulsivity with a lack of control. This reflects 
clinical understandings of what impulsivity is (Favazza, 1998; Herpertz et al., 1997; 
Muehlenkamp, 2005). As I noted in Chapter 2, viewing self-injury as ‘impulsive’ is 
problematic and not well supported by existing literature. Clinical understandings of 
impulsivity tend to interpret it as an individual (often internal, biological) factor. This 
view obscures a variety of social reasons why a lack of control may be experienced, 
such as issues relating to gender, age, socio-economic status or sexuality. The 
narratives of my participants provide further evidence that this is a complex issue. As 
well as suggesting that the behaviour can alter over time within individuals, the 
emphasis on control in many of my participant’s interviews suggests that the label of 
‘impulsivity’ may be particularly inappropriate in many cases. Nevertheless, for 
some, Harriet in particular, this description of their behaviour is important, and may 
well be an appropriate reflection of how ‘urges’ to self-injure are experienced.  
 
These issues in turn raise epistemological concerns regarding the status of 
participants’ accounts. Harriet’s description of her self-injury as ‘impulsive’ may 
well reflect how she experiences the behaviour. However it is unclear how far she is 
drawing on psychiatric discourse and clinical understandings of what impulsivity 
means. It is also possible that she might be deploying the term in order to abdicate 
herself of responsibility for her behaviour, or because, in the context of the interview, 
she felt I would be more receptive to ‘technical’ terms. I address these concerns 
further in Chapter 8.  
 
The concepts of control, power, and impulsivity all relate to emotional issues, and in 
particular, to feelings. As I noted above, I do not accept that a discussion of 
‘feelings’ is contradictory simply because it refers to a range of opinions, emotions 
or sensations – rather, I would argue this merely reflects the complexity of lived 
experience. When my participants talked about power, control and impulsivity, they 
were talking about feelings of power, feelings of release, feelings of control (as well 
as control over feelings). Talk about impulsivity refers to a lack of control over 
‘internal’ potentially ‘emotional’ feelings. What these concepts all touch upon, and 
which I now go on to discuss in more detail, is the issue of emotional expression. 
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5.3 Expression and invalidation 
 
In this section I will expand upon the issue of emotional expression and self-injury. 
This is closely related to the metaphor of ‘release’ which was used by a number of 
participants when describing their self-injury. In particular, emotional expression can 
be seen to relate closely to communication. While ‘release’ seems to refer to a 
personal, individual mechanism; expression seems more likely to implicate 
communication to others. Distinguishing between release and expression is not easy. 
However, I would suggest that there are some indications of difference, and this can 
be linked to the concept of invalidation. Emotional expressions are perhaps more 
open to invalidation than are emotional releases. An expression may invite a 
response more so than a release, though this is not to say that an emotional release 
does not do this.  
 
Emotional expression was raised by a number of participants as being an element of 
their motivations for self-injuring – and this appeared to be slightly different to the 
concept of release. Harriet, Anna, Rease and Francis each suggested that self-injury 
could be a form of emotional expression. However, the issue of not being allowed or 
able to express emotions was raised far more often. Finally, many participants also 
talked about having their feelings or emotions invalidated – denied, overlooked or 
minimised. These issues relate closely to arguments I will raise in Chapter 7 
regarding the problematic nature of communication about self-injury and negative 
moods, particularly within households.  
 
5.3.1 Self-injury as emotional expression. 
 
The idea that self-injury might itself be a form of emotional expression is raised in 
existing literature (e.g. Alexander & Clare, 2004), and some of my participants made 
this suggestion. Anna described her self-injury in this manner when she was talking 
about her fears around inadvertently killing herself by cutting too deeply: 
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“… it gets scary … because …. Like there’s always the … the …… there’s always the 
sortae, …. D’you know like if you’re upset or …. Angry or whatever it’s a …….. …… 
d’you know ….. …. Ah …. What am I tryin tae say, d’you know if you go “arrgghh” 
an jus … swipe an go deep […] an god knows what could happen” 
 
Anna appears to be saying here that the self-injury can take on the form of 
expression: what she describes seems to be an act which to an extent expresses the 
anger or upset that she is feeling. As discussed above, Anna also used the concept of 
release to describe her self-injury, which does raise a further question as to how far 
expression and release are different at all. 
 
Emma suggested that her self-injury had been to “express, how desperate things are 
inside”. She linked the idea of expression with communication, as she noted that 
there was some contradiction between her desire to ‘express’ these feelings through 
self-injury and her subsequent hiding of the wounds and scars that resulted. Harriet 
made a similar link between her self-injury as expression, highlighting the 
importance of the visual and visible nature of self-injury: “I was like hurting so 
much, but I couldn’t express that pain […] and I couldn’t understand it, but by 
causing it physical pain, I could see the scars on my arm”. Like Francis (see below), 
this actually seems to be more about creating a visual marker for ‘internal pain’ 
rather than expressing the emotion/pain per se. However, Harriet went on to say that 
with anger in particular “… it’s just easier just like, if I just go and cut myself […] 
that’s the way to, no other way of expressing it”. Rease also briefly noted that 
expression was “a big part of what self-harm is about […] not feeling able to 
express, what I felt”.  
 
Francis suggested that his self-injury might have been “sort of trying to, create, …  
sort of a, a wound for pain that you’re, sort of feeling internally, that you can’t  
express, that you can’t sort of visualise”. Francis was clear that he was exploring 
these issues in the interview, and therefore he offered several different, and tentative, 
suggestions about his motivations for self-injury. This excerpt alludes to both the 
idea that self-injury might express some sort of ‘internal pain’ but also notes that this 
is pain that cannot otherwise be expressed.  
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The idea that self-injury might itself be a form of expression is complicated, as the 
idea of expression can be so closely tied to communication. Further, in some cases, 
what initially seemed to be a description of self-injury as expression, on closer 
examination might be more reflective of a need to create something visual to signify 
internal pain. It is likely that these issues represent multiple layers of meaning and 
motivation for people who self-injure, and that these meanings and understandings 
will change and shift over time, or be employed differentially according to context. 
 
In relation to the idea of self-injury as expression, several participants described 
having problems expressing, or feeling able or allowed, to express emotions – the 
suggestion being that self-injury then became the ‘only’ way of expressing certain 
feelings. I discuss this in Chapter 7 in relation to communication and the hiding and 
revealing (of scars and wounds) practices of participants, however in the next section 
I will provide further examples of the problems participants described having with 
emotional expression. 
 
5.3.2 Emotional repression and self-injury 
 
Harriet, Francis, Rease, Emma and Craig each talked about feeling unable to express 
certain emotions, or feeling that they were not allowed to express certain emotions. 
In particular, anger seemed to be a problematic emotion. That this was named more 
often may, however, be a reflection of my own interests, as this was an issue raised 
by the psychotherapy I received during the fieldwork. Thus, I did directly prompt 
participants about anger, whereas I did not tend to name other emotions very often. 
 
Francis talked about feeling “incapable of, feeling emotion, just completely numbed”. 
He explored this idea in some detail, and his narrative raises several issues that are 
addressed in this chapter – the problems of defining emotion, and separating 
expression and display from feeling: 
 
“the times when I have self-harmed I think it is that it’s, that I have felt, yeah numb 
and, …like I know all these things are happening but and I, …. I wasn’t, em, …you 
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know I wasn’t, getting upset and crying about it, I wasn’t, em, you know, …. … I was 
sort of self-containing it, I was containing it really and sort of, you know, … yeah 
em, …. …. not expressing it I suppose, and….. I think I’ve been, … and so I was 
sort of, …. .I felt it wasn’t right, or, it felt wrong, to be, to have, to know, that I 
should – that    I’m upset, to know that these things have upset me, but not, but the, 
you know I’d learnt, or I’d got into the habit of really, … not displaying that” 
 
Francis’ discussion raises issues of morality as well – he feels that it was ‘wrong’ of 
him not to be more emotionally expressive, or more generally emotional. There also 
seemed to be some confusion as to whether the emotions were ‘there’ or not; whether 
they existed at all if they were not being expressed or displayed. Francis’ narrative 
here also invokes the embodied nature of emotion, both in his reference to 
“containing” emotion, and his habit of not “displaying” his emotions. 
 
Harriet talked a lot about not being able to “express” herself, and she was clear that 
she felt this was an important reason why she self-injured. She described how, as a 
teenager, she had been unable to express herself verbally, and the main focus of 
much of the counselling and therapy she had undergone had been on teaching her 
how to “express” herself. However, she said that she still found it difficult, and 
continued to find writing things down far easier than saying them. Harriet also 
described the problems she had trying to communicate her distress to others: 
“sometimes you don’t know … how to like express what you’re …. What you’re going 
through without it like being … sounding as if you’re threatening them [with self-
injury]”. Harriet felt that she had severe problems expressing ‘herself’ and she linked 
this to her need for self-injury. As discussed above, she suggested that with anger in 
particular she had “no other way of expressing it”.  
 
Emma also described “not talking” when she was a teenager, saying that she 
“stopped talking” for 2 years when she was 15. She suggested that this was her way 
of “dealing with” depression. Emma related this to her family, who, she said “didn’t 
let things out”. She related a series of different stories which expanded upon this 
issue. For instance, she told me how her mother never expressed emotion, and had 
not even cried at her own mother’s funeral – which Emma described as “weird”. She 
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also recounted various occasions where her mental health had been particularly poor, 
indicating that this was never talked about explicitly by her parents:  
 
“I used to play scrabble with my mum in the evenings. Cos I was, quite upset about 
the break up, just everything happening at once, I was a bit of a mess. And I used to 
play scrabble with my mum in the evenings cos I never went out for about a year, cos 
I didn’t know anyone in Edinburgh anyway…. You know, my hands would be 
shaking so bad, with the anti-depressants that I could hardly put the tiles down… 
That’s kind of the way in my family, nothing is talked about, so…. Em… she was 
just quite happy to erm….. hehe… she was just quite happy to, sit and play scrabble 
with me…” 
 
Emma said that an important part of the gradual (and continuing) improvement in her 
mental health was related to her “learning to cope with emotional stuff a bit better, 
[…] by expressing it, which em, is totally alien to them [her parents]”. Emma 
suggested then, that the atmosphere in the family household she grew up in 
discouraged emotional expression and that this was a major contributing factor to her 
mental health problems. She also noted that her sister had also suffered from mental 
health problems but that she had otherwise “managed to escape it”. Emma recounted 
a conversation that she had with her sister about this, who maintained that she was 
better able to express herself because of her relationship with her husband who 
helped her to learn how to express herself rather than “clamming up”. Unlike Harriet, 
then, Emma explicitly related her problems with communication to her family’s 
tendency towards emotional repression. In contrast, Harriet offered no explanation 
for her problems, though it may be significant that she talked about her family very 
little. 
 
Rease also described not feeling “allowed” by her family to express herself. She 
related this in part to her father’s religious beliefs, which she felt meant that she was 
unable to express elements of her own less traditional spirituality. At the time Rease 
was self-injuring she described how her relationship with her father was particularly 
strained because although he was unhappy with Rease’s ideas about religion and 
spirituality, he was also conducting an extra-marital affair: 
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“I was sitting there, you know, why are you telling me this? Like I’m your, friend, or 
something, and obviously, thinking, you know, your this religious person, you know, 
this Christian, whose so --- into you, you know, because over the years, I’d 
sometimes made an attempt to tell him, how I felt about stuff. And he’d always turn 
round and say, Rease I can’t believe you’re thinking that, how can you think such a 
twisted thing, or, you know. Kinda, not allowing me to express myself. And here he 
was telling me about an affair!” 
 
Like Harriet, Rease also named anger and rage as emotions that were particularly 
problematic, and which she “didn’t know how to deal with” and “wasn’t allowed to 
express”. Rease further suggested that part of the reason she felt unable to express 
emotions – especially negative ones – was a concern with ‘burdening’ other people. 
Craig also raised this issue, explaining that one of the reasons he did not tell people 
when he was self-injuring was because he did not want to ‘burden’ them. Belinda 
also said that she did not express anger ‘outwardly’, though she suggested that this 
was because her father had quite violently expressed his anger when she was 




An even more prevalent theme was that of emotional invalidation. More than half of 
the participants referred to some type of emotional invalidation. I have used the 
phrase emotional invalidation to describe a variety of situations described by 
participants. These include circumstances where feelings and emotions were 
experienced as being overlooked, minimised or downplayed by other people. 
 
Emma, Anna and Rease all described very similar situations whereby they had been 
admitted to hospital following an act of self-harm (either cutting or, in Rease’s case 
an overdose, and in Emma’s cutting and an overdose). For all three women, a key 
feature of the narrative was that following, and during, the hospital stay, the feelings 
that they had which had led to the act of self-harm were ignored, minimised or I 
would suggest – invalidated – by their families. 
 
Anna highlighted her mother as being particularly dismissive of her feelings and 
behaviour. In the following excerpt Anna talks generally about her mother’s 
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awareness of her problems, referring explicitly to the period of time when Anna was 
27 and had recently been diagnosed with post-natal depression: 
 
“its just no mentioned, its never spoken about she’s not got a clue what I’ve been 
through, not a clue, when I was in hospital I finally told her that I self-harmed …and 
she went “well, we’ll be stopping that then won’t we”” 
 
Anna was clear that this dismissive attitude was not recent, or focussed solely on her 
self-injury, but that her mother had always been like this. For instance she recounted 
how she had told her mother about starting her menstrual periods, to which her 
mother had responded: “‘oh, I thought that might happen’ and that was it! That was 
the whole conversation!” Anna found this situation especially intolerable because her 
mother apparently believed that they were “best friends”.  
 
Emma, as discussed above, described her family as incredibly uncommunicative, 
however she also talked about trying to “protect” her parents, by not telling them 
about the worse aspects of her mental health. In the following excerpt Emma 
recounts trying to prevent her parents from finding out about an incident of self-
injury: 
 
“I tried to keep that from them, the biggest….em… but my mum went up to visit me 
in, … cos I did that when I was in the [psychiatric hospital], and my mum came up to 
visit me, when I was, I’d been taken to the [general hospital], em,… and she 
appeared in the [general hospital], while I was trying to phone my dad, cos he was 
supposed to come and visit me that day. I was trying to phone him to say not to come. 
Hehe. And er, … my mum walked in and just went ‘what in God’s name have you 
done to yourself’ heheh. And I’m like….. that’s a strange reaction, you know, I’ve 
just seven stitches in my arm, and em, my stomach pumped, and em, you know, … 
you’re, almost blaming me” 
 
 
Emma herself pointed out the contradiction between her desire for better 
communication with her parents, and her attempts to hide her self-harm from them. 
This was paralleled in her self-injurious behaviour, whereby on one hand she 
described this as an expressive act, but on the other she was careful to keep the scars 
and wounds hidden. Despite being clear that she herself struggled to communicate 
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about these issues, Emma talked about becoming increasingly exasperated by her 
family’s inability to do so either: 
 
“As long as I can remember, em, we’ve never had a discussion about, ….. anything, 
er, of great import. You know, we’ll talk about the weather, we’ll talk about em, … 
my cats, we’ll talk about, how lovely my niece is, but eh, even, you know after, 10 
visits to the, the [psychiatric hospital] […]you know my parents, I would go walking 
with my mum, and she would, she would sort of, very very awkwardly sort of, … just 
kind of  stammer out ‘so how you doing’ hehehe, and that would be it […] you know, 
‘are you, still on the medication?’….. no I, jees is that all you can, ask me about? 
[…] you know, after all I’ve been through hehehe - all you’re worried about is 
whether I’m still on the medication or not” 
 
Rease also described her family as responding in what she saw as a woefully 
inadequate manner following her overdose: 
 
“ … I woke my dad up and I’m like, you know, dad I’ve done this really stupid thing. 
And it wasn’t a suicide attempt. At – sort of extension of the self-harm, or, panic, or, 
the self-harm not working, and thought mebbe, something might. So I woke him up, 
and jus like, em. So I got an ambulance, and, got my stomach pumped and stuff, 
and but, again, em, nothing came of it. Can you believe how much my family 
doesn’t talk! Heheh, it was ridiculous!” 
 
Rease went on to describe her second overdose, and in this instance it was the 
hospital staff who she felt did not acknowledge her distress: 
 
“ And, finally because I was so sick of where I’d got to, you know, couldn’t believe I 
was doing this to myself, couldn’t, you know, just, -- wanting to tell someone so I 
was like, em, I [told] her, my mum’s an alcoholic and I wasn’t coping, and she just 
went, ‘Oh right, ok’. And, and then buggered off. And I was like, no hang on a 
minute, I just dropped this massive bomb, that I’ve not told anyone, and not been 
able to talk about and, your, your just walking off! So again, I shut down. You know. 
Nobody wanted to talk about anything! It’s just nuts!” 
 
What I want to draw out here is that Rease, Anna and Emma all felt that their 
distress, their feelings, were not validated. All described responses (or lack of 
responses) which they frame as being inadequate. So, there is a situation whereby 
individuals who have described having ‘problems’ expressing themselves, and 
especially expressing negative emotions, have their attempts at expression (self-
injury, self-harm) invalidated, overlooked or ignored.  
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Other participants discussed a variety of other ways in which they felt that their 
feelings or emotions were invalidated. Craig, for instance, suggested that part of his 
reasons for self-injuring might have been that he was a “fairly melancholy person 
[…] you know, that would be my default state – and being told not to be like that”. 
Similarly, Anna said that there was “nothing worse than somebody saying, ‘don’t feel 
bad’ or, ‘how do you think it’d make me feel?’”.  
 
As I note above, Harriet talked a lot about the problems she faced when trying to get 
her distress recognised. She told me that she was often told by others, including her 
CPN (community psychiatric nurse), that she “looked fine” when she felt far from 
fine. This was a dominant theme in Harriet’s interviews more generally – the 
apparent lack of fit between her external appearance (“fine”) and her internal feelings 
(“really anxious”). This could be related to the function of self-injury for Harriet, 
which she suggested enabled her to ‘see’ the pain she felt inside, emphasising the 
importance of the visual over less easily identified ‘inner feelings’. This idea was 
also raised by Belinda and Francis, who both talked about self-injury being 
something more ‘concrete’ than their inner state of confusion or numbness. 
 
Dinah and Robert each described rather different situations, where their 
emotions/emotionality was not recognised at all. Dinah told me that she was 
described as “cold and unemotional” by her family, and that although she had felt 
this was not true, she nevertheless assumed that other people thought this about her 
for a long time. This is similar to the other stories of invalidation in that it refers to an 
inconsistency between the way that Dinah felt, and the way that she was described by 
other people, and by her family in particular. Similarly, when I asked him whether 
his parents had been aware of his eating disorders and self-injury, Robert recounted 
the following: 
 
“…it’s quite funny actually because like em, …. I have actually, like sat, since that 
point eh, ken sorta maybe a couple of years later, em, I did actually turn round and 
ask my mum, I was like ‘ken did you not actually realise that there was something 
wrong?’ […] and she was like, she says ‘well we did’ she says ‘but we ken, we just 
thought ken, that as long as you were happy, ken as long as you were fine eh’ and 
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it was like ‘but I wasnae fine’ …. It was like ken, that was why, it was like ken I was 
going through like a really difficult time and all that eh,… em, and it was like ken 
well, …. I dinnae ken, parents just seem to say the wrong things at the wrong time, its 
like ‘oh well you came through the, you came through the other end’” 
 
Robert’s family apparently did not openly discuss his distress, despite him being 
anorexic and bulimic over several years:  “I mean they could see that I was losing 
the weight and they could see that I was like, deathly pale and all that, but it was 
never actually mentioned”. This is paralleled in Dinah’s narrative, when she told me 
that her father and step-mother had been apparently “oblivious” to her self-injury, not 
finding out about her behaviour until she told them several years later.  
 
This issue of emotional invalidation is raised by Freund (1990) in his work on the 
‘expressive body’, and these ideas seem particularly relevant here. Freund develops 
Hochschild’s concept of ‘status shields’ in an attempt to develop a theoretical 
position which incorporates emotions, bodies and social structure. People of lower 
statuses, Freund argues, lack ‘status shields’ and thus lack any significant defence 
against the aggression of others (1990, 466). This aggression includes having one’s 
feelings or perceptions ignored, invalidated, or termed irrational, but further to this: 
 
“The invalidation of one’s feelings, however, may be more threatening than the 
invalidation of perceptions, since feelings as a form of information are experienced 
as the deeply authentic, existential ground of who we are” (ibid) 
 
I will extend this discussion in the final section of this chapter, where I discuss self-
injury as a form of emotion work, and further address the issue of emotional 
authenticity with regard to self-injury. 
 
5.4 Emotions and social life 
 
Thus far, this chapter has demonstrated how self-injury was variously conceptualised 
as being a ‘release’ of emotion; an expression of emotion; and a form of emotional 
control. These are similar to many of the activities that Hochschild (1979; 2003 
(1983)) labelled ‘emotion management’ and in this section I will further expand on 
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this idea. Hochschild’s work has been critiqued on a number of points however, 
perhaps most significantly for implying that emotions that are not ‘managed’ are 
somehow more ‘authentic’ (Wouters, 1989). This thesis suggests that the concept of 
authenticity is particularly relevant with regard to self-injury, and I conclude this 
section with a discussion of this. 
 
5.4.1 Being emotional ‘appropriately’ 
 
Emotion management is a concept developed by Hochschild to describe the ‘work’ 
that is done to emotions in order to make them appropriate to the ‘feeling rules’ of a 
given social context. She distinguished this from instances where individuals ‘act’ 
out emotions in order to attempt to ‘fit’ a situation, emphasising that “… the emotion 
management perspective fosters attention to how people try to feel, not, as for 
Goffman, how people try to appear to feel” (Hochschild, 1979: 560). An example 
that Hochschild gave was of a bride actively trying to make herself ‘feel happy’ on 
her wedding day, however she developed the concept over several years and through 
different publications, the most significant being her work on air hostesses and 
commercial ‘emotion management’ (Hochschild, 2003 (1983)), and her later work on 
the ‘second shift’ and the ‘emotion work’ carried out in families (Hochschild, 2003). 
In The Managed Heart, Hochschild described how air hostesses controlled their 
feelings of rage and animosity in order to present a pleasant and personable face to 
the customers who in many cases induced these feelings (2003 (1983): 25). The 
methods that the air hostesses used included a wide range of cognitive and bodily 
techniques; the important factor in all of these was that the ‘emotion management’ 
must go undetected in order to be successful.  
 
There are three significant similarities between self-injury and the forms of emotion 
management Hochschild discusses: firstly, that self-injury, like emotional 
management, is used by some people to ‘work on’ and alter emotional states; 
secondly, that many people who self-injure hide their self-injury, just as those 
practicing emotional management also seek to do so without being noticed; finally, 
Hochschild’s participants described a range of embodied methods of doing emotion 
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work, which could be compared to self-injury. Evidently, this mode of self-injury is 
not universal. As I discuss in Chapters 6 and 7, for many people who self-injure it is 
equally important that people do see the self-injury, or are aware it has occurred. 
Nevertheless, I would argue that in some cases at least, self-injury can be understood 
as a form of emotion management. 
 
Rease, Mark, Justin and Francis all described self-injury as something that made 
them feel ‘good’ (Rease, Mark). It acted as a ‘jump start’ (Francis, Justin). Anna said 
that the ‘release’ provided by self-injury enabled her to carry on with daily life, to 
think rationally. Similarly, Belinda said that self-injury stopped the confusion in her 
head, again, allowing her to continue with her life. 
 
Another way that Hochschild’s theory can be seen to apply to some of the narratives 
is in her emphasis on the contextual nature of ‘feeling rules’. I would suggest that in 
the cases of some participants – particularly Emma, but also Craig, Dinah and 
Francis – the ‘feeling rules’ in the contexts of the participants’ families discouraged 
emotional expression to such an extent that this contributed to individuals being left 
with no way of knowing ‘what to do’ with strong, negative emotions. The influence 
of the social, emotional and interpersonal dynamics of families on the development 
of self-injury is controversial, and is an issue that is rarely raised in the literature 
(perhaps because these ideas are so similar to those of Laing (1960) whose work 
seems to be generally unfashionable nowadays).  
 
However, several of my participants were very clear that they felt their family was in 
no way ‘to blame’ for their behaviour (the issue of blame, and the problem of 
‘blaming the parents’ reflecting a critique of Laing’s work). Mark and Milly in 
particular stressed this point, but it may also be significant that both Harriet and 
Robert seemed reluctant to talk about their families. Conversely, some participants 
clearly felt that their upbringing had contributed to the feelings that led to their self-
injury. Anna, Emma, Rease and Justin all stated this strongly, while Belinda, Dinah 
and Francis each explored the issue with me.  
 
 148 
Applying a broader lens to this issue, Milly, Rease and Dinah all suggested that 
wider societal and cultural mores discouraged emotional expression. Milly talked 
about the problems she felt she had regarding ‘appropriate’ emotional expression. 
She said that in the past she felt she had ‘inappropriately’ expressed her emotions, 
and discussed the challenges of expressing emotions enough, but not doing so 
‘inappropriately’: 
 
“I’m lucky that I can, em, …. I can go through those emotions without feeling too, … 
em, … detrimental towards myself […] cos I know, society these days is just so, …. 
…. ‘one must not show one’s emotions’ […] to the world kinda thing. And I’m not 
really showing them to the world but, I’m just, …. Making sure that I’m still allowing 
myself to be human” 
 
Milly’s discussion certainly relates to theoretical debates around understandings of 
(emotional) control and release and the importance of broader socio-cultural beliefs 
about this (Lupton, 1998a; Williams, 1998a). Similarly, Dinah talked about “the total 
Scottish culture, British culture, but you’re keeping things to yourself, not wanting to 
worry other people”. Part of the reason Dinah felt people had thought that she was 
“cold and unemotional” was because she tended to ‘express’ emotions privately 
rather than in front of others. Rease and Craig conveyed similar stories about not 
wanting to ‘burden’ other people with their problems or emotions. There appears to 
be some suggestion then that the lack of emotional expression described in some 
families could relate to wider social and cultural attitudes towards emotional 
expression.  
 
These ideas are discussed by Wouters (1989) in his critique of Hochschild. He argues 
that although Hochschild’s work suggests that emotional expression is often limited 
or constrained by late modern commercial activity, it can equally be argued that 
emotional expressivity is actually more possible now, in late modern, Western 
society, than it ever has been. Williams (1998a) extends these debates, suggesting 
that late modern society is actually characterised by a contradictory tension between 
expression and control over emotions, a theme also identified by Lupton (1998) in 
her empirical research. My participants’ narratives reflect these concerns, however 
there was less conflict between concepts of control versus expression than implied in 
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some of the theoretical work. Rather, participants’ tended to use both control and 
expression in positive ways, with some participants suggesting that control could be 
achieved through expression or release.  
 
These tensions can be related to debates around the construction of mental illnesses. 
Most mental illnesses are characterised by some kind of emotional ‘problem’ – 
whether it is inappropriate emotional ‘displays’ or inconvenient and apparently 
unexplained emotions more generally (Bendelow, 2009; Busfield, 1996). Some types 
of depression could be characterised as ‘unexplained sadness’. BPD is characterised 
by an inability to regulate emotional expression and particularly “inappropriate and 
intense anger” (Bjorklund, 2006, 5). Further, these could be related back to the 
concept of emotion management, by arguing that people may be more liable to be 
‘labelled’ – or to ‘self-label’ (Thoits, 1985) – as having a mental illness if their 
attempts at emotional management fail somehow.  
 
5.4.2 Emotional authenticity and visible pain 
 
Hochschild’s theory of emotion management has been criticised for implying the 
existence of ‘authentic’ emotions, as well as a ‘true’ or ‘real’ self (Wouters, 1989, 
97). Wouters provides a rigorous critique of Hochschild’s work, demonstrating how 
much of her theory relies upon a problematic distinction between public and private, 
and between the ‘managed’ self and the allegedly more authentic, ‘real’ self.  I take 
into account such criticisms in my own use of the concept of emotional management. 
Following Wouter’s critique, I do not suggest that emotion management detracts 
from an ‘authentic self’ or that it therefore results in inauthentic emotions – rather, I 
would suggest that emotional management is intrinsic to social life, and to individual 
selves and identities. Practices of emotional management are a part of that self, and 
indeed are so intrinsic that they cannot be satisfactorily split off from ‘unmanaged’ 
emotion. This leads from my conceptualisation of emotions as essentially social 
‘complexes’ rather than private or individual (Williams, 1998a; Wouters, 1989). 
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However, the concept of authenticity can be seen to be important to self-injury in 
other ways. An issue which arose in some of the interviews was the concept of ‘real 
self-harmers’. This was initially raised by Anna, who talked about people ‘copying’ 
self-injurious behaviour in psychiatric hospitals. She said that she could not 
understand how such people were able to self-injure, since it must hurt them, because 
they were not ‘really’ ‘self-harmers’. Belinda too talked about people 
‘inauthentically’ self-injuring, for her this was related to the issue of ‘attention 
seeking’ – Belinda suggested that her own reasons for self-injury were more 
acceptable than those of other people who were injuring just to be “cool”. Milly 
picked up on this issue when she discussed how her self-injury had started – that she 
had ‘copied’ it from a girl at school -  however, Milly was clear that she ‘claimed it 
as my own’ – which seemed to be claiming some level of ‘authenticity’ to the 
behaviour.  
 
This issue of ‘real self-harm’ and ‘authentic’ self-injury can be tied to the 
authenticity of emotions. This issue could relate to the problems many of the 
participants described having more generally with getting their emotions ‘validated’ 
– and the frequent occurrences whereby emotions and feelings were invalidated. This 
might lead to a greater concern with self-injuring behaviour being seen by others as 
‘authentic’. Self-injury could also be seen as more authentic by being more concrete, 
relating directly to the corporeal physicality of self-injury. I refer here to Belinda, 
Harriet and Francis, who all described confusing, troubling, but more importantly 
‘intangible’ feelings, and who each described self-injury as providing something 
‘more real’ than these amorphous ‘feelings’. In each of these cases the common 
feature is a lack of confidence, or an uncertainty, regarding emotion – either on the 
part of the individual who self-injures, or on the part of others who ‘invalidate’ or 
otherwise dismiss the individuals’ attempts at emotional expression. Indeed, Simon 
Williams  (1998a: 748) suggests that there is a wider ‘search’ for “more ‘authentic’, 
ways of being and knowing” in late modern society – and it could be argued that 
self-injury might be understood as being a part of such a search. 
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5.5 Emotions and self-injury 
 
I have raised a range of ‘emotional’ issues in this chapter. Viewing emotions as 
communicative, inter-subjective complexes, I have demonstrated that emotional 
control and emotional expression are important, both in understanding self-injury, 
but also in understanding the ways that emotions are conceptualised by people. In 
particular, this chapter has provided support to existing theoretical debates which 
have emphasised the centrality of bodies and embodiment to understandings and 
experiences categorised as ‘emotional’ (Lupton, 1998a; Williams & Bendelow, 
1998). 
 
I discussed the concepts of emotional expression and release. My analysis of 
participants’ use of these terms in their explanations of their self-injury affirms that 
although there are important differences in the way these are understood, they are 
certainly related. I suggested however that the ‘release’ of emotions might be less 
open to invalidation than the ‘expression’ of emotions. Several participants related 
their self-injury to their up-bringing, and to family ‘modes’ of emotional expression 
and repression. Others related this to broader socio-cultural understandings regarding 
the appropriate management and expression of emotions. Nevertheless, release, 
expression, control and invalidation can all be related to broader socio-cultural 
understandings regarding the appropriate place of emotions in social life. I have 
shown that participants drew upon established understandings of emotion in order to 
justify their self-injury. Framing self-injury in terms of control and release makes the 
behaviour understandable, if not entirely acceptable. 
 
Using Hochschild’s concept of emotion work, I have suggested that self-injury can 
be made more understandable by viewing it as an embodied method of doing 
emotion work. This perspective further affirms the embodied nature of both emotions 
and in turn self-injury. Through self-injury, emotions are acted upon via the body, 
eliciting both a physical and emotional ‘release’ whilst simultaneously providing a 
visible marker.  
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Finally, this chapter has also introduced another element to the broader theme of 
authenticity. I have suggested that self-injury might be understood as an attempt to 
demonstrate ‘authentic emotion’. In its visible and visual nature, self-injury 
concretely ‘shows’ distress and upset – both to the self who is injured, and to the 
people around them.  
 
The visible nature of self-injury is discussed further in the following chapters. In 
these, the power that self-injury can have to communicate to others (whether 
intentionally or unintentionally) is discussed. This communication is particular to 
self-injury (as opposed to e.g. overdoses) because it is immediately and dramatically 
apparent. Further, self-injury continues to ‘communicate’ in the days, months and 
sometimes years after the initial injury. Scars and marks continue to affect social life, 











This chapter is the first of two that broadly address the ways in which 
communication about self-injury was described by participants. Here, I examine the 
inter-related and problematic concepts of help-seeking and ‘attention-seeking’. Help-
seeking in this chapter is limited mainly to formal help, from doctors, psychiatrists, 
counsellors and therapists, while Chapter 7 will examine what might be called 
informal help-seeking, where self-injury is communicated to friends or family. 
Attention-seeking is introduced in depth in the final section of this chapter, but 
remains a concern throughout chapters 7 and 8.  
 
I begin with a brief discussion of help-seeking and attention-seeking, highlighting 
their problematic nature and explaining my own use of them. I then turn to 
participants’ narratives about help-seeking. First, I detail participants’ stories about 
support that was oriented towards the participant’s (self-injured) self, or towards 
disorders or conditions understood to underlie their self-injury. Secondly, I examine 
the narratives of participants who had sought or received help for the wounds or 
injuries created by their self-injury.  
 
The second section of the chapter critically examines the concept of ‘attention-
seeking’. I demonstrate how participants struggled with the negative connotations of 
the term. Some endorsed this negative understanding, whilst others challenged 
accepted and potentially damaging interpretations of ‘attention-seeking’. This 
discussion is closely related to the preceding discussion of help-seeking, and in the 
last section I extend these themes, further emphasising the double-bind that people 
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who self-injure are in: namely, that if they seek help for their behaviour they run the 
high risk of being labelled ‘attention-seeking’ and yet ‘attention’ is frequently 
exactly what they need (Crouch & Wright, 2004). This raises important questions 
regarding wider social and cultural attitudes towards help-seeking in general, but in 
particular relating to emotional and mental distress. This leads in to Chapter 7, where 
I discuss the issue of display and visibility of both self-injury and emotional distress 
in more detail. 
 
6.1.2 Help-seeking and attention-seeking: problems and 
contradictions 
 
Both help-seeking and attention-seeking are problematic terms, though for different 
reasons. Help-seeking is widely used in medical and sociological literature to discuss 
patient behaviour in relation to illness. It is generally understood to be a ‘good thing’, 
and much research focuses on exploring why people do not seek help for certain 
illnesses, and how far this relates to the type of illness or the type of person (e.g. 
O'Brien et al., 2005 examines gender and help-seeking). With regard to mental 
illnesses, help-seeking is seen as particularly important, since it is understood that 
people frequently do not seek help for mental distress (Biddle et al., 2007). Further, 
gender, age, social-class and ethnicity are all thought to have important effects upon 
help-seeking behaviour and are likely to lead to biases in existing understandings 
about rates of mental illnesses in the general population (Biddle et al., 2007; 
Busfield, 1996; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1999). 
 
Self-injury is understood as a ‘hidden’ and ‘secret’ behaviour, with very low rates of 
help-seeking (National Inquiry into Self-Harm Among Young People, 2006). Despite 
this, and as discussed in Chapter 1 and 2, most research has focused on clinical 
populations, comprising people who are obviously already receiving ‘help’. Research 
that explores the help-seeking behaviours and experiences of people who self-injure 
is scarce, and this chapter will at least begin to address this deficit.  
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However, help-seeking is a problematic concept, and the narratives of my 
participants certainly demonstrate this. What is defined as help-seeking, for instance, 
may not always involve the active involvement of the individual concerned. Help 
may be imposed, individuals may be coerced into accepting it, or they may be taken 
to different help providers by someone else. Similarly, ‘help’ might not be perceived 
as such by the individual, it could equally be viewed as interference, or even, in 
extreme cases, as violence. Further, the help-seeking individual may not have their 
behaviour interpreted in this way by those they are seeking help from. Attention-
seeking is one way in which help-seeking behaviour can be re- or mis-interpreted by 
others. 
 
Attention-seeking too is problematic. It is highly morally charged: if help-seeking is 
morally virtuous (a ‘good thing’) attention-seeking is certainly a vice (a ‘bad thing’). 
Despite this, attention-seeking and help-seeking are in some cases ostensibly the 
same behaviour. The difference lies primarily in how the behaviour is interpreted by 
others. Attention seeking is particularly important with regard to self-injury, since, as 
noted above, it is a charge frequently levelled at people who self-injure. Further, the 
literature regarding this is contradictory. Some commentators are clear that self-
injury is sometimes an ‘attention-seeking’ behaviour (Jacobson & Gould, 2007; 
Nock & Prinstein, 2004), while others claim that this idea is a ‘myth’ and that in fact 
self-injury is never about attention-seeking (McAllister et al., 2002a). This latter 
position tends to argue that it is a hidden and secretive behaviour. As I will 
demonstrate in this chapter and Chapter 7, the stories of my participants suggest a far 
more complex picture.  
 
6.2 Routes to and forms of formal help-seeking 
 
With the exception of Justin and Craig, all participants described seeking or 
receiving support of some kind from formal services, either for their self-injury or an 
apparently related illness or condition. I will begin by discussing the narratives of 
those participants who described receiving general support for themselves as 
someone who self-injures, or for ostensibly related problems. I will then turn to 
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narratives which addressed support received specifically for the wounds that their 
self-injury created. 
 
6.2.1 The whole person: support for ‘the self-injurer’ 
 
Most participants talked about having sought or received care in general for their 
self-injury, using counsellors, therapists, psychologists, psychiatrists, GPs and 
charities or help lines. The methods and motivations regarding how these services 
were accessed varied however, as did the ways in which participants talked about 
these issues. 
 
Milly, Robert, Mark and Francis had all sought out counselling themselves in 
response to mental distress. Milly and Robert had each seen three different 
counsellors. They both appeared to view receiving counselling as relatively 
unproblematic, and took a pragmatic approach. Robert, for instance, talked about 
seeking out counselling when he was struggling at college. 
 
“I actually, spoke to the counsellor during my period at [residential college] as well 
(A – mhm) had a, an appointment with her because I was getting really depressed, 
and, couldnae handle the workload and things eh, so I spoke, I had a chat with her.” 
 
More recently he described visiting a counsellor to cope with a recent medical 
diagnosis and changing his college course. Milly and Robert both described 
counselling as a relatively unproblematic resource which they drew upon when in 
emotional distress. 
 
Mark had seen a counsellor briefly when he was suffering from depression, and was 
also currently seeing a counsellor for something that he said was unrelated but did 
not disclose. Therefore his counselling was apparently largely unrelated to his self-
injury. Mark was relatively positive about his self-injury in general however, and 
therefore it makes sense that he would not have felt the need to seek ‘help’ for his 
self-injury in particular. Francis had also seen a counsellor around the time that I 
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interviewed him. Whilst this was also not explicitly about his self-injury, Francis said 
that he had discussed his self-injury with the counsellor, and found this useful: 
 
“I’ve had sort of 5 or 6 sessions with them, and, em, … … you know sort of, ah, it 
wasn’t immediately obvious, the, the benefit it was having on me but, afterwards, I 
sort of feel like its probably, been quite a positive thing to have done. em, yeah, I 
mean, yeah my concern, one of my concerns about, having done it, I think, I think its 
quite a shocking thing, to, .. to just see that you’ve permanently  changed your body, 
you know that alone, regardless of, I imagine its sort of similar to getting a tattoo or 
something, you know that its actually, you’ve permanently changed, an aspect of 
your body, you can’t take that back now, and em, …” 
 
The embodied nature of self-injury is highlighted here, as Francis particularly notes 
that counselling helped him to come to terms with the fact that his self-injury had 
“permanently changed” his body. Although he had found counselling beneficial in 
beginning to come to terms with his self-injury and family problems, Francis was 
much more ambivalent about receiving counselling however, and this seemed to 
relate to his family’s more general dismissal of his negative and ‘self-pitying’ 
feelings.  
 
Francis, along with Anna, Emma, Harriet and Milly, had also received support from 
his GP about his self-injury. Milly visited her GP and was prescribed anti-
depressants. Francis sought help from his GP soon after his first act of self-injury, 
and we discussed this at length in his interview, as I was surprised at his decisive 
attitude towards this. 
 
“F - I was concerned and that’s when I went to the GP and - 
A- (interrupting) yeah, I guess I was quite struck by the fact that you went to your 
GP, [---], an interpretation of it could’ve been that it was quite decisive action like, 
well there’s something wrong here, lets get to the GP and get it sorted, I sort of, and 
especially when they offered you counselling and you didn’t take it, I guess I was 
wondering what, you were kind of expecting them to say  
F – yeah 
A -  and do about it  
F – I think it was par-, I think it was really more that, at that stage I hadn’t told 
anyone, and it was really just going to someone, to tell someone, like. And even just 
that act of getting it off my chest 
A - yeah 
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F - I had, I mean that made me explain why I, I mean I can’t actually remember what 
I was thinking at the time but” 
 
Francis’ views on this are slightly conflicting: he felt that he needed to ‘tell someone’ 
and therefore visited the GP, but he appeared to feel that this was enough and that a 
counsellor as well would be somehow self-indulgent. Francis’ decision not to seek 
further help at that point may well have led from his family’s reaction to his 
behaviour. As I discuss further below (Section 6.4), Francis’ sister in particular 
accused him of ‘attention-seeking’ and it is possible that such reactions led to him 
deciding not to seek further support. 
 
Anna, Emma and Harriet had each had extensive contact with psychiatric services, 
and some of this was accessed through their GP. Emma’s psychiatric care had 
recently been given over to her GP following the retirement of her long-term 
psychiatrist. Harriet was initially treated by her GP when she first “took ill” at the 
age of 16. This situation was complicated, however, as her GP at this point was 
apparently her father, so she had to be transferred to another surgery. Despite this, 
she remained concerned about how confidential her treatment would remain, and she 
worried that when she used out of hours services that this would get back to her 
father:  
 
“… its like, its hard like, having, … a dad as a doctor, because everyone knows him, 
and you’re like, like – ‘oh, your dad’s a GP isn’t he’ its like – yeah (A – mm) and 
they find that ------- how can you be unwell when your dad’s a GP (A – mm) its like 
you go to the like out of hours, and they like, look at you and their like, hehe, yeah…. 
Kinda like, its strange, them like knowing, knowing I’m ill. Like, hope they don’t say 
anything – I know they can’t say anything bad but sometimes you worry like, they 
might say ‘oh I saw your daughter and… in like out of hours sort of thing” 
 
Psychiatric services were used extensively by Anna, Emma and Harriet, and Dinah 
had also had some involvement with psychiatry. With the exception of Dinah, these 
were generally presented as services which participants had had to access – that is, 
they did not necessarily choose to go, but rather their attendance was part and parcel 
of their being diagnosed with a mental illness. Accessing these services went with 
the territory of being diagnosed with post-natal depression/manic depression (Anna); 
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bi-polar disorder (Emma) and borderline personality disorder (Harriet). Anna was 
referred to psychiatry after her post-natal depression was identified at a routine 
check, and had remained involved with services ever since. Emma had different 
episodes of involvement with psychiatry, neither of which she directly accessed 
herself. In the first instance, she was taken to the doctor by a friend at university who 
was worried about her, and subsequently referred to a psychiatrist and therapist. In 
the second instance, which occurred when Emma was 27, she visited her GP with 
what she thought was an ear infection, was diagnosed instead with depression and 
referred to psychiatry again.  
 
Harriet did not discuss explicitly how she came to be involved with psychiatric 
services, though we did briefly discuss how her case was escalated to an ‘emergency’ 
status: 
 
“H - I think I was lucky when I was like in adolescent services cos they got me seen, 
really quick, it was like, got an emergency appointment,  
A – yeah 
H - cos like, ‘no we need to get her seen’, and I’m like – ooo. 
A – yeah, no that’s what happened to me when I was, it was when I was 16, was that 
I was on a waiting list, like for a psychologist, and like crises were happening, and I 
got put on an emergency thing, got seen, 
H – oh, mine was straight away an emergency  
A – yeah 
H - I think the school was persua- said they had to get her, in, as an emergency 
because, they couldn’t , have me in school in the state I was” 
 
Through this discussion, then, Harriet implies that her ‘state’ was so severe that her 
school instigated her involvement with psychiatry. This excerpt also demonstrates 
one of my attempts to involve my own story in the data collection, though not 
terribly successfully here. I was attempting to create common ground between my 
experiences and Harriet’s. However, Harriet appeared to interpret this as a challenge, 
following which she sought to affirm that she was the one in the ‘worse’ state. This 
represented an incident where there was a clear conflict between: my position as a 
researcher; Harriet potentially positioning me as ‘therapist’; and my status as 
someone who had similar experiences to those I was researching.   
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Dinah’s interaction with psychiatry was quite different. Like Emma, she accessed 
psychiatric services on two separate occasions. The first was when she was 19 and 
was instigated by her then partner, Gianni, who was controlling and abusive. She was 
clear that, partly for these reasons, this did not go well: 
 
“Oh I told you aye, when I mind Gianni made me go and see a psychiatrist when I 
was 19 I think I told you that, I’ve just remembered heh. Ehm…. Ironically enough, 
he added to everything, you know, he didn’t help, but he wanted me to go and do 
something about it! Very strange, weird thing going on there. Ehm, but I went to see 
some, I went to see my GP who referred me to the young people’s unit when I was 
19.. .and, they were the ones that said, you can, you can go to a group therapy thing 
if you want… (A – right) and I was like, no thanks, I don’t want, cos I was really 
really shy, I d don’t really want to talk about this in front of oth-, I’ll talk to my 
friends, and I might talk to an individual but I really really didnae want to speak to.. 
[…] Because I know, and I know what triggers it, and I know why I do it and  
w-what’s the point of going to see a professional who might, … just I dunno, just 
seemed a bit silly. Especially that, cos I was like, I’d been forced to go as well which 
didn’t help” 
 
Dinah notes that she felt she was clear enough about her reasons for self-injury, and 
therefore felt further intervention or ‘support’ was entirely unnecessary. This also 
perhaps highlights the inadequacy of some of the services recommended to people 
who self-injure. Emma also indicated that she had been offered group therapy, but 
had declined for similar reasons to those expressed by Dinah – a disinclination to 
discuss problems with groups of ‘other people’. The second instance was prompted 
by Dinah herself when she was in her late 20s. She described becoming increasingly 
concerned about her own moods, and requested a referral herself. This referral came 
through shortly after the death of her first daughter, and therefore the support she was 
offered was oriented towards this. Again, Dinah experienced this as inappropriate. 
She felt she was coping perfectly well with her grief, and she noted that her self-
injury preceded her loss by many years. She therefore felt that the support she was 
offered was again misplaced, and ceased her involvement with services.  
 
Dinah’s case contrasts with those of Emma, Anna and Harriet. Dinah appears to have 
had much more choice and control about her involvement with psychiatric services. 
While Dinah successfully terminated her involvement with services, Emma, Anna 
and Harriet were each admitted to psychiatric hospitals on numerous occasions. 
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Conversely, this could indicate that despite their relatively passive engagement with 
services (in that they received the help rather than sought it) the services that Emma, 
Anna and Harriet were involved in were experienced as necessary, if not entirely 
beneficial.  
 
Participants’ narratives about their experiences with psychiatric hospitals were also 
varied. Harriet described being initially very wary and scared about being admitted to 
a psychiatric hospital, and successfully resisted admission, despite apparent pressure 
from both her school and her psychiatrists. More recently, Harriet claimed that she 
had begun to view admission to psychiatric hospitals as a helpful part of her overall 
care plan and was far more pragmatic about her admissions. These admissions now 
were instigated by Harriet herself, and she had to ask to be admitted.  
 
“it’s always like, planned admissions (A – ok) like, we plan it an everything and, ok, 
we’re gonna fit you in. But now it’s up to me to say when I need to go in (A – mhm) I 
mean I’ve been in twice this year, was in in April, and then I went back in in June” 
 
In contrast, Emma and Anna implied much less control over their admissions to 
psychiatric hospitals. For instance, Emma referred to being ‘taken back’ to a 
psychiatric hospital. Anna discussed this in detail, demonstrating clearly that 
although on paper she admitted herself to the hospital, this was not how she 
experienced it. In this excerpt, from Anna’s first interview, she is clear that she was 
not ‘sectioned’
14
: “It … was a case ae, well, there was nae choice am.. I I wisnae 
sectioned, ehm…… but …. It was just a case eh well it’s for your safety so … go…” 
Referring to the same incident in her second interview however, Anna reveals that 
she had been told that “… if I didnae go in I was gonna get sectioned”.  As Anna 
makes clear, although she was not officially sectioned, she nevertheless felt that she 
had no choice but to admit herself to the hospital.  
 
6.2.2 The wound: treating the injuries 
 
                                                 
14
 The term ‘sectioned’ refers to an individual being admitted to a psychiatric hospital for treatment or 
monitoring, without their consent, under the terms of the Mental Health Act 1983. 
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Several participants described receiving help specifically for the injuries they 
inflicted upon themselves. In most cases, this involved visiting A&E departments, 
though participants’ routes to and experiences of A&E differed. 
 
Anna described visiting A&E when she injured herself severely, for instance when 
she was unable to stop the bleeding herself. She described this explicitly in terms of 
wound severity: “Last year I had to go into A&E cos I’d severed the artery in my 
arm, and the blood was just going wheeew, spurting out em…”. Emma also talked 
about visiting A&E only when the wounds were too severe for her to treat herself: “I 
didn’t really tell people, em, … … . unless it was, it needed medical attention, in 
which case I took myself to (A - yeah, ok) […] to, hospital and stuff”. Emma frames 
this in terms of her general tendency not to tell anyone about her self-injury, 
implying that a hospital visit was a last resort. Emma did not discuss in detail (and I 
did not ask) how she determined whether a wound needed medical attention or not. 
She did, however, describe wounds that were stitched and stapled up without 
anaesthetic. I discuss this instance further below (section 6.3.2). 
 
Harriet also described taking herself to A&E, and she too suggested this was a 
decision she took on the basis of the type of wound that had been inflicted, and 
whether or not it was likely to require stitches: “sometimes I’ll take myself in the car, 
because, sometimes, … I really need to get it seen to because its like, it needs like, 
sutures on it and everything.” Harriet’s narrative around this issue was complex 
however as she mentioned that on some occasions she took herself to A&E, only for 
the wounds to have already “closed-up.” Harriet related this story whilst explaining 
how hard she found it to cut her wrists, which was “a nightmare its like – it doesn’t 
work!!”:  
 
 “hehe, you’re like ‘grrrr why won’t it work?’ and I found that your wrist, it, closes 
up straight away (yeah ok) you cut and, within like, half an hour its closed itself up 
(A – mm) and you go to hospital and they’re like, ‘but its closed up’ (A – mm) --- you 
dinnae cut that deep it just, it somehow it closes (A – mm)  … like, oh, it doesn’t 
actually look like I’ve done anything” 
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This could indicate that although Harriet’s stated intention for visiting A&E was 
related to the severity of the wound, this was perhaps not always entirely the case. 
Alternatively, it may suggest that Harriet was sometimes so distressed she was 
unable to accurately gauge how much damage she had inflicted. 
 
Harriet also told me that in many (if not most) cases, she did not take herself to A&E, 
but rather an ambulance was called by friends. This aspect of Harriet’s narrative was 
especially illuminating, and again points to the importance of social aspects of her 
self-injury. In this case, Harriet describes how an ambulance would be called because 
of her friends’ fears about her intentions, rather than her actual self-injury: 
 
“A - like how, it might be a really stupid question right, but, em how do you,  how do 
you decide, like, that, ok right I need to go to A&E, like, is it cos its, so bad, or, do 
you know what I mean? 
H – yeah….em………. normally when like an ambulance has come out, and the 
police, its been my friends that’s called them because I’ve been in touch with them, 
and, I’m not really with it, and they’re like getting really worried about me that I’m 
gonna, do something serious.” 
 
As Harriet indicates here, in most cases when an ambulance was called (either by 
Harriet or her friends), the police were also in attendance. Harriet was rather 
ambivalent about these situations, partly expressing embarrassment at the fuss being 
made over her, but the excited manner in which she related these stories to me 
indicated some level of enjoyment also: 
 
“I was like in A&E for self-harm, like, every week, from like April to the June, and 
A&E are absolutely fed up with me, and they’re like going – ‘you’re self-harming, 
just so you can come here aren’t you?’ and I’m like ‘no’ and their like ‘you’re just 
attention seeking’ and I’m like ‘no, I’m not’ like ooh. It’s scary, cos, every time you 
self-harm, and, you, like, you call for an ambulance a lot of the time the police 
come out! And I’m like, ok! I’m like, what do my neighbours think, with the police 
coming out, and the ambulances coming out? And I’m like, oh, my god. Heh. Like, 
just not making a good name for myself round here! Hehe. Heh. Police, stuff, out, 
like 2 police cars ----- outside my door!” 
 
The section I have highlighted in the above passage may also be significant, 
implying perhaps Harriet’s readiness to involve formal services when she self-
injured. This apparent readiness to seek formal support was further reflected in her 
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use of a wide range of different support services – far more than any other participant 
reported. 
 
Harriet’s use of A&E can be contrasted with Dinah, who said that her visits to A&E 
had been entirely down to the intervention of friends. Dinah’s narrative was quite 
different from Harriet’s however. While Harriet implied that she communicated her 
intentions or actions to her friends
15
, Dinah was clear that the only reason her friends 
ever found out about her self-injury, and subsequently took her to hospital, was on 
occasions where Dinah had drunk so much alcohol that she was not “careful”.  
 
“ I mean I’ve probably been to the hospital about 5 or 6 times, there’s probably 
times I can’t actually remember to be quite honest, the only times, times where I ever 
got in a state, in a situation where people found me, was when I’d been drinking, so, 
you know, most of the time wasn’t, I was never, I was[n’t] doing it in front of other 
people and many people didn’t know about it, and when they did find me, it was 
really bad and it was probably cos I was drunk I wasn’t being care-, you know I 
wasn’t being careful…. Ehm….hehe. yeah, aye that’s definitely what was going 
on…oooh. Don’t care what I do, you know what I mean?” 
 
It is unclear from the transcript and tape whether Dinah meant that the amount she 
had drunk made her less careful about hiding her self-injury, or less careful about 
making or caring for the wounds.  
 
None of the other participants described visiting A&E as a result of their self-injury. 
Rease said that she had gone to A&E on two occasions, because of overdoses she 
had taken. Milly related an incident where she did seek help for a wound she had 
inflicted, and like the stories of Anna and Emma, she related this to the severity of 
the injury: 
 
“… because I’d never cut with a knife before, I didn’t know…. About the pressure, 
or, how deep it was gonna go and bla bla bala, and I gave myself that one that night 
[scar on forearm], and it was so deep, so deep, I absolutely, shat myself, and ended 
up having to go and speak to somebody, and .. Colin’s reaction was… bang on” 
 
                                                 
15
 Harriet lived alone and as far as I could ascertain, most of her social interactions took place via the 
internet and phone and were therefore ‘active’ – requiring her to instigate communication. 
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Like Dinah, Milly had been drinking prior to this injury. However, she associates the 
severity of the wound not with her lack of care necessarily, but her lack of expertise 
– she was not used to using a knife. The depth of the wound on this occasion scared 
her so much that she ‘had’ to go and speak to somebody. This case can be further 
contrasted with Craig’s comparable narrative about his ‘worst’ injury. While Milly 
felt that she ‘had’ to speak to somebody about her injury, Craig indicated that he had 
stayed in his room for a week and stitched the wound himself.  
 
With most participants it appeared that they had not attended any formal support 
services for the care of wounds mainly because they were able to manage the care 
themselves, and largely because the injuries they had inflicted were not of a severity 
which warranted a visit to A&E. Harriet’s stories complicate this, as she appears to 
have visited A&E with non-severe wounds (i.e. wounds that did not require specialist 
treatment). This is further problematised by both Craig and Anna, both of whom 
described caring for relatively severe wounds themselves. In Anna’s case this was in 
response to poor care she received from A&E, which led to her trying as far as 
possible to bandage and steri-strip her wounds herself. As noted above, Craig 
described actually sewing up his wound himself in order to avoid visiting a hospital: 
 
“… woke up and was basically stuck to the mattress, with blood hehehe cos what I 
figured out, was I just sort of serrated bread knife and I just slashed my leg, I’ve got 
three scars, and erm, you can see, I’m not anatomist so I’m not quite sure but.. tubes 
and stuff like that inside and erm, I actually ended up sewing it up, myself. Cos I 
didn’t want to go to hospital – I can’t go to hospital, they’ll lock me away, for 
being a mental! So erm.. that kinda, yeah, I think I probably stayed in my room for 
like a week or something, and didn’t really do anything. Was horrified that I’d get 
gangrene, hehehe, or bleed to death or something like that… it seems nonsensical 
now” 
 
Craig expressed extreme concern and embarrassment about his behaviour. Craig’s 
narrative here is particularly distinct from Harriet’s discussions around seeking help 
for her wounds, and highlights the diverse ways in which participants approached 
and understood their behaviour. This contrast also emphasises the importance of the 
material injuries that self-injury involves in experiences and understandings. 
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However, it also stresses that the injuries themselves (even when similar) can be 
experienced and understood very differently in different contexts.  
 
6.3 Experiences of help-seeking 
6.3.1 Negotiating self-injury  
 
Harriet and Anna each had stories regarding the policies and attitudes of staff in 
psychiatric hospitals towards their self-injury. This has been an important matter for 
groups such as the National Self-Harm Network (Cresswell, 2005a), who have 
campaigned for in-patient wards to allow self-injury. These groups argue that if self-
injury is prevented, with no other appropriate coping mechanisms in place, the 
individual concerned may suffer even greater distress and injury than if they were 
allowed to injure themselves ‘safely’. Such a ‘harm reduction model’ is 
controversial, with some advocating the approach as best practice (Harrison, 1998), 
whilst a well known treatment programme in the US valorises the use of ‘no-harm’ 
contracts (SAFE Alternatives, 2007). Anna’s experiences over the years reflect these 
conflicting perspectives: 
 
“Right, cos even in [psychiatric hospital], like, the three times I’ve been in, its 
changed each time, em,,.. to start of it was like (in stern, military-esqe voice)‘you will 
not self-harm, you will not cut yourself, we will search you’  […] but then by the next 
time it was , kay, we know you do it, be safe, fine, ok. And then by the third time, it 
was,… I dunnno, how I think it should be… it was like, d’you know, that’s  fine, 
we know you cut, be safe, if you need dressings, get them, if you want to talk you 
talk, if you dinnae, well leave it, and we can talk later or, or whatever…em, and its 
like there’s nae questions asked. Okay, excellent.”  
 
Anna clearly preferred the ‘harm reduction model’. However, she went on to relate 
how, in a more recent hospital stay, not all of the staff were following this model, 
which caused her some distress: 
 
“Until this, one woman, who I suppose is this old school frog marched me along, 
‘show me what you used, give me it’. And I gave her this piece of glass, cos we’d 
been glass paintin, and I’d took it and smashed it. Em. ‘is there any more, or do I 
have to strip your bed?!’ I was like, strip my bed and I’ll deck you.. and it wasn’t 
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until I came out and I said to my CPN and she was like ‘oh, no, no, no, that’s not 
supposed to happen’ and I’s like, no, I know that.”  
 
This quote emphasises the lack of power that Anna experienced in hospital, though 
also hints at her resistance (“strip my bed and I’ll deck you”). This parallels the 
experience Anna described having in A&E, which is described below. In both cases, 
Anna frames herself as perfectly aware of ‘best practice’ but in each instance 
experiences herself as unable to challenge the ‘poor practice’ of the medical staff 
involved.  
 
Anna’s experiences and descriptions of her stays in in-patient psychiatric wards were 
quite different from Harriet’s. Anna was particularly negative about the psychiatric 
hospital, describing it as “scary” and emphasising the difficulty she had coping with 
the lack of power she experienced when an in-patient. In contrast, Harriet described 
her stays in hospital in a much more positive tone. Although she said that her very 
first experiences with hospitals had been, like Anna’s, “scary”, she described how 
she now “used” her stays more effectively. Harriet related a story about her 
interactions with hospital nurses which highlights the different ways that the two 
women appear to have experienced psychiatric hospitals: 
 
“… once I started using the hospital stays constructively …. It, … really helps me. 
But to start with, and, like, they put in a rule like, if you self-harm in any form, you 
will get discharged. They didn’t have it to start with, like sorta saying, no, it’s a rule, 
if you do anything, you’ll get discharged. And it made me take responsibility. 
Everyone thinks, oh, when you go to hospital, all the responsibility gets taken off 
you, but, you, I had the responsibility to make sure I didn’t hurt myself in any way 
cos I would get chucked out, and also that, if I was to go back, I would go and talk 
to somebody […]last time I picked the same nurse every time, because she would 
understand me. And she, she had the time to sit and listen to me.” 
 
Harriet described experiencing the ‘no harm contract’ in a very different way from 
Anna. Where Anna experienced this as disempowering, Harriet describes having 
such a contract as being helpful, in forcing her to take responsibility for herself so 
that she did not get “chucked out”. Harriet also implies a greater level of control and 
power in her stays in the psychiatric hospital: she “picked the same nurse” to speak 
to. Later, Harriet discussed her hospital stays further, in a narrative which further 
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emphasised the lengths she had to go to in order to get the support she felt she 
needed in these contexts: 
 
“when I’m in hospital,  like, I got told – right, when you’re not ok, go straight up the 
top to a nurse (A – mhm) but like, some of them are just like – ‘oh we don’t have 
time’ and the last day I was in there I was getting really anxious about leaving (A – 
mhm) and not, I tried 3 nurses, and none of them had time to talk to me (A – mhm) 
they kept going – ‘I’m busy, I’m busy’ and I was like – ok. …. Its like, I need to talk 
to you and you’re like going ‘I’m busy’ you know like, getting really, really stressed 
out, and I was like ooohhh. Get told to talk to people and instead getting like more, 
anxious and worked up, you don’t have time……… you kinda like build up the 
courage to go and find somebody and go – and you worked out what you wanted to 
say to them and like” 
 
While this excerpt suggests that Harriet was far from successful in getting the 
support she wanted, it also implies that she was relatively determined in seeking the 
support, trying three different nurses. Research has frequently demonstrated the 
negative ways that patients who self-injure are viewed by medical staff (McAllister 
et al., 2002a; McCann et al., 2006). Sociological work on staff attitudes has 
suggested that these negative attitudes may be related to moral judgements regarding 
different behaviours. For instance, Jeffery (1979) found that staff were more 
sympathetic towards patients whom they thought had ‘really’ tried to kill themselves. 
In contrast, those who were deemed to have been ‘attention seeking’, by presenting 
at A&E with non-serious overdoses, were viewed as ‘rubbish’. Similarly, May and 
Kelly (1982) demonstrated the different ways that patients in inpatient psychiatric 
wards were viewed by staff. In both papers, staff judgements of patients’ moral 
worth centred around understandings of responsibility. Patients who were viewed as 
‘responsible’ for their actions were treated more punitively than those who were not. 
This may at least partly explain why patients who have self-injured might be viewed 
particularly negatively: they are seen as wholly responsible for their situation. They 
are consciously and therefore culpably ‘deviant’. In Harriet’s situation her, in many 
ways, responsible attitude toward seeking out help may have been reinterpreted by 
nursing staff as evidence that she was not ‘really’ in need of any help.  
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6.3.2 Horror stories 
 
Those participants who had attended A&E as a result of their self-injury invariably 
had horror stories about the treatment they had received there. These horror stories 
are reminiscent of and parallel literature from user-led groups such as NSHN and 
LifeSIGNS who campaign for better treatment for patients who have self-injured, as 
well as similar narratives reported in academic literature (Harris, 2000).  
 
Anna related in detail her last visit to A&E, an experience which left her adamant 
that she would not return: “I‘d rather die, seriously would rather just die,  I 
wouldnae go through that again for anybody. It was, horrendous.” Anna led into the 
story from a discussion where she likened her self-injury to being similar to a 
“druggie” or an “alcoholic” needing their “fix”, which led to her contrasting the 
types of treatment she saw these groups of people receiving, compared to the 
treatment she had received. I have reproduced the excerpt in full to convey some of 
the complexity of Anna’s narrative: 
 
“I always say, if an alcoholic gets or or any drinker gets so drunk that that they 
drink till they pass out and the cut their head and and need it stitched or whatever, 
they get treated, and if a drug addict takes a an overdose, they get treated. And yet, 
… on, many occasions, I’ve needed either, antibiotics for an infected cut, or stitches 
or whatever, and you get treated like the lowest form eh life. It’s just so bad. Last 
year I had to go into A&E cos I’d severed the artery in my arm, and the blood was 
just going wheeew, spurting out em… and we went in, and it was like wrapped in this 
totally blood soaked tea towel, went in and the, the triage nurse, sortae put steristrips 
on it, she says that’ll hold it, I’ll bandage it, ‘til you get it seen. And I seen this 
doctor, and he put me in a cubicle, he looked it and he went ‘oh, you did it’ - ‘aye’ 
and so then he moved me into this dirty cubicle, em, he’d left the screen open… 
while he was like looking at it and treating it and everything, left the curtain thing 
open… em, he refused to stitch it… and , the, the blood was just like, everywhere, it 
wouldnae stop bleeding, you shouldae seen it, he refused to stitch it, and he fought, 
and I mean literally fought, and fought and fought, he went through hundreds of 
steristrips, because, they were just falling off… and I was like… You’re just no in a 
place to argue are you, like mentally, physically, emotionally your no in a place to 
argue, well I wisnae. And, I was,  I was j.. and they wouldnae let Mike come through 
he had to sit in the waiting room[…] So anyway, it ended up that… he steristripped 
it, and put a .. one of these… sterile pad things over it, right, by the time I had got 
home that had burst off and it was bleeding again, so I just wrapped it up and left it, 
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em… and, within like sorta 24 hours of that it was infected, […] I was so ill, ended 
up wi septicaemia” 
 
There are several important aspects to Anna’s story. She describes herself as feeling 
powerless; she was in “no place to argue”. Her husband was prevented from staying 
with her, removing a potential advocate and source of support. Anna relates this 
directly to her having done the injury herself, suggesting that the doctor provided the 
type of treatment he did explicitly because she had injured herself. She points out 
how counter-productive this approach ended up being, as due to the poor treatment 
the wound was infected, and she required further treatment for septicaemia. Anna’s 
body is central to this narrative. She had to visit A&E in the first place because she 
was unable to control the bleeding of a severed artery on her own. The doctor’s 
disapproval of Anna’s behaviour is played out on Anna’s body, as he “fought” with 
the wound, attempting to close the laceration with steri-strips rather than sutures. 
Whatever the doctor’s reasons for taking this approach, from Anna’s perspective this 
was experienced as a further attack on her body, one that led directly to her 
developing an infection.  
 
The doctor in Anna’s case is framed as having a problem morally with the fact that 
Anna had created the wound herself. This was echoed in Emma’s ‘horror story’ 
about a visit to A&E. 
 
“I have been discriminated against, cos I, I turned up, I’d cut my arm, and my 
stomach, … and em, …. … taken myself up to A&E and, er, … … … they, … I had to 
get 11 staples, em, to, to sort of patch it up, and em, they didn’t bother giving me 
anaesthetic or anything they just went, well, you’re a self- harmer, click click click. 
You know, it was, … I was just lying there going, ‘your not gonna give me 
anaesthetic’ they went ‘nah, you’re a self-harmer – you did this to yourself so, … 
don’t really care’ and I’m like, but – but you’re just stapling me up with nothing! 
[…] em, …. … and I spent, you know I stayed over night in the, the psych ward in 
the, [hospital] (A – mhm) and em, … I thought they were gonna, take me back into 
the [psychiatric hospital] again but they didn’t, they just let me go. And eh, I went 
straight to college heh!” 
 
Like Anna, Emma is clear that the damaging and violent treatment she received from 
the medical staff was understood as directly related to their negative moral 
interpretation of her self-injury. In each case, Anna and Emma interpret the actions 
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of staff as suggesting that they ‘deserve’ such treatment, as they inflicted the wounds 
themselves. Anna suggests that the treatment meted out to her is worse than that 
given to other patients, such as alcoholics or drug addicts, who have also ‘done this 
to themselves’. This is a significant parallel, as some other research has also 
associated the treatment of self-harm patients with other similarly ‘self-inflicted’ 
categories of patients (Jeffery, 1979). Jeffery, like Anna and Emma, argued that the 
treatment of such patients was based on the moral judgements of staff.  
 
Harriet also mentioned that she had heard about people who had been stitched up 
without anaesthetic, though she did not say she had had this happen to her. However, 
she did imply that sometimes her visits to A&E were not supportive. She was 
accused of ‘attention-seeking’ by staff on at least one occasion, and she said that 
doctors in particular were sometimes “really horrible”. 
 
Rease and Dinah had also had negative experiences at A&E. Rease attended due to 
an overdose, where she experienced the response of the staff to her attempts to open 
up about her reasons for her behaviour as entirely inadequate. Dinah, as previously 
discussed, only attended A&E for her self-injury when she had been drinking and 
other people took her. She noted that this appeared to impact negatively on the care 
given to her at A&E: 
 
“I ended up wi my… flatmate, ehm, took Lexy and her pal took me to hospital, and I 
was completely away with it… I mean, like, and I wasn’t even that dr-… that’s the 
thing I suppose when I was really hyper I didn’t really need that much to drink 
anyway.. and I was completely away with the fairies, like talking to myself and like 
nn.. and, like just left, no no interest whatsoever, and just, you know what they were 
interested in was if I’d been drinking and then…. put the stitches on and then 
away, you know what I mean and huuuh, its like… Which suited me, to be quite 
honest… it did suit me, cos I didn’t really want, particularly want anything to do 
with the services, but… ehm… its just… bizarre, just totally .. and utterly dismissive 
about the whole - ” 
 
Dinah suggests that staff were mainly concerned with how much alcohol she had 
consumed, and were generally “dismissive” about the self-injury itself. However, 
although looking back Dinah labels this as negative care, she is also clear that at the 
time she certainly preferred this lack of interference. The attitude of staff is similar to 
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Emma, Rease and Anna’s experiences, in that staff appeared uninterested in treating 
any of the women outside of the injuries they presented with. Rease, Emma and 
Anna appear to have interpreted this dismissive attitude far more negatively than 
Dinah, who admitted that at the time she had been quite pleased about the lack of 
interventions offered.   
 
6.3.3 More hopeful indications 
 
Many of the participants described some of their experiences with services more 
positively. These more positive narratives tended to be about counselling oriented 
support services, though Harriet did note that the treatment she got from nurses at 
A&E was often good: 
 
“ Like, some of them are, like, not too, are kinda nice with you, and others are like 
really horrible (A – mhm) H - just depends on who you see, but I think, the nurses 
usually are quite nice, but the doctors are like, ‘we don’t have time for people like 
you’ (A – mm) H -  … its like, mmm, I don’t know, its like, there’s a load of nice 
nurses in there (A – mhm) like, their like ‘ohh, what did you, what happened’, and 
‘what made you do this?’ and, (A – mhm) … kinda really gentle with you (A – yeah) 
and, like, which kinda helps 
 
Harriet describes this care as being positive both in terms of how she was treated as a 
person, in that she was asked about her intentions and allowed to talk, but also in the 
way that her injuries and body were treated: ‘gently’. This experience is of course far 
more positive than the violent and upsetting treatments described by Anna and 
Emma in the previous section. 
 
Several participants, who had received counselling, appeared to regard this relatively 
positively. Anna and Emma each said that they had received very helpful counselling 
from a psychologist. Both seemed to label this treatment as ‘good’ in part because 
they were able to develop a positive relationship with the professional involved. 
Significantly, both also emphasised that these particular psychologists had helped 
them to understand their self-injury. For instance, Emma said that the “biggest 
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difference” had come from a psychologist she saw in relation to her fibromyalgia, a 
condition she developed several years after her self-injury had stopped: 
 
“… the, the guy sort of wheedled out of me, he was very clever, cos he could, he 
could make me come up with things, and I’d think I’d done it myself, when he’d sort 
of steered me in the right direction to, to, … em, you know, he sort of steered me 
towards that conclusion, but he did it very skilfully so…. I knew I was being 
manipulated hehehe, but I really enjoyed it!” 
 
Similarly, Anna told me that only following a year of counselling from a 
psychologist had she started to understand the possible links between her 
relationships with her parents and her self-injury. As discussed above, both Robert 
and Milly described using the services of counsellors, and their willingness to engage 
with counselling on different occasions indicates that they found the process useful.  
 
6.4 Attention seeking 
 
‘Attention seeking’ is related to help-seeking in a number of ways. Firstly, ‘attention 
seeking’ was used as a negative label for some participants when they sought help 
for their immediate self-injury at A&E. Secondly, help-seeking and ‘attention-
seeking’ could be viewed as involving the same or similar behaviours – the main 
distinction being that the use of ‘attention’ rather than ‘help’ implies that the 
‘attention’ is not needed. For instance, people receive ‘medical help’ or ‘medical 
attention’. However, when the word attention is removed from a ‘medical’ context, it 
implies that the attention may not be needed or deserved. In contrast, help-seeking 
even out with a medical setting still implies that the help is both necessary and 
needed. Importantly, and as I will demonstrate in the following two sections, the 
term ‘attention seeking’ has more negative moral connotations than help seeking.  
 
6.4.1 Negative accounts of – that is ‘not me’ 
 
Both Harriet and Craig explicitly said that their self-injury was not about attention 
seeking, though they did so in markedly different ways. Craig discussed this in the 
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context of explaining his ‘worst’ incident of self-injury, where he had cut his leg with 
a bread-knife, and subsequently sewed it up himself, rather than seeking medical 
treatment: 
 
“you don’t want to go to the hospital, and [say] ‘I did this to myself!’ and I was 
probably embarrassed as well… cos I know a lot people say if they’ve not done it 
themselves, or for attention seeking or anything like that, but em, it was kind of the 
opposite, certainly in my case, and I think a lot of other people’s cases I didn’t want 
people to be talking about it and stuff”  
 
He was also clear that he kept his injuries hidden from other people, and avoided 
talking about his self-injury entirely. He did note, however, that his friends at 
university (when the majority of his self-injury occurred) had in fact been aware of 
his behaviour, and had attempted to talk to him about it. Craig related this to me in a 
way which suggested he was unsure about this – and it did directly contradict some 
of his other statements regarding how far he had been able to keep his self-injury “to 
himself”: 
 
“(A - did any of your friends at uni know?) I didn’t think so, but I found out later 
on that they did. Erm… there was a few of them, kind of confronting me about it. 
Apparently they were saying that they thought I’d really deny it, or get defensive 
about it, but apparently I just kinda went yeah, and just didn’t want to talk about 
really. So they didn’t particularly know what to do about it. […]But yes they did… 
they did know…..” 
 
Craig’s use of “apparently” and his initial claim that he had not thought that his 
friends knew, complicates the reading of this excerpt. It seems to suggest that Craig 
did not remember this happening – and this does unsettle the more general message 
from Craig’s narrative, which was that nobody knew. I am not suggesting here that 
Craig had self-injured ‘for attention’ – but I am suggesting that because of the 
negativity around understandings of self-injury as attention seeking, people who self-
injure may well try very hard to portray their self-injury as ‘private’ or ‘secret’ – both 
to themselves as well as to other people. 
 
Harriet’s narrative was very different from Craig’s in that, as discussed above, she 
described numerous and varied attempts to ‘seek help’: she regularly attended A&E; 
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she used telephone help-lines; she visited online support groups and message boards; 
she texted and phoned friends; and she got telephone support from her CPN. Despite 
the differences in their help-seeking behaviour, Harriet was equally adamant that was 
not ‘attention-seeking’. She related this to me whilst discussing the reactions of staff-
members at A&E during a period of time where she had attended weekly: 
 
“I was like in A&E for self-harm, like, every week, from like April to the June, and 
A&E are absolutely fed up with me, and they’re like going – ‘you’re self-harming, 
just so you can come here aren’t you?’ and I’m like ‘no’ and they’re like ‘you’re 
just attention seeking’ and I’m like ‘no, I’m not’ like ooh. It’s scary, cos, every time 
you self-harm, and, you, like, you call for an ambulance a lot of the time the police 
come out! And I’m like, ok! I’m like, what do my neighbours think, with the police 
coming out, and the ambulances coming out? And I’m like, oh, my god. Heh. Like, 
just not making a good name for myself round here! Hehe. Heh. Police, stuff, out, 
like 2 police cars ----- outside my door! (A[sarcastically]-wow)” 
 
Harriet is clear then, that her behaviour does not constitute ‘attention-seeking’. My 
response betrays my own feelings on this matter – as Harriet related this story to me 
(in an excited and enthusiastic fashion) I did feel that what she was describing to me 
was ‘attention-seeking’. At the beginning of the research, my views on self-injury 
‘for attention’ were rather derisive – I felt sure that my own self-injury was ‘private’ 
and hidden, and I found people who ‘showed off’ their scars and wounds 
embarrassing. I had also been fairly convinced by much of the literature (often user-
written) that claimed that no-one really self-injured ‘for attention’ anyway. Over the 
course of the research these views have softened considerably. However, at the time 
that I spoke to Harriet, there is some evidence that my opinions regarding what she 
told me were not neutral. My own changing opinions have certainly informed my 
analysis, and my decision to focus on this aspect of self-injuring behaviour. I am 
sensitised to the negative moral connotations of ‘attention-seeking’ precisely because 
I used to feel so negatively about the matter. Harriet did not appear to be aware of 
my attitude – or perhaps did not care – for she related numerous further stories which 
involved similar behaviour. 
 
Harriet’s narrative on this issue highlights the close relationship between ‘attention-
seeking’ and ‘help-seeking’ – what Harriet clearly saw as perfectly acceptable 
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attempts to seek help for her self-injury, was interpreted by the staff at A&E (and to a 
certain extent, by me) as being ‘attention-seeking’. This issue is also evident in 
Francis’ narrative, whereby he described seeking help very soon after he first injured 
himself – telling his mother and seeing his GP – but this was interpreted by his sister 
as ‘attention-seeking’. Francis did not explicitly defend himself against this claim in 
our interviews. However, Francis did talk about a school-friend who he felt may have 
self-injured for attention. This was part of a long narrative where Francis discussed a 
girl he had known when he was 15, who had scar tissue on both arms from “wrist to 
elbow”: 
 
“(A – did she wear like short sleeves and stuff, like?) I think she, she usually wore 
long sleeves, I, I mean she mustn’t have done all the time cos I saw them, […]I think, 
I mean, knowing, the person that she, was, presumably still is, she, she is, em, …. She 
was always, … …. Sort of quite, em, she liked being the centre of attention sort of 
thing and she did, she would, she was quite, she sort of, yeah had histrionics, and 
sort of, you know would …. Would em, … would do things just to get people’s 
attention, so, … I don’t know whether that might have affected where she, wanted 
the scars or, (A – yeah) how she displayed them, I don’t know whether it was 
something that she wanted people to talk about (A – interesting they still didn’t 
though, well, if they didn’t)” 
 
Francis suggests that the placement of his friend’s scars, and her at least occasional 
revealing of them by wearing short-sleeves, coupled with her personality, contributed 
to his understanding that her self-injury may have been “for attention”. As I note at 
the end of this excerpt, whether this was the case or not, her self-injury was not 
apparently discussed openly anyway, which Francis attributed to their age (15) at the 
time. 
 
6.4.2 Accepting the charge 
 
Belinda, Robert, Anna and Milly each said that they had, at least on occasion, self-
injured ‘for attention’. For Anna, she was clear that this only described her very first 
act of self-injury, where she broke her wrist with a hammer, an act that was designed, 
she said, to: 
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“get a bit of attention, and that sounds bad and it …. like…. that’s no what the self-
harm’s about at all, its not about getting attention because nobody knows about it, 
em…. But I think that that was.” 
 
So although Anna felt that this first incidence of self-injury had been about seeking 
attention, she was adamant that this did not accurately describe her self-injury more 
generally. Anna also indicates the negative moral implications of this issue with the 
phrase “that sounds bad.”  
 
Anna’s claim that nobody knew about her self-injury raises an important point 
regarding how ‘private’ self-injury is. Anna certainly framed her self-injury as a 
‘private’ act, and something she did not tell anybody, unless she “really, really 
trusted them, which is never”. However, in the intimate context of her family home, 
with her husband and sons, her self-injury was known about, and she described how 
she would tell her husband if she injured herself, since he would find out anyway, 
and that her sons did ask about her scars and wounds. The negotiation of self-injuring 
behaviour in the context of such close familial relationships problematises discourse 
on self-injury which emphasises how ‘private’ it is. This was discussed, albeit 
briefly, by other participants. Emma felt that her self-injury had driven away 
potential romantic partners, who had been “scared off” by her scars. Dinah described 
self-injuring throughout two of her past relationships, and at the start of her current 
relationship. Although Robert did not live with his partner, he did describe him as a 
‘support’ – noting that he had said that Robert should phone him if he ever felt like 
hurting himself, which Robert did occasionally do.  
 
Like Anna, Robert described his early self-injury as being ‘attention-seeking’, and 
contrasted this with his more recent self-injury, which was not. He too indicated an 
awareness of the negative manner in which ‘attention-seeking’ can be framed, saying 
“I think at that point [his early self-injury], it was more eh a cry for attention, more 
than anything, which sounds really pathetic now.” As I discuss above, Robert’s 
discussions around how far his self-injury was hidden or not were confused, and part 
of this may have been because his practices around hiding or revealing his self-injury 
may well have changed.  
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Belinda’s narrative on this issue also highlighted the negative connotations of 
‘attention-seeking’ and she also applied this description to her early self-injury only. 
Belinda presented a number of justifications for her ‘attention-seeking’ behaviour, 
and she clearly struggled with the issue as she discussed it in our interviews, saying 
for instance: “I hated to think that I was doing it for attention, even though I was 
doing it for attention. But I wasn’t doing it for attention to be cool”. Belinda 
contrasted her behaviour with that of others, implying that her reasons for needing 
attention were more valid – it wasn’t “to be cool”. Belinda suggested that her self-
injury had been a necessary step, after years of being ignored when she attempted to 
communicate or seek help for the physical abuse that was occurring at home, or the 
bullying she experienced at school: 
 
“I mean I, hehe, if you try so many ways of getting people’s attention, like, you tell 
people at school and then, they call the meeting with the principal […] and you tell 
them everything and then they just disregard you. How are you supposed to get 
people’s attention?! How are you supposed to tell them?”  
 
Belinda framed this early self-injury as an explicit attempt to initiate communication 
with others: 
 
“And that’s why originally I started, cutting. Because I, wanted people to know (A – 
mhm) em, that, you know, come on, listen to me and, and, in their eyes it seems a bit 
drastic, but if that’s what I had to do! Hehe. You know, I just, I didn’t know what to 
do with myself and I didn’t know, what to think and what to feel, and, and I wanted 
people to believe me (A – mhm) wanted people to listen (A – mhm) or to notice or 
just to do acknowledge, or something! (A-mm) em, and that’s originally, why I 
started” 
 
Belinda’s other attempts to communicate or ask for help, were, she said, disregarded: 
as her parents had warned her, she was not believed. Self-injury, apparently, would 
be more believable than Belinda’s own words. As discussed in Chapter 7 (p. 193), 
Belinda’s mothers’ reaction to her self-injury did not offer the care or 
acknowledgement she had wanted, though Belinda did describe having a supportive 
dance teacher, who spent a lot of time talking with her. This appears to have been the 
extent of the ‘attention’ Belinda received, and she was clear that her self-injury since 
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that point had been “a me thing, not a them thing” – not for others. Despite this, and 
as I discuss elsewhere (Chapter 7), Belinda did not really hide her self-injury, and 
indeed appeared to feel unable to.  
 
6.4.3 Resisting negative moral interpretations  
 
Milly’s discussion of her ‘attention-seeking’ self-injury largely resisted the negative 
features of the other participants’ accounts. Milly’s narrative described a degree of 
openness regarding her behaviour, for instance talking about how “obviously” people 
saw marks on her arms and “of course” she told others following an act of self-
injury. She described some of her self-injury as being “conscious, very conscious in 
retrospect, attention-seeking”. However, she also said that: 
 
“a lot of the conscious effort is not to do with attention-seeking, this is how I see it 
anyway, em, but subconsciously, there is something that is, crying out for help, and I 
didn’t know how else to cry out for help that night” 
 
There is some confusion in Milly’s account then, around whether the ‘attention-
seeking’ had been conscious or subconscious. This issue also sits uncomfortably 
alongside Milly’s discussion of her attitude towards being “appropriately emotional” 
– which apparently involved being emotional away from other people. This then is a 
slightly odd feature of Milly’s narrative: self-injury is oriented (relatively 
unproblematically) towards other people, whereas emotions and emotionality should 
be performed or expressed away from other people. It could be that this reflects 
Milly’s different and changing attitude towards these issues between her first and 
second interview. Milly talked about ‘attention seeking’ frequently in the first 
interview, while her discussion of being emotional ‘appropriately’ occurred in the 
second interview, during which she only mentioned ‘attention seeking’ on one 
occasion: 
 
“Although, yeah, there, there were times where I was doing it that, that, em, … I 
would, I would kind of hint, to people that I was doing it, and yeah that was an 
attention seeking thing but I only did that with a couple of people” 
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Milly’s attitude towards this issue was different in her two interviews, which 
illuminates the negotiated, partial and flexible nature of these understandings and 
interpretations. 
 
I have demonstrated in the above discussion that the issue of ‘attention-seeking’ is 
both morally charged and complex. Rease’s account of her self-injury adds a further 
layer. Here she discusses ‘revealing’ her self-injury, and how this was not ‘attention-
seeking’: 
 
“also I think I did wear a short sleeved t-shirt to school once, and I had, … actually 
written something on my arm, em, with a razor blade, em, but it wasn’t, like, sort of 
attention seeking it was just, I dunno, it was just em, ……. I think it was partly em, I 
don’t know if anybody else is like this with self-harm, …. Maybe its just me, em my 
tomboyishness,  but, I’ve always kinda felt like a really weak person, em, and I 
always felt like em, … self harm was, it sound weird but its like, something I’ve 
achieved, like it was an achievement, and, …. You know like the macho thing with 
like guys showing off their ----- and sort of going though, em, sort of eh, sort of trials 
or something or em, burn themselves or cut themselves to show that their tough. 
There’s a little bit of that, ...” 
 
 
Rather than ‘attention-seeking’ Rease describes this act of revealing her self-injury as 
being something quite different – she interprets it rather as a display of strength, or 
machismo. This challenges what some of the other participants implied regarding the 
difficulties of ‘revealing’ self-injury, or seeking help for self-injury whilst also 
avoiding being charged with ‘attention-seeking’. Rease’s emphasis, however, is on 
her own understandings and interpretations of her behaviour. In contrast, many of the 
other participants’ discussions of this issue focused on the interpretations of others. 
What Rease describes is (non-verbal) communication however – and it is 
communication oriented towards others, as well as to the ‘self’.  
 
6.5 Contradictory narratives  
 
This chapter has shown that most participants engaged in at least some forms of 
formal help-seeking for their self-injury. Significant exceptions to this were Craig, 
Justin and Mark. It may be important that these exceptions were all male, certainly 
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this finding lends a small amount of support to the suggestion that men may be less 
likely than women to disclose or seek help for their self-injury. It is likely that the 
people who volunteered for this research may have been more likely to have sought 
help for their self-injury, or rather, that people who had not sought help for their self-
injury may have been more reluctant to speak to me. In Craig and Justin especially, 
however, I was able to speak with two people whose experience with self-injury had 
expressly not involved any contact with formal services. Belinda also reported 
minimal contact with services – certainly, since she had left home at 17 she did not 
report any contact with medical services about her self-injury. All three of these 
participants indicated that they were concerned about being labelled ‘mad’ or 
‘dangerous’ by others should their self-injury have been found out. Previous work by 
Biddle and colleagues  (2007) has suggested that fear of negative labelling may be 
particularly important in discouraging help-seeking for mental ill-health among 
young people. 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that in several cases, where participants did ‘seek 
help’ they did not necessarily describe themselves as being particularly active or 
powerful in this. Those participants who described the greatest involvement with 
psychiatric hospitalisation each framed their contact with services relatively 
passively: hospital stays and medication were prescribed and taken, though not 
always without protest. Both Anna and Emma indicated that they had not ‘sought 
help’ for mental illness, but been diagnosed and identified as such when attending 
medical services for other (non psychiatric) issues (post-natal care and an ear 
infection, respectively). Dinah’s first contact with psychiatry had been instigated by 
an abusive and controlling partner.  
 
In contrast, other participants did describe a more active role in help-seeking. Dinah 
sought and ceased involvement with psychiatry herself later on in her life. Francis 
took himself to the doctors after his very first self-injury. Milly and Robert each 
sought help from counsellors at various points in their lives when they felt they were 
not coping well. However, in both of these cases, they suggested that this help was 
sought after a period where they had attempted to “cope” alone, again paralleling 
similar findings by Biddle et al (2007). 
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Harriet’s narratives about her help-seeking were particularly rich and varied. She 
described early contact with psychiatry where she was referred by others, identified 
as ‘at risk’ by her school. Her more recent attitude seemed to be far more active, with 
Harriet describing seeking help (on the instruction of her psychiatrists and CPN) 
regularly and from various sources. However, Harriet also described the problems 
she had with this – she struggled to have her distress taken seriously unless she had 
“done something”. A similar double-bind was identified in research carried out by 
Crouch and Wright (2004) in an in-patient adolescent psychiatric ward. In Crouch 
and Wright’s research, however, the patients were concerned at being labelled an 
‘inauthentic self-injurer’ by other patients. Harriet’s experiences seem to indicate that 
her distress was labelled as ‘inauthentic’ or at least ‘not serious’ by medical staff 
themselves, unless she had injured herself, following which she received care and 
treatment.  
 
This chapter has also demonstrated that the concept of ‘attention seeking’ is both 
closely related to that of help seeking, as well as being morally problematic. Several 
participants expressed negative opinions about their own or other people’s ‘attention 
seeking’ behaviour. These negative attitudes have also been found among medical 
staff, both with regard to patients presenting with self-harm (McAllister et al., 2002a; 
McCann et al., 2006), and more generally towards ‘deviant’ patient groups (Jeffery, 
1979; May & Kelly, 1982). Research regarding staff attitudes towards self-injury 
tends to conclude that viewing such patients as ‘attention-seeking’ is unhelpful, if not 
false. My research (along with Crouch and Wright) indicates that these negative 
attitudes are also found among lay people, including those who self-injure. In 
particular, research carried out with people who self-injure (this study included) 
suggests that if self-injury is labelled ‘attention seeking’, it is viewed at best as 
inferior to more ‘secret’ self-injury, and at worst, as an ‘inauthentic’ behaviour.  As 
Harriet’s narrative indicates, this can result in contradictory and complicated 
situations where a participant injures themselves in order to demonstrate authentic 
pain (whether to themselves or to others), but the very visible nature, and the act of 
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revealing the injury is equally likely to lead to a charge of ‘attention seeking’ and in-
authenticity.  
 
Rease and Milly’s narratives offer a different and perhaps more positive perspective. 
Both women seemed able to resist, challenge and in some ways transgress normative 
and negative interpretations of ‘attention seeking’. These issues are taken up further 
in the following chapter, where concerns with authenticity, morality, display and 
revelation are further explored. Chapter 7 focuses on the ways in which participants 












This chapter expands upon and develops themes around communication, emotions 
and the materiality of self-injury. In particular, the focus here is upon communication 
about self-injury in informal interpersonal contexts. Display is developed as a central 
theme here, incorporating the display of emotion, and the display of self-injury. In 
the first half of the chapter I explore participants’ narratives about the ways in which 
self-injury was communicated in the context of their households. As most 
participants began self-injuring as adolescents, much of this talk is centred on the 
role of parents. This section highlights that self-injury was more commonly not 
talked about. Communication instead was described as occurring non-verbally, 
through the display (both inadvertent and purposeful) of the wounds and marks 
created during self-injury. 
 
Section 7.3 addresses the ways in which participants dealt with communications 
around their self-injury in other informal contexts. This introduces the theme of 
hiding and revealing, introducing the different ways that participants described 
negotiating comments (expected or actual) about visible aspects of their self-injury.  
 
Section 7.4 expands upon the theme of display and visibility. This develops 
discussion initiated in Chapter 6 in the section on attention seeking. Specifically, this 
section addresses a conundrum: although self-injury was described as being ‘not 
talked about’ – some participants said that they did not hide their self-injury. This 
section then deals with participants’ hiding and revealing practices. Some 
participants were clear that they very carefully hid their self-injury from certain 
people; whereas other participants said that they did not.  
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I suggest that these hiding and revealing practices are important in illustrating 
participants’ experiences of self-injury, and their understandings about its meaning. 
Further, participants’ narratives about their hiding and revealing practices highlight 
the importance of the corporeality of self-injury in terms of the lived experience of 
participants. In particular, this relates to the marks that self-injury leaves, and how 
participants described negotiating social life with these marks.  
 
7.2 Communication about self-injury in the family 
 
 
Communication about self-injury within the family was an issue I asked most 
participants about. I was interested to know whether parents were aware of 
participants’ self-injury, and if so, how they had become aware. Self-injury is often 
described as being a ‘secretive’ act, and I wanted to know what this meant in 
practice. Did it mean that self-injury was kept from everyone, or just some people? 
Participants’ stories about this illustrated that the matter of self-injury being ‘private’ 
was certainly far from straight-forward, and often either reflected or was complicated 
by participants’ broader talk about communication in the family more generally. I 
begin this section by introducing those participants who talked about their families in 
relatively unproblematic, positive terms. This positive attitude jars with other 
comments they made which suggested potentially problematic modes and methods of 
communication. I then move on to those participants who described family 
communication about self-injury as non-existent – sometimes despite attempts by the 
participant to challenge this. Finally, I discuss the stories of three participants who 
described explicitly negative reactions to their self-injury from family members. 
What all of the narratives in this section share is a distinct difficulty regarding 
communication about self-injury specifically, but which also hint at more general 
problems faced with communication about ‘difficult’ emotions or issues.  
 
7.2.1 Supportive families, silencing atmospheres 
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Milly, Dinah, Mark and Francis all stressed that their early family life had been, on 
the whole, a very positive experience. Mark and Milly especially expressed a 
concern that some perspectives on mental illness were too quick to ‘blame’ parents. 
Similarly, Dinah related how some of the counselling she had received had 
immediately addressed the issue of her parents, saying that, with some pride, she had 
informed them that her family life was fine: supportive, loving and warm. These 
positive experiences and associations are important, and were evidently very 
significant to the participants. However, I would suggest it is equally important to 
attend to the nuances of family life, and the ways that it can and does have both 
positive and negative effects. With regard to communication within the family, each 
of these participants also talked about less positive aspects of family life, which I 
argue reflect a more widely held socio-cultural attitudes towards the appropriate 
communication of negative emotions.  
 
Dinah addressed this issue most directly, saying that although her family, and 
especially herself and her mother, were very close, warm, and loving, there had been 
problems growing up with communication about emotions: 
 
“…aye, I do find it strange when I think, talking about my family cos I think I told 
you when I to, when I spoke to the two psychiatrists over the time, they asked me 
about my family and I said, well, I got on really well (A - yeah, yeah) really really 
well hehehe, you know, there’s, there’s just communication when it comes to 
emotions that, (A – yeah) is obviously, a problem” 
 
Dinah directly identified communication as a problem. This issue is further clarified 
with regard to her self-injury, as Dinah told me that although her mother had ‘always 
known’ about her self-injury, her father and sister did not find out until she was in 
her mid-twenties.  
 
A dominant theme in both of Dinah’s interviews was the importance she placed on 
communicating about emotions. She told me that she felt that her mood and 
behaviour were now much improved, in large part because of her improved ability to 
communicate about her emotions. This emphasis was similar to points raised by 
Emma and Rease. Emma also directly stated that she felt her mental health was 
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improved because she was better able to ‘express emotion’. Rease, like Dinah, said 
that her current relationship with her partner had helped her mental health. Both also 
talked about doing a lot of ‘work’ with partners to improve the level of 
communication in the relationship.  
 
Francis also described a close and supportive family. Francis’ case was unusual in 
that he told his family about his self-injury very soon after it started. In fact, his 
mother was the first person he told, before going to see his GP. This was in stark 
contrast to most of the other participants who indicated that they had not talked about 
their self-injury for some time after they first started, and certainly none described 
seeking help so quickly. However, in his second interview, Francis talked more about 
his mothers’ attitude towards what he described as ‘self-pity’: 
 
“I mean self-pity is definitely em, …. Something I was, I grew up to really, not like, 
(A – mm) em, … I don’t know if it was an explicit thing, or if it was just the 
environment I grew up in (A –mm) …. That it was, …. frowned upon, I mean I think 
its just that, I mean my mum is one of 9 kids, […] and I think, in their household 
when she was growing up there wasn’t, any room for self-pity, you know no-one was, 
you just got on with things and, you know I think she probably grew up quite quickly 
having to look after her younger brothers and sisters […] so it was sort of left to the 
two eldest, girls, Ann and then my mum (A – mhm) I think they probably did a lot of 
the, work around the house sort of thing, em, they’re both doctors now, (A – mm) so, 
don’t know if that says anything, em, …… so I think yeah, and, and having the cleft 
lip, as a kid you know, she probably … I don’t know, she was just, definitely someone 
who….. hates self-pity (A – right) you know, think, thinks it’s a very unattractive, 
quality (A – mm) more than that, I think, probably actually not that its unattractive, 
its just, its wrong, to be self-pitying” 
 
Francis ascribed his mothers’ attitude towards self-pity to her upbringing, and 
suggested that this had been passed on to him. Francis went on to suggest that this 
attitude explained his approach to counselling (initially suspicious), as well as his 
tendency to “not display” emotions. Like Dinah, Francis emphasised the potential 
importance of communicating about emotions in explaining his self-injury. Moral 
understandings of emotions are illuminated in Francis’ suggestion that it is “wrong” 
to be self-pitying. This negative attitude was further reflected in Francis’ recollection 
of his sisters’ response to learning about his self-injury:  
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“I found [her response] quite, well at the time quite hurtful but, em, .. well, you 
know, now its quite sort of funny in a way cos she was just like oh you know, so you 
do it- stop attention-seeking sort of thing” 
 
Francis defended his sisters’ response by emphasising her own physical illness (she 
had been diagnosed with a severe debilitating condition at 17), as a way of 
explaining why she had little time for people who “make their own problems […] in 
terms of, physical, injury and stuff.” Francis described a family that did 
communicate, and did discuss his self-injury. However, beneath this support and care 
were underlying negative attitudes towards both Francis’ self-injury and ‘self-pity’ in 
general. Potentially, this could leave little space for problematic emotions or 
emotional states to be communicated.  
 
Milly’s narrative alluded to the moral aspects of communicating about emotional 
states. She talked in detail about the problems she had with expressing her emotions 
“appropriately” and this focused especially around her family. I asked Milly how 
emotions could be expressed ‘appropriately’ and she discussed this in relation to her 
sisters’ pregnancy, and the big changes this entailed for the whole family: 
 
“I, I don’t quite know what that role’s gonna be like, but, em, .. and, I don’t know 
why, but the other day when I was round at my folks, it was a big kinda family meal 
and I think it’ll probably be the last one before, the sprog is born, em, … my mum 
had knitted all the, these little, woollen stuff, and Jenny and Micky are standing there 
going ‘aww they’re so cute ahhh’ and, they went out, the three of them went out to 
get something from the car and I just welled up (A – mm) and I don’t know what it 
was, because, there’s so many times that I get emotional and I don’t know where it 
comes from. […], I get this kind of well of emotion, and I don’t know where its 
come from, so I’ll kinda, I took myself away from that situation, my dad and my 
brother were sitting watching the rugby, and I took myself away from that situation, 
because I just, I wanted to get this, this kinda tears out. Went out the back, had a 
cigarette, let the tears flow, kind of, .. that was that, nobody knew, came back in, 
plonked myself down, and, you know I was thinking about it rationally (A – mm) em, 
as to, where these feelings were coming from, and I think, I kind of, its, it’s the 
change thing, its, you know its ok that I’m feeling (A - ---- make me cry! Hehe) I 
know! It, but its ok, its accepting, for myself, that its ok to feel, that way, and not 
necessarily go ‘look everybody I’m upset’ because it’s not the right place to do it, 
(A – aha)” 
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Milly described feeling emotional about the changes occurring in the family, but she 
felt it was inappropriate to express this to her family, so she removed herself from 
the situation, and ‘released’ the emotion without anyone knowing. Embodiment is 
central here, Milly describes ‘releasing’ her emotions by crying. This relates closely 
to what was discussed in chapter 5 about emotions, rationality and release. I want to 
demonstrate here that communication is also intimately linked to these concerns. 
Milly is clear that her upset should not be communicated to her family – “it’s not the 
right place to do it”. This sentiment is further reflected by Milly when she relates her 
fathers’ response to her admission, at 18, that she was feeling depressed again – he 
told her not to tell her mother, as it would upset her. Like Dinah, Milly characterised 
this attitude towards the communication of emotions as being part of a wider cultural 
understanding: 
 
“so, em, … yeah and I’m just, I’m lucky that I can, em, … that I can go through those 
emotions without feeling too, … em, … detrimental towards myself. (A – mm) cos I 
know, society these days its just so, … …. One must not show ones emotions (A – 
yeah) to the world kinda thing. And I’m not really showing them to the world but, I’m 
just, …  making sure that I’m still allowing myself to be human (A - yeah, yeah, 
absolutely) yeah… ….. …. …. I think it’s appropriate to do whatever you want, 
when you’re by yourself hehehe”  
 
Although Milly had not injured herself for several years, her attitude towards the 
management of emotions was nevertheless suggestive of what are often seen as key 
features of self-injury – that it is a way of ‘releasing’ emotions, and that it is best 
done alone. However, Milly was also one of the participants who described her self-
injury as, occasionally, ‘attention-seeking’ whereby the injury was not hidden, but 
actively ‘displayed’.  
 
Mark, like Milly, emphasised the positive nature of his family and upbringing, and 
wanted to avoid any suggestion that they might be ‘blamed’ for his self-injury or 
depression. When talking about some counselling he was receiving he said:  
 
“the classic one was, last week when she’s ‘you know, we haven’t really talked about 
your mother yet’ was like oh, here we go! […] my poor mum, you know, there’s a 
reason for that, cos she’s lovely, I don’t wanna drag her into this hehe you know”  
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Despite this attitude, when I asked him about it, Mark was unsure whether his 
parents knew about his self-injury, but was clear that it had certainly never been 
discussed. He noted that, when he had been a teenager, his father had been “quite 
dismissive” about “things like depression and all the rest of it, [but that] these days 
he’s much more understanding”. This dismissive attitude, similar perhaps to Francis’ 
mother’s, might at least partly explain why Mark had never discussed his self-injury 
with his parents. Both Mark and Francis’ descriptions of the ways that their families 
communicated about self-injury, or not as the case may be, suggest that 
communication could be implicitly discouraged by parental attitudes towards states 
like ‘depression’ or ‘self-pity’. In the next section, I discuss those participants who 
were more direct about the extent to which their families did not directly address 
their self-injury.   
 
7.2.2 Silent families 
 
Robert, Craig, Justin, and Rease each described varying degrees of silence regarding 
their self-injury in family contexts. Like those participants in the previous section, 
Robert and Craig discussed this in the context of their families being ‘fine’, whereas 
Justin and Rease were more critical. Justin’s was perhaps the most extreme case; he 
presented a picture of a family where communication was “non-existent” especially 
regarding his self-injury or any other “emotional” issue. This situation seems 
particularly incongruous given that Justin was one of four siblings, and was home-
schooled by “hippy” parents until he was 14. Justin was extremely disparaging of 
both his parents and his upbringing, and suggested that both he and his older sister 
struggled in their emotional and social development precisely because they were 
home-schooled for such a large portion of their childhood and adolescence:  
 
“I know it’s a bit crap to kind of you know blame your childhood on everything that 
happens (A – hehe) your parents and stuff but, you know I do wonder how, the fact 
that, you know I had extremely limited … sort of social and emotional experiences, 
as a child (A – mhm) and you were in a sort of an environment that was very .. 
similar and, you know with your parents, in your house, you didn’t have to constantly 
go out to different, you know a different school and meet different teachers, meet 
different pupils and stuff, and that sort of, flexibility wasn’t built in from the start” 
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Although Justin started cutting himself while he was still living at home, his parents 
were apparently unaware of this – certainly, it was never discussed. Justin was the 
only participant who said that he had never talked about his self-injury with anyone 
apart from me.  
 
Craig said that he thought his mother had been aware of his self-injury, but he was 
also clear that it had never been mentioned. Craig told me that he did not know why 
his parents had split up when he was 13, and this seemed to indicate a general lack of 
communication in the family, at least about ‘difficult’ issues. Robert too felt that his 
parents must know about his self-injury, since he did not hide it from them, but 
again, it was not something that was ever mentioned: 
 
“ em, so, so I mean its not, its not really mentioned by my family (A – yeah) ken and 
obviously everybody’s seen it and I dinnae try to hide it anymore (A – mm) ken its 
like well, what’s the point trying to hide it now, its like they’re there [his scars] and 
that’s it, nothing I can do about it. (A – mm) so I mean it’s not really sorta 
mentioned…. I, at least I’m never asked about it anyway (A - yeah, yeah) its maybe 
sorta look ken, and they say ken, look at his arms and stuff eh, (cough) but I do know, 
em, that, that some people, are actually, do have like, more scars on their arms than 
what I do (A – mm) ken what I mean so its like, but I mean obviously they’re there 
[his scars], em, and they’re kinda remind me (A – mm) yeah, sorta like a place that I 
was, which wasnae very nice but (A – mhm) but em, its never, its never ever 
mentioned” 
 
As discussed in chapter 5 (section 5.3.3) Robert’s family apparently did not discuss 
his eating disorders either, despite his visible weight-loss. That his self-injury is also 
never mentioned appears to fit with a general atmosphere of non-communication in 
the family. Like Craig, Francis and Mark, this seems to be particularly around what 
might be seen as ‘difficult’ or ‘emotional’ issues. 
 
Finally, Rease’s narrative also suggested that her parents did not discuss her self-
injury. She noted that following her first overdose, at 17, her self-harm was not 
discussed by her family: “So I got an ambulance, and, got my stomach pumped and 
stuff, and but, again, em, nothing came of it. Can you believe how much my family 
doesn’t talk! Heheh, it was ridiculous!” Rease overdosed again when she was 22, an 
 193 
event which she described as partly related to “the build up of 5 years and still no 
talking about anything”  - in this instance, her father responded in the following 
manner: 
 
“I spoke to him on the phone and he was like, ‘Rease, you can’t keep doing this’. 
That’s all he had to say. And I’m like, well, I wonder why I’m doing this, you know, 
its just, not even asking that question. […] And that was it.” 
 
Rease expressed exasperation about this response: this highlights the importance of 
the type of response or acknowledgement. As I discuss further in the next section, if 
self-injury is acknowledged at all, the ways that family members respond to self-
injury were intensely important to participants. 
 
7.2.3 Extreme negative reactions 
 
Belinda, Anna and Emma all described responses to their self-injury from their 
mothers, in each case these were framed as negative experiences. Belinda’s mother 
“totally freaked out” when she noticed marks on her arm: 
 
When I was………..tttt… 17, (A - mhm) err, three days before Christmas, ran away 
from home. (A - ok) Reason being, that mum found out I was cutting (A - right) and 
went ape, like completely, just flew off the handle.(how long before Christmas?) 3 
days…. (A - ok, yeah, ok, how did she find out?) […] em, …  I was mashing hehe, 
mashing potato in my kitchen, and I had scars on my wri-, or, marks on my wrist, 
and she questioned me about it, and I …. You know, couldn’t see the point in lying 
(mm), and so I just told her straight, you know she I was thinking in my head that 
she’s always wanted me to be honest, so I did, and she completely lost it. Erm, and 
then I got really scared, cos she lost it so much, and I got pissed off, because I was 
thinking why are you being angry at me, (mm)… shouldn’t you be trying to help me? 
Instead of just like, shouting at me about how much of a disappointment I am to you 
and, and all that, shouldn’t it, you just be saying ‘are you ok’? Instead of shouting at 
how bad I am. Em, so, I ran away” 
 
 
Belinda describes being so hurt, upset and scared by her mothers’ response that she 
ran away from home. In her discussion of this she expresses anger about her 
mothers’ reaction, suggesting that it was not sufficient – “shouldn’t you be trying to 
help me?” This sense that the response to self-injury is insufficient or wrong in some 
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way can also be seen in Emma’s case, as discussed in section 5.3. Emma described 
trying very hard to keep most aspects of her self-injury and self-harm from her 
parents, however on one occasion she did not manage to prevent her mother from 
visiting her in hospital following an overdose and severe cut to her arm. Like 
Belinda, Emma experienced her mother’s reaction as negative and hurtful – to the 
extent that she felt that her mother was “almost blaming” her. This reaction may 
seem odd, given that Emma had indeed harmed herself – indeed, this may indicate 
that for some people, self-injury and self-harm are indeed understood (or perhaps 
excused) as something that is not their fault. 
 
Finally, Anna described her mother’s response to finding out about her self-injury in 
similar terms – her mother dismissed her behaviour, saying “well we’ll be stopping 
that then, won’t we” and the matter was never discussed again.  
 
What all of these accounts share, is an impression that self-injury is ‘not to be talked 
about’. Even for those participants who described warm, loving families, verbal 
communication about self-injury specifically, but ‘emotional’ issues more generally, 
was portrayed as problematic, or more commonly, non-existent. For the majority of 
the other participants, who described less positive family backgrounds, self-injury 
was equally ‘not mentioned’. Where self-injury was not mentioned, despite being 
visible, this silence can be understood as a powerful communication: indicating that 
the subject of self-injury is taboo. The cases of Emma, Anna, Rease and Belinda 
demonstrate that even where self-injury is at least mentioned or acknowledged, the 
manner in which this is done can be highly problematic, and indeed can be 
experienced as damaging and hurtful. 
 
7.3 Communicating about self-injury out-with the family in 
informal situations 
 
In this section, I examine participants’ narratives regarding how they addressed 
communications about their self-injury in informal situations outside of their 
immediate households.  
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7.3.1 Responding to questions about scars, marks and wounds 
 
Milly, Emma, Robert, Rease, and Dinah all talked about giving ‘honest’ responses to 
questions about their visible scars. Both Dinah and Robert also discussed lying about 
them sometimes, and Emma still covered up her scars in certain contexts, in order to 
avoid questions or comments. Milly, Rease and Mark gave the impression of being 
much bolder about this – each claiming that they almost never purposefully covered 
their scars up. These approaches to scar management meant that Milly and Rease in 
particular had several stories about people commenting upon or asking about their 
scars, though they told me about quite different experiences.  
 
Milly’s stories concerning conversations about her self-injury scars were generally 
very positive, and she described responding to even potentially negative comments in 
a positive manner: 
 
“there will be people that say, you know ‘what’s that’ (A – mhm) em, and I’ll go, ‘its 
just something stupid that I did when I was younger’. And some people give me 
respect for it, em, not in a ‘oh good on you’ kinda way but, eh, a, a em, ‘oh right, 
well that’s interesting’ in a way, and other people have gone, em, ‘well that was a 
bit stupid wasn’t it’ … and I’ll be like ‘well yeah it was, hehehe, but, I’m over it’ 
hehehehe. So, just having that confidence to be able to show it” 
 
Milly went on to describe further incidents where her scars had been noticed and 
commented upon, but this time by other people who had self-injured. In these 
instances, Milly suggested that her practice of revealing her scars, and therefore 
inviting commentary, was a positive one precisely because it enabled and inspired 
other people who self-injured. In framing her openness in this manner, Milly 
challenged other possible interpretations – such as the concept of ‘attention seeking’: 
 
“she pulled me aside and said, em, ‘see those marks on your arm, is it self- harm?’ I 
said ‘yeah’ …. She said, ‘cos, I’ve been doing it too’ and at, at that moment, cos I’d 
had a couple of people say that to me and I’d been like ‘aahoo, ok, what d’you want 
me to do?!’ heheheh (A – heeheheh) and just but, being there, and saying, here’s 
my story, em, not necessarily going into complete in depth, em, reasons why (A – 
mhm) cos quite often they’re not, in depth, but, being able to say ‘yes I’ve been 
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through this and this is how, this is the process of how, I got myself out of the, the 
cycle (A – mhm) is, really nice, for, for people to hear, just a comfort” 
 
Milly emphasised the positive effect that she felt this interaction had on the girl who 
asked her about her scars. She also suggested that over time she herself had become 
more confident in dealing with such questions. 
 
Rease told me two contrasting stories about people commenting upon her scars. The 
first concerned a woman “staring at my scars, I suppose in sort of horror,” Rease 
was still self-injuring at the time this occurred and the woman in question went on to 
comment: 
 
“ ‘what if you want to get married, what will your future husband say’? (A – yeah) 
and I just sort of looked at her and I’m like ‘what do you mean?’ hehee. Like for a 
start you’re assuming I want to get married, which I don’t, and secondly, … if my 
future husband, you know, had a problem with that, then he wouldn’t be my future 
husband! Heheh (A - hehehehe yeah, yeah) you know, it was just the most ridiculous, 
its kind of like, you know, … Again about your body not belonging to you, I’m just 
like, that’s ridiculous, like for a start how dare you say that to me, cos again its 
her, … em, sort of, taking my experience and my body and twisting it, into 
something, you know for her, and what it means to her, and not looking at what it 
means to me. And then again like, also like selling my body like its em, it matters to 
somebody else, like, judgement” 
 
Rease describes being affronted by the woman’s misinterpretation of her scars, and 
her “ridiculous” assumptions about Rease’s lifestyle and beliefs. This scenario could 
be seen to represent the danger inherent in other people’s assumptions about self-
injury. Skeggs (2001) and Freund (1990) have each made similar arguments 
regarding the potentially damaging effects that such invalidation (Freund) or 
misrecognition (Skeggs) might entail. Perhaps what is most striking in the case of 
Rease is that such situations did not cause her to stop ‘revealing’ her self-injury to 
others, though she did describe a great deal of ambivalence and concern with other 
people’s continued ‘misinterpretation’ of her scars. 
 
Rease presented the following story to me, which highlighted a more positive and 
affirming, way in which ‘others’ had responded to her scars: 
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“the woman I was working with just sort of said to me one day, em, ‘you’re, those 
scars are really beautiful, I like the way they catch the light, and I was just 
wondering if’ em, cos she thought they were-  actually a fantastic thing to say! She 
said ‘I was wondering if, they were a part of your tattoos, em, like, you did them as a 
sort of, em, (A – yeah) do you know what I mean like some people do scarification (A 
– scarification) yeah, or, if it was, self-harm’. Em, and I was just, I was dumbstruck 
for a while cos I was like, that’s, the best approach anyone has ever said, you know, 
its such a lovely sort of…” 
 
Although each of the examples Rease gave me involved people making 
‘assumptions’ about her scars, she was clear that the manner in which this was done 
in the second example was far more acceptable. As I discuss below, other 
participants were far more ambivalent about the ‘assumptions’ of others.  
 
 
Belinda, Robert, and Dinah all told me that they occasionally lied about the origin of 
their scars, while Mark and Francis both talked about employing diversionary tactics 
in order to avoid further questions. Indeed, it is important to note that even Rease and 
Milly said that they occasionally deliberately wore clothing to cover up their scars if 
they ‘couldn’t be arsed’ explaining them that day. Mark described himself as being 
relatively open about his scars, especially with his friends. However, he related a 
situation whilst teaching where he had avoided explaining his scars by telling a 
student it was “none of your business”. Similarly, Francis described how he usually 
dealt with questions about his scars: 
 
“I guess I don’t feel 100% comfortable ………….. you know explaining it, or trying, 
cos I feel like I have to justify myself (A – mm) when people notice it, and as I say it 
doesn’t happen very often, but, people do say ‘oh what’s that on your arm?’ (A – 
mm) and I don’t really want to go into it at the time (A – yeah) so I tend to say 
something like ‘oh you know …. You know, buy me a few beers and I’ll tell you 
about it’” 
 
Belinda described having a similar aversion to having to “explain things”. Belinda’s 
concern with having to “explain” particularly about her recent split with her 
girlfriend had, she said, led to her not self-injuring, even though she had wanted to. 
As discussed further below (Section 7.4.3), Belinda shared with Harriet an 
understanding that self-injury could not be successfully hidden. Belinda talked a lot 
about her worries regarding the “assumptions” others might have about her scars or 
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injuries, and what these might imply about her. This concern led her, in some 
situations, to lie about the cause of her injury: 
 
“I have my plan in my head – I burnt myself on the oven hehe. Em, but yeah, I mean, 
if someone’s going to ask me, I’d prefer that they just ask, you know, ‘oh, where’d 
you get your scar from’ or something like that than, to say, ‘oh, you must be really 
sad’! (A - yeah, yeah) cos yeah, I can, deal with that, cos then I can say, a lie, or I 
can tell them the truth, depending on, if I trust them, or I like them, or, can be 
arsed, explaining or just don’t want anyone to know! Em, so then, you know, if I 
don’t want them to know then I can just make up an excuse” 
 
Belinda was clear that she would prefer a direct question than an “assumption” about 
her intent, or the origin of an injury.  
 
Robert also described having excuses ready when he injured himself. On two 
occasions, Robert had cut his face, an especially difficult location to cover up. 
Robert’s narrative around this issue was slightly confused in that he described having 
these excuses ready, and he talked about largely hiding his self-injury; however he 
also talked about numerous instances where his self-injury was noticed. This may 
reflect the changing nature of Robert’s self-injury – as I discussed in Chapter 6, 
Robert felt that his early self-injury had been a “scream for attention” implying that 
his more recent self-injury was not. The following excerpt demonstrates some of 
these complexities: 
 
“…the ones on my face were quite difficult actually (A - yeah!) em, … it was like 
sorta emm, …. Because obviously all the rest of them I could sorta cover up wi, 
like, jumpers and stuff eh, it was the ones on my face when I did it, I dinae ken 
why I did it to my face (cough) em, I’d kinda, and people were sorta like saying ‘oh 
what have you done’ its like, ‘oh I cut myself with a razor’ that was, the first one, 
that was there, […] I used another one, when I done, the one, sorta like, somewhere 
else, I cannae remember exactly where it is, em, … and I had said, I’d, like, stood up 
and, I, caught it off the corner of a door, like one of the cabinets in the kitchen or 
something eh, and it was like the other one, eh, ken it was, again I think that was like 
ken, … think that was the razor ( – mhm) so every single time I was asked I had an 
excuse, em, and still to this day actually like ken my nieces and that’ll say to me ‘ken 
you’ve got a scar on your arm and all that eh’ (A – mm) and its like ken I’ve never 
hid it from them, ken its like ken, ‘how did you do that’ and its like ken, and just turn 
round and say ‘ken I’ve cut myself’ and its like, ken, and its like ‘you’ve cut 
yourself?’ ‘aye’ and its like ken, ‘I wasnae in a very good place at that time when I 
did it’ so its not something I’ve ever hid from them” 
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Robert’s narrative could be seen to reflect the tension between wanting to be seen to 
be ‘honest’ and the equally (morally) virtuous position of either not being someone 
who self-injures, or not ‘burdening’ others with problems.  
 
7.3.2 Negotiating the (unspoken) ‘assumptions’ of others 
 
Much of the participants’ discussions about interactions with other people regarding 
their self-injury focused upon what were sometimes termed ‘assumptions’. 
Participants often expressed concern about the ways that other people might interpret 
their self-injury. In many cases, these concerns did not appear to be related to 
participants’ experiences of having their self-injury explicitly misinterpreted, as with 
Rease’s narrative above. Rather, participants’ concerns centred upon the often 
unspoken assumptions of others. 
 
I explored this issue with Belinda particularly, as she expressed anxiety about having 
her self-injury discussed by others on a number of occasions in the interviews: 
 
“So in a way it’s easier to be open, ish. But at the same time, people who don’t ask 
me about it and just think in their heads, and make up their own conclusions – I’d 
prefer that they did ask me about it, actually, but if, if they make up their own 
conclusions they’d be like oh, you know, then it will go round camp you know – 
‘have you seen Belinda’s arm?’ hehehe that sort of thing.” 
 
 
In particular, Belinda was concerned that the ‘assumptions’ of others would then be 
passed on to others, without enabling Belinda to mediate and offer her own 
interpretation. Leading from this, Belinda suggested that she would rather people 
asked her about marks on her arm, and her narrative suggests that this could be 
because this would allow her more control than unspoken ‘assumptions’: 
 
“I can, deal with that, cos then I can say, a lie, or I can tell them the truth, depending 
on, if I trust them, or I like them, or, can be arsed, explaining or just don’t want 
anyone to know! Em, so then, you know, if I don’t want them to know then I can just 




Belinda’s narratives regarding these unspoken assumptions challenges Kay Inckle’s 
(2007) analysis which seems to imply that it is improper for ‘normatively embodied’ 
people to ask questions of those who are ‘non-normatively embodied’ (2007, 120-2). 
Inckle raises this issues within a broader discussion about attempts to ‘pass’ as 
normatively bodied, and how comments from ‘ignorant’ normatively bodied people 
can be discriminatory and “shame-inducing” (2007, 121):  
 
“It’s still amazing though, like you said, the way that people think they have a right 
to know, and it constantly pisses me off and blows me away at the same time the way 




While Inckle’s analysis certainly taps into the emotional experiences of negotiating 
social life with a ‘non-normative’ or self-injured body, it is limited by her focus on 
the negative consequences of communications about the bodies of those ‘non-
normatively embodied’. In contrast, Belinda’s narrative highlights the negative 
consequences of avoiding communication, particularly for the person who is the non-
normative body. 
 
Indeed, Inckle’s analysis also seems to overlook the moral framing of 
communications, in particular, the idea that it is seen as ‘good’ to be ‘open and 
honest’. Belinda also addressed this, and again, her narrative helps to unsettle this 
idea and demonstrate how complex these moral and ethical arguments can be: 
 
 “ - oh, you know we should be really open about it, but, however much people say 
that you know, you can’t – I don’t think you can really, cos you know you’ve got this 
fear that you’re gonna scare them, you know, or em, yeah….” 
 
 
So Belinda acknowledges the moral imperative towards openness, but highlights that 
in practice, this is difficult to enact. Other participants also expressed similar “fear” 
around how their scars might impact on other people, and in particular on how other 
people might view them. For instance Belinda shared with Justin, Craig and Robert a 
concern that others would think they were “crazy” if their self-injury was discovered. 
                                                 
16
 Inckle’s presentation of her analysis was not standard. This quote is from a section where Inckle had 
presented a fictionalised account of a conversation between herself and her respondents.  
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While Belinda worried people might think she was suicidal, Craig, Robert and Justin 
said that they were worried that they might be ‘locked up’ if people became aware of 
their self-injury.  
 
Significantly, in most cases, participants had not been expressly told by someone else 
that they thought they were crazy, and none of these participants had actually been 
threatened with incarceration for their self-injury. Rather, participants may have been 
projecting their understandings about what other people might assume that their self-
injury indicated: mental illness or suicidality. I discussed this with Emma: 
 
A – yeah, … and do you, can I just ask a question about that? right, tell me if I’m 
being out of order but do you, do you know that’s what they think or do you 
E – no, that’s  
A - kind of you, 
E - projecting onto, yeah, em, … … … …. … .. a couple of people have, just thought 
it was too scary, and, … sort of backed off, sort of potential partners and things, just 
sort of backed off  
A – yeah  
E - not getting involved with that… em, … … … which is a bit unfair, cos, especially 
since I don’t do it anymore 
 
Emma accepts here that she may have been ‘projecting’ a negative understanding of 
her self-injury onto others. However, she goes on to suggest that she has identified 
concrete effects, arguing that potential partners have been scared off by her self-
injury scars. It was not clear whether in these instances Emma had been told this was 
the case, or whether in these cases Emma again ‘projected’ her own understanding of 
why they backed off. Whatever the case, Emma herself felt that her scars scared 
people off, and she experienced this as unjustified. 
 
These examples all demonstrate that participants’ understandings of what other 
people thought were important to and perhaps indicative of their own feelings about 
their self-injury. In the next section, I explore this issue further, in an examination of 
the ways in which participants reacted to such understandings in their practices of 
hiding and/or revealing their self-injury to others.  
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7.4 Hiding, revealing and display 
 
 
In this section I discuss participants’ narratives regarding their display of the marks 
and wounds created by their self-injury. For some, the decision to reveal their self-
injury at least to some others, or more pointedly, to stop hiding it, was framed as a 
decision that was taken at a certain point in their life-story. For others, self-injury 
was still something they preferred to hide from others. Participants had various 
reasons, and had employed different strategies to achieve this. Throughout this 
section I want to make clear that these actions (oriented towards either hiding or 
revealing) are integral to the lived experience of self-injury. As evidenced by the 
stories of some participants, these decisions had to be continually refreshed, even 
years after self-injury has stopped.  
 
The role of bodies is fundamental here, emphasising the centrality of bodies to the 
lived experience of self-injury. This highlights the importance of the self-injured 
body, and how it can continue to influence and mediate social interaction long after 
self-injury has stopped. This section also addresses moral aspects to discussions 
around the appropriateness of displaying both emotions and self-injury.  
 
In the process of tackling the above concerns, this chapter will also challenge the 
prevailing belief that self-injury is a ‘hidden’ behaviour: 
 
“In the vast majority of cases self-harm remains a hidden and secretive behaviour 
that can go on for a long time without being discovered. Personal testimony 
submitted to the Inquiry shows that most young people make great efforts to hide 
their scars, bruises or other signs of self-harm and are extremely reluctant to talk 
about their self-harm or what may be troubling them. Most family and friends are 
likely to be unaware that someone close to them has self-harmed. This may help 
explain why research – for example that by Meltzer et al (2001)7 and Green et al 
(2005)8 - found that parents were often completely unaware of incidents of self harm 
which their children reported to the same study.”(National Inquiry into Self-Harm 
Among Young People, 2006: 19) 
 
In contrast to the above quote, the narratives of my participants suggest that self-
injury is frequently not hidden or kept secret, although it is rarely openly discussed. 
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Further, I suggest that the emphasis on secrecy and privacy regarding self-injury is 
reflective of wider socio-cultural and moral attitudes regarding the appropriate 
expression of emotion. In particular, this relates to understandings that negative 
emotion should be hidden, and that self-injury – as representative of negative 
emotion, and therefore failing social bonds – should also be kept hidden. Due to 
these morally charged narratives around appropriate expression, people who self-
injure may be more likely to present their behaviour as ‘hidden’ even when this is not 
entirely the case. Further, these moral understandings may lead to ‘others’ observing 
evidence of self-injury being less inclined to mention it.   
 
7.4.1 Deciding to reveal  
 
When I spoke with them, several participants did not hide the marks that their self-
injury had left. In all cases where participants ‘revealed’ their self-injury, the marks 
were several years old, with scarring mostly white
17
.   
 
Dinah, for instance, wore short-sleeved t-shirts when I spoke with her, and this 
revealed several visible scars, and some tattoos. Dinah told me that when she was 
younger she had hidden her self-injury carefully:  
 
“oh aye, always, I mean I always wore, like, long sleeved, long sleeved tops, and, or 
things round my wrists or, you know, obviously bits here that weren’t on my legs, cos 
I’ve got a lot of scars on my legs as well” 
 
Dinah also described focusing her self-injury on areas that could be more easily 
covered, such as the tops of her thighs. However, over time, Dinah’s practice 
regarding this changed. In her mid-twenties, she began to worry less and less about 
covering her scars up.  
 
“Also around then when I met Adam, I started wearing short sleeved things, before 
then I’d always been very careful, even when I was training to cover them up. But 
after that, my wardrobe changed a lot and I didn’t care as much if people saw my 
scars.” 
                                                 
17
 Although the way that scars form can differ widely, on Caucasian skin, recent scarring tends to be a 
red or purple colour. Over the course of several months and years, the scars eventually go white. 
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Dinah associated this changing practice partly with meeting Adam, her current 
partner, as well as getting some of her tattoos. These tattoos served both to cover up 
some of her scars (one in particular which she disliked), as well as distracting from 
her scars and decorating her arm. The gradual ‘revealing’ of self-injury, once the 
participant was no longer ‘actively’ self-injuring, was also indicated in the narratives 
of Milly, Craig and Justin. 
 
Tattoos were also implicated in Craig, Justin, Emma and Milly’s narratives about 
their changing practices regarding scar covering. Justin and Emma described getting 
tattoos for the explicit function of covering up scars. Justin in particular told me that 
he got his tattoos, and used a scar minimisation treatment, in order to be able to wear 
short-sleeves on an upcoming holiday.  
 
In contrast, Craig and Milly implied that their tattoos had accompanied a greater 
confidence in and with their bodies, as well as giving them greater reason to wear 
more revealing clothing. Rease similarly associated her self-injury scars with her 
tattoos and piercings. Though she was clear that at the time the self-injury was not 
decorative, she now saw her scars as “beautiful” and was clear that she felt it was 
proper and right that they should be displayed. Rease’s orientation towards her scars 
was particularly positive, and reflected her more generally positive attitude towards 
self-injury. Indeed, she implied that she had a positive attitude towards her wounds 
when she was actively self-injuring and had in fact chosen to ‘reveal’ them when 
they were still fresh. This was in contrast to the stories of most of the other 
participants, who generally suggested that they had hidden their self-injury whilst 
they were still injuring, and only began to reveal the parts of their bodies that bore 
scars once the scars were less recent.  
 
I discussed this issue with Belinda, who suggested that revealing older scars was 
“easier” because they were “easier” to explain to people. This related particularly to 
Belinda’s belief that people might think she was suicidal if they knew she self-
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injured. Therefore, Belinda suggested that if people saw older scars it would be 
obvious that any suicide attempt had been unsuccessful: 
 
“I think as well if you say – that it, it was , if you say ages ago, if you talk about it in 
a past tense, people don’t worry about you so much, because like you know, oh your 
ok, because your obviously still alive and you’re here, but if you say oh it was last 
week, then people think ‘oh my god their gonna kill themselves’ and that’s like the 
whole, hype around it that people think, and I hate that, that that’s what you want to 
do when its, definitely not what I want to do” 
 
This excerpt also relates to the narratives of other participants who talked about 
wanting to avoid ‘burdening’ others with their problems. Participants who had 
chosen not to hide the scars left by their self-injury tended to make this decision 
several years after they had last injured themselves. However, as discussed in the 
previous section, participants were not always able to reveal their scars without 
consequence. Questions were invariably asked, and these intrusions were not always 
welcomed. Indeed, fear of such questions and intrusions led several participants to 
tend towards hiding their scars. 
 
7.4.2 Hiding: reasons and justifications 
 
Although Anna was the only participant who said that she currently kept her self-
injury entirely hidden, most participants described keeping their self-injury hidden 
some of the time, or had done in the past. However, although Anna described 
keeping her self-injury hidden from “everyone” this was not the case in her home and 
with close family – her husband and sons saw her scars, as had a niece, whom she 
said was one of the few people outside of her immediate family who knew about her 
self-injury. Therefore, even for Anna, the extent to which her scars were kept hidden 
was dependent upon context. The way in which Anna talked about her hiding 
practices could also indicate something more generally about the way that ‘privacy’ 
is understood in different ways. For instance, someone describing their self-injury as 
‘private’ may mean that it is kept hidden from absolutely everyone, or from everyone 
outside of the immediate household, or from everyone apart from a sexual partner.  
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Emma also described keeping her scars hidden in certain contexts. In contrast to 
Anna, however, Emma was relatively open about her scars in most public settings. 
However, Emma shared with Anna a problematic relationship with her parents. Both 
women specifically kept their scars hidden from their parents, though for different 
reasons. Anna’s hiding of her scars from her mother in particular, seemed to be 
oriented towards self-protection. When her mother had seen her scars she had been 
dismissive, which had hurt Anna, who subsequently preferred to avoid the issue 
entirely by keeping her body covered. Emma, on the other hand, kept her scars 
hidden from her parents in order to “protect” them. This concern with protecting her 
parents even led Emma to avoid visiting them in hot weather: 
 
“… they know, that there’s scars, but they’ve never seen them (A – no) E - I always 
keep them hidden, I try and avoid going up to visit them in the summer, when it’s hot 
[…] because we don’t talk about stuff. ….. …..it, it makes it very difficult to, … to 
openly show, you know, em, … … scars and things that eh, …. They’d probably 
rather not know about [it]” 
 
Further, Emma suggested that if her parents found out about the extent of her self-
injury and the resulting scars they would “be really upset and really horrified.” 
Emma also suggested that her scars had “scared off” people she had wanted to get 
close to, and this could have further contributed to her tendency to hide her scars in 
some situations. Francis expressed a similar ambivalence about his scars, and 
particularly his concern about other people’s opinions of his scars: “because I think, 
you know people have preconceptions about it and stuff like that”. Both Emma and 
Francis were adamant that they were not ashamed of their self-injury, or of their 
scars, however, each suggested that at the same time they were concerned about the 
ways that their scars might be interpreted, and that this sometimes led to them 
preferring to hide them: 
 
“Yeah, I don’t know I kind of, I suppose there’s a bit of disparity cos, in my mind I 
sort of feel like I’m ok with it, like, I’m perfectly, happy with, you know, …. ….. what 
I’ve, you know I don’t have, any reg- I don’t really regret doing it or I’m, really 
ashamed of it or, you know anything like that, but at the same time I’m not…. I don’t, 
wouldn’t want to just openly talk about it at work, or, … you know in a sort of, if I 
don’t know people very well, em, cos they just think, I think and I think that’s 
basically cos of, I think they might have preconceptions and sort of they might have, 
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you know or maybe its something that I don’t really wanna focus on, or, I don’t 
know, …” (Francis) 
 
Here Francis expresses similar concerns to Belinda’s regarding the assumptions or 
preconceptions of others. However, while Belinda said that she would rather people 
did ask her about her scars, Francis preferred to keep his covered and avoid both 
questions and assumptions. 
 
Mark described generally not hiding his scars, saying that he simply preferred to 
wear short sleeves, and noting that in most cases people did not mention his scars 
anyway. Nevertheless, Mark said that he had purposefully covered his arms when 
working in a particular school, with affluent students. He indicated that in this 
context, his scars were likely to have been taken as a form of weakness, saying that 
these students would “take anything, anything, you know anything that’s kind of  
----- no wonder the teachers felt stressed”. 
 
7.4.3 ‘Just’ revealing/displaying  
 
Although most participants who described revealing their self-injury implied that 
they did so through choice, some participants indicated that they had no choice 
regarding how visible their scarring was.  
 
In Robert’s case, the reason he was unable to hide some of his self-injury was 
because it was on his face, which he jokingly noted made it hard to cover up. 
Belinda, however, suggested that she could not cover up the injuries on her arms, 
specifically in the summer: “I can’t really hide it, because it’s hot, its summer hehe, 
I’m not, I don’t want to hide it, I wish it wasn’t so visible sometimes.” This contrasts 
with Anna’s narrative, where she described particularly disliking summer time 
because she was invariably too hot as she “had to” wear long sleeved clothing to 
cover up her scars. What is significant here is that both women suggested that they 
would rather their scars were not seen by others, but that Belinda, unlike Anna, felt 
unable to cover her scars up. I found this perplexing, especially since I have 
generally always covered up my scars, even in hot weather. What this may point to 
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are different thresholds regarding embarrassment, and different priorities. For 
instance, Anna and I discussed the problems we faced when wearing long sleeved 
clothes in hot weather: 
 
Anna - I dinnae get any mair undressed than this, cos its just… pretty messy [bit 
unclear, quiet?] Summers… I hate summers…  
Amy – mm 
Anna -  people are stripping off, and they’re going, are you not too warm? No, fine, 
great, nice today! Heheh 
Amy - I spent the whole summer once working in a warehouse, where the uniform 
was either a t-shirt or a sweatshirt, and they’re all like, are you not hot, and I’m like 
no, no, I get really cold! 
Anna - I know! Hehe I’m always cold! Hehe 
 
In contrast, Belinda seems to have felt it to be more desirable to deal with comments 
about her self-injury than questions about her choice of clothing. Similarly, Belinda 
suggested that when she returned home to Australia, she would be unable to hide her 
self-injury from her mother: 
 
“… when I go home to see my mum, obviously my mum’s going to see cos, you know, 
heh, some places on your body scar more than others I’ve found. So yeah I’ve got a 
couple of scars that aren’t gonna go away, erm, very visible. Em, but yeah she’s 
gonna see so, I don’t want lots. … yeah, I just don’t want people to see, I just, it’s a 
me thing.” 
 
Again, Belinda suggests here that she would rather her mother did not see her self-
injury, but at the same time, she feels unable to hide her scars. This contrasts with the 
stories of other participants who appeared to feel more able to wear clothing which 
covered up their scars. 
 
Harriet implied a similar orientation towards the hiding of scars in summer time. In 
the following extract, she suggests that her concern about people seeing her recent 
self-injury sometimes led her to self-injure different, more easily hidden, parts of her 
body: 
 
“[I] used to be mostly like cutting my arm and everything, and I think, the urges are 
like, really strong to like, totally slash your arms up (A – yeah) and then like, but, if I 
do that, everyone’s gonna know, and, so you can only use that in winter when you 
can hide it. So if I think I just like, phew stop doing it where people can see!” 
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Belinda and Harriet appear to share an understanding that in summer time short 
sleeves must be worn, and that therefore self-injury on the arms at this time of year 
cannot be hidden. This is in contrast to the understandings that Emma and Anna (and 
I) have in that wearing concealing clothing in summer is far preferable to either 
revealing self-injury, or injuring other parts of their (our) bodies. What could be an 
important distinguishing feature that separates the embodied and lived experience of 
self-injury for Emma and Anna from that of Belinda and Harriet is the amount of 
scarring that the women had on their arms. Emma and Anna each had extensive 
scarring on their forearms, while Belinda and Harriet both had very little. Equally, of 
course, the different orientations of the women towards covering up their scars could 
have led to the different levels of scarring.  
 
7.5 Power, bodies and inter-personal contexts 
 
This chapter has explored participants’ narratives regarding the ways in which their 
self-injury was addressed in informal interpersonal contexts. In particular, I have 
demonstrated the importance of the visible aspects of self-injury. Immediately after 
self-injury, and in some cases, forever after, participants described making decisions 
about what to do with their scars or marks: to hide, or reveal. I have suggested that 
the decisions that participants made regarding the hiding or revealing of these marks 
were varied but tended to be closely related to their understandings of what ‘others’ 
might think. 
 
In the first part of the chapter I suggested that in most cases, participants’ families 
indicated that self-injury was not something to be spoken about. This message was 
conveyed both explicitly through negative and damaging responses, and implicitly, 
by self-injury being ignored. The stories participants told about the reactions of 
people out-with the family indicated that these silent or negative responses were 
wide-spread. Participants experienced this in different ways. Some regarded this as 
unproblematic, and were glad when they could undertake daily life without undue 
comments. Others indicated that they found it difficult when people did not say 
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anything, and preferred it when people did ask about marks and scars, as this would 
enable a response to be given. This finding contradicts Inckle’s (2007) suggestion 
that people with non-normative bodies might prefer not to be asked. Rease and Milly 
both had positive narratives, which suggested that self-injury could be acknowledged 
in an affirmative manner that was neither negative nor silencing.  
 
Power and control appear to be relevant in these narratives. Some participants 
implied they had more control than others over whether their scars were revealed, 
and how they were then interpreted. Rease and Milly for instance suggested that they 
almost defiantly never covered up their scars. In situations where they explicitly 
chose to reveal the scars on their arms, Rease, Milly and to a lesser extent Dinah and 
Robert, were perhaps taking command. In contrast, Belinda and Harriet suggested 
that they felt unable to cover their scars. Their exposure of their scars was framed as 
a less powerful act than that of those participants who described themselves as 
choosing when and where to reveal. This was further highlighted by Rease and 
Mark’s narratives about choosing to hide in certain contexts, where they either could 
not be bothered with comments, or recognised that to do so may have been especially 
dangerous.  
 
The narratives of Harriet and Belinda contrasted especially with those of Anna, 
Emma and Francis. All of these participants expressed concern about the negative 
assumptions or opinions others might hold regarding their scars. However, Anna, 
Emma and Francis’ narratives implied that they were far more successful in hiding 
their self-injury from others. In particular, Anna and Emma viewed the hiding of 
their scars with potentially inappropriate clothing (long sleeves in summer) as 
unproblematic, and certainly preferable to revealing their scars. Harriet and Belinda 
on the other hand implied that the comments attracted by dressing inappropriately 
were reason enough to avoid injuries in obvious places during the summer (Harriet) 
or were more resigned to having to deal with negative reactions and comments 
(Belinda). I want to emphasise here that although most participants wore short 
sleeves when I interviewed them – and many had visible scars – their understandings 
regarding the exposure of these scars differed widely.  
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This chapter has also demonstrated that the hiding and revealing of self-injury 
appears to be affected in some cases by moral discourse around emotions and 
emotional expression. I suggested in section 7.2 that participants’ problems with 
communicating about self-injury to their families reflected both their family’s 
understandings regarding appropriate emotionality, but also wider socio-cultural 
discourses. In these cases, the label of ‘attention-seeking’ is employed to invalidate 
and discourage displays of negative emotion, and self-injury can be seen as a display 
of negative emotion par excellence. While some theorists have suggested that the 
wounds created by self-injury ‘cry out for response’ (Crowe, 1996), my research has 
shown that whether this is the case or not, they are very often not responded to. 
Scarred, scabbed or bleeding arms may well conjure up dramatic imagery, but in 
mundane and ‘every day’ life, they are nevertheless frequently ignored.  
 
In the final substantive chapter of this thesis, I extend previous discussions around 
morality, authenticity and self-injury, further demonstrating the importance of the 












This chapter extends and develops theoretical themes introduced in chapters 4-7. I 
examine three related concepts: emotion work, authenticity, and motivation. 
Underpinning each of these is a concern with the body, and with morality. Thus, I 
will further demonstrate the centrality of the body to understandings of self-injury. A 
focus on morality will illuminate the relationships between understandings of self-
injury and wider socio-cultural beliefs around bodies and emotions. Demonstrating 
the existence of these relationships serves to emphasise the importance of locating 
understandings, explanations and accounts of self-injury within social and cultural 
contexts. 
 
The first section will extend the discussion of emotion work begun in Chapter 5. I 
have suggested that self-injury might be understood as a method of emotion work, 
and here I critically interrogate this idea. I demonstrate that although self-injury can 
be viewed in this manner, to do so, understandings of what emotion work actually 
entails must be questioned. I suggest that some sociological studies continue to 
sideline or downplay the role of bodies in both emotions and emotion work. I 
propose that this may reflect wider socio-cultural biases towards cognition and ‘the 
unconscious’ in understandings of emotions. Through this analysis of self-injury and 
emotion work, I conclude that sociology must redouble its efforts to demonstrate and 
emphasise the importance of bodies in understanding the significance of emotions in 
social life.  
 
I then turn to the concept of authenticity, a focus of important criticism of emotion 
work, especially as conceptualised by Hochschild (1979; Wouters, 1989). Here, I 
 214 
turn this argument on its head, suggesting that self-injury can be seen to represent an 
attempt to ‘be authentic’ rather than looking at it as a representation of either ‘false’ 
or ‘authentic’ feelings. I demonstrate that for people who self-injure, the need to be 
seen (or to see themselves) as authentically ‘in pain’ is a key aspect of the way that 
they narrate their experiences with self-injury. I argue that this interpretation may 
explain how the body comes to be seen as an understandable and acceptable site for 
the ‘authentic’ expression of pain.  
 
Finally, I examine more explicitly the explanatory claims made by my participants, 
using Mills’ (1940) vocabularies of motive, and Scott and Lyman’s (1968) accounts. 
I suggest that the accounts given by my participants were more often in the form of 
justifications. That is, responsibility for the behaviour was accepted, but the reasons 
given for the behaviour drew on commonly held views of emotions and health in 
order to give them legitimacy. I note that participants also gave excuses (where 
responsibility was denied) but that these were generally linked to accounts given to 
‘other people’. I suggest that my status as someone who had self-injured may have 
encouraged such accounting. Further, I note that justifications were necessary for 
most participants, since even if they no longer self-injured, most carried with them 
permanent marks and scars which had to be continually explained – both to 
themselves and to others. In conclusion, I suggest that the existence of marks and 
scars make justificatory accounts more likely, as individuals claim responsibility for 
their behaviour (and therefore a label of sanity), thus maintaining a coherent sense of 
self.  
 
In a final discussion, I draw together these themes, demonstrating that each 
contributes to a more complete, and importantly, more sociologically informed 
understanding of self-injury. This understanding puts self-injured bodies at the centre 
of the analysis. Doing so demonstrates the embodied nature of experience and of 
emotions. This focus also enables a better understanding of why certain types of 
accounts may be employed by people who self-injure – the materiality of the 
permanently scarred, self-injured body necessitates a self-narrative which adequately 
incorporates self-injury into a coherent and morally acceptable self. 
 215 
 
8.2.1 Emotion Work 
 
As I have already suggested, self-injury can be seen as a form of emotion work. For 
some of my participants, self-injury was understood as a method of controlling or 
coping with strong emotions or feelings – doing so either by changing feeling, 
eliciting feeling, or simply causing the participant to “feel better”. Although 
Hochschild’s (1979; 2003 (1983)) formulations of emotion work have addressed the 
practical methods through which people did emotion work, subsequent sociological 
treatment of the matter has tended to overlook this, focusing instead on feeling rules. 
Where emotion work itself is examined, the focus tends to be on mental, cognitive or 
even ‘unconscious’ aspects, with the bodily and embodied nature of emotions and 
thus emotion work being generally overlooked (see e.g. Bolton & Boyd, 2003; 
Theodosius, 2006). I argue that the drift away from the embodied nature of emotions 
in research on emotion work is problematic. Downplaying the role of bodies in 
emotion results in incomplete and partial understandings. In contrast, a more explicit 
engagement with the role of bodies in emotions and emotion work provides a more 
comprehensive impression of the socially situated self. Addressing the bodies as well 
as the minds of social actors will itself force analysis into a more explicit 
engagement with the material nature of social life. In particular, this entails attention 
being paid to the visible and invisible nature of different forms of emotion work, 
which in turn requires an examination of Goffmanian hiding and revealing practices. 
Ultimately, this will lead to a more grounded understanding of social life as it is 
experienced by social actors, actors who are both bodies and minds. 
 
My analysis explicitly orients itself towards bodies. This approach establishes the 
necessity of an embodied approach to emotion work. As self-injury so overtly 
involves bodies in the managing of emotions, it is an ideal focus for an elaboration of 
embodied emotion work. In particular, this demonstrates the importance of attending 
to the practical methods that people use to do this work. 
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I illustrate this point in the first instance by providing examples from the research 
which focused upon the way in which self-injury was understood to operate as a 
method of working upon or with emotions. Following this, I discuss the relevance of 
bodies in both self-injury and emotion work. I suggest that self-injury might be 
viewed as a challenge to attempts to manage emotions using the mind or cognition 
alone, and that this should certainly be seen as a warning to those theorists of 
emotion who have latterly drifted towards a disembodied analysis of emotions.  
 
8.2.2 Examples of self-injury as (embodied) emotion work. 
 
This section is split in two, though both sections will illustrate the ways that 
participants understood their self-injury to have acted upon their emotions. Firstly, I 
present data from participants who described their self-injury as being a method of 
eliciting or creating feelings. I briefly contrast this with Robert’s narrative which 
used the opposite formulation, where self-injury was described as acting to remove 
emotion. Secondly, I discuss the stories of participants which concentrated upon the 
managing of emotions. 
 
8.2.1.1 Eliciting emotion, creating feeling 
 
Both Belinda and Francis talked about self-injuring in order to feel “something”. For 
Belinda this “something” was required to replace feelings of confusion, whereas for 
Francis the “something” replaced feelings of numbness, or an absence of feeling. For 
Francis, his practice of self-injury was strongly related to his belief that he should 
have been feeling something – a belief which suggests the existence of feeling rules. 
In this case, the feeling rule was that if one’s parents have split up, and one’s father 
has been diagnosed with a mental illness, one should be feeling something more than 
“numb.” 
 
“I felt it wasn’t right, or, it felt wrong, to be, to have, to know, that I should – that 
I’m upset, to know that these things have upset me, but not, but the, you know I’d 
learnt, or I’d got into the habit of really, … not displaying that […] I felt I was 
incapable of feeling anything, you know incapable of emotion and…. Em…. I didn’t 
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like that, I wanted to be able to feel I wanted to, you know, live or experience stuff or. 
…….. and so, self-harming was, you know a way of, feeling, pain, you know feeling 
pain cos it was something” 
 
For both Francis and Belinda, the feeling that self-injury elicited was “pain.” In 
Francis’ case this could be viewed as appropriate – the situation with his family is 
one that could be understood to cause painful feelings. Francis felt “incapable” of 
experiencing these feelings and interpreted his self-injury as being a way of feeling 
“pain” rather than nothing at all. This reflects the common narrative of self-injury 
being a way of ‘doing’ physical pain in place of emotional pain and further 
highlights the interconnected nature of physical and emotional pain. Indeed, in the 
passage above Francis does not indicate whether he is talking about emotional or 
physical pain. This could reflect the impossibility of attempting to separate out these 
concepts.  
 
For Belinda the feeling rule is less clear, though it can certainly be suggested that 
feelings of confusion are rarely viewed as positive. Belinda herself apparently views 
these feelings of confusion as so unacceptable that something must be done to 
remedy the situation. Key to this is the level of control Belinda is able to enact over 
these feelings, through her self-injury: 
 
“I just, it sort of, I think now, it’s just to feel something else, to replace the feeling, 
like with something……that I know, and something that I sort of have control over 
feeling, and it’s to replace a different feeling, to think about something else for a 
while, that’s what I think it is now.” 
 
Here Belinda provides more detail about how self-injury works for her. Self-injury 
replaces her feelings of confusion with something that is different but, importantly, 
this different feeling is also something that Belinda feels she has more control over. 
The need for control over feelings could be said to be a very general feeling rule, 
there are few, if any, social situations where a lack of control over feelings is 
required or encouraged. Self-injury, in this sense, might be likened to other more 
socially acceptable methods of doing emotion work in the face of ‘uncontrollable’ 
feelings, such as smoking cigarettes or taking deep breaths.  
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The feelings which self-injury was said to elicit were sometimes described in 
positive terms. Indeed, although Francis described his self-injury as causing pain, he 
noted that this was “a good pain, not a bad pain.” Some participants took this 
further, suggesting that self-injury actually operated to make them “feel good”. This 
was the case for Rease, Mark and Justin. Justin’s narrative in particular fits closely 
with traditional conceptualisations of emotion work. He said that his early self-
injury, between the ages of 16 and 18, had primarily been carried out in order to give 
himself a “buzz” which he likened to a ‘pick me up’ of whisky.  
 
“I guess like if it was in sort of social situations where there was a whole bunch of 
people downstairs, you could, you know, cut yourself, get a rush, and then, you 
could kind of, you know it was like sort of, you know almost like a sort of, almost like 
drinking (A – mm) basically, like it would give you a kind of you know, Dutch 
courage or something (A – mhm) errr, and so, ... and then plus once you sort of start 
something like that, I think you know you sort of, it sort of becomes habit, or, or 
whatever” 
 
Justin’s earlier self-injury was described as being a method he used to enable him to 
socialise more successfully. He noted that in later life, he used alcohol in much the 
same way.  
 
Mark and Rease described their self-injury as making them “feel good” in the face of 
depression, and both intimated that self-injury had played a part in their eventual 
‘recovery’ from depression. For instance, Mark suggested that in some cases his self-
injury was related to feelings of depression or “brittleness” and that the act of cutting 
ended cycles of such feelings. His description is further suggestive of the embodied 
nature of these feelings, and the impossibility of separating the physical from the 
emotional: 
 
“everything’s really brittle (A – mm)……. … … you know, it can all go wrong any 
time , em,…………… ………it doesn’t matter what you do, cos tomorrow’s gonna be 
the same, then the next week’s gonna be the same, there’s no end to this in sight …. 
……… … the cutting definitely breaks the cycle (A – mm) you wake up the next 
morning, and it’s a new day, (A – yeah) and it does feel different and it is 
different… …. … em, …. I’m not saying it’s a sensible move, (A – yeah) I can’t quite, 
---- the feeling you get the night before after the cutting, …. …. … I think it’s like a 
weight off your chest (A – mm) you can sleep -----, you can actually go to sleep” 
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This passage suggests that, for Mark, self-injury leads to these more positive feelings 
through three routes. Firstly, self-injury has allowed him to feel in control of 
something, and that in itself is positive. Secondly, it relieves some tension “a weight 
off your chest”. Finally, these factors contributed to allowing him to sleep. Belinda, 
Dinah, Anna and Harriet all also talked about problematic emotional states (primarily 
anxiety) leading to difficulty sleeping. Belinda and Dinah both indicated that they 
had used self-injury in order to “exhaust” themselves so that they were able to sleep. 
In these cases, self-injury can again be seen to act as a method of doing embodied 
emotion work – by ‘exhausting’ the participant, or by ‘relieving’ problematic 
emotional states enough for sleep to occur. The sociological importance of sleep has 
recently begun to be explored (Williams, 2002). Certainly, it is clear that good 
quality sleep is generally understood to be related to positive mental health. In the 
cases where self-injury is used to facilitate or induce (through exhaustion) sleep, it 
can therefore be understood as a practical and logical method of working on 
emotions in order to better participate in ‘normal’ life. Further, the role of sleep or 
sleep disturbance in some participants’ stories emphasises the importance of bodies 
in experiences of mental distress.  
 
In contrast to these participants, Robert suggested that for him, rather than creating 
feelings, self-injury removed unwanted emotion: 
 
“once I did it was like it was gone, it was like, there was just nae emotion 
whatsoever, it was just, em, …. I suppose like everything had been lifted[…] I mean 
once it was, once it was done, … it was like ken, everything, like I say the emotions 
and that, they were gone, they were away, it was like as if I’d been cleansed, it was 
like as if, the, em, I suppose, like ken, people call blood letting and stuff eh” 
 
The way that Robert describes this process is suggestive of the release metaphor 
discussed in Chapter 5 (Emotions and Self-Injury). Release could be likened to the 
removal of emotion – in fact as I noted earlier, participants who invoked the concept 
of release were often unclear about what was being released. Robert’s narrative 
suggests that for him what was being released was emotion, and that it was released 
almost materially, through the “letting” of blood.  
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8.2.1.2 Managing emotion, dealing with feelings 
 
Other participants described self-injury as operating slightly differently in the 
management of their emotions. Rather than creating, eliciting or removing emotions, 
these participants talked about self-injury in terms of its ability to release or relieve 
emotions or feelings, or to serve as a distraction from feelings. 
 
Harriet, for instance, described self-injuring in order to relieve tension and anxiety, 
and in a slightly different formulation of the release/relief metaphor, Dinah suggested 
that self-injury helped to relieve feelings of guilt. Dinah’s discussion of this issue 
highlights a possible explanation as to why other participants described their self-
injury in terms of self-punishment. Dinah talked in detail about how responsible she 
felt for other people’s feelings, and as a child and teenager, how these feelings of 
responsibility had at times become over-generalised, so that she felt what might be 
popularly termed ‘the weight of the world on her shoulders’: 
 
“I think it was more me being really really daft and thinking oh my god I’ve really 
embarrassed myself, well, you know, I’ll have to punish myself for doing something 
really awful, and that’s the thing I kinda always felt that I was………hurt… not 
hurting other people, but it was usually because I thought that I had done something 
to other people, you know I felt responsible for stuff that I done to other people, you 
know ----unclear---- when I was younger and I was really sensitive, it was just kinda 
like oh no, I’ve done this, and that’s hurt that person, that’s hurt, I would have these 
big lists, of all these people that, you know I could’ve possibly have damaged and 
you know what I mean, it was just kind-of a big sorta spiral of blaming myself for 
hurting other people” 
 
In Dinah’s case, self-injury made her feel “better.” What I am suggesting here is that 
self-punishment (in the form of self-injury) could be understood as a type of emotion 
work. If emotion work includes ways of ‘working upon’ feelings – and self-injury is 
being used to work upon or relieve feelings of guilt, then it can be understood as a 
method of emotion work. 
 
In contrast to narratives which suggested that self-injury acted to release or relieve 
the participant from problematic emotional states, other participants described self-
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injury as providing a distraction from feelings. Milly for instance, was clear that self-
injury did not alter the “underlying feelings”:  
 
“it was almost a distraction, from the mood rather than a, a kind of changing of the 
mood which is why it was so continuous […] the mood kinda dissipated, and went 
back up again, and nothing was really solved.”  
 
Milly’s narrative suggests yet another way in which self-injury can be seen to operate 
as a method of emotion work. In her case, self-injury serves to distract from the 
problematic emotion – not, as with some of the other formulations, to remove the 
problematic emotion. Indeed, Milly is clear that the mood returned, as self-injury for 
her did not “really” solve the problem. This contrasts with the narratives of Rease 
and Mark, where self-injury itself was framed as effective, serving to successfully 
solve problems: with body image and feelings of self-hatred (Rease); and with a 
difficult relationship and problematic emotional states (Mark).  
 
The idea that self-injury works because it distracts was also invoked by Craig and 
Harriet. Both suggested that the physical pain of the wound/s caused by self-injury 
gave them “something else” to think about, to orient towards. Craig specifically 
suggested that the level of control people who self-injure have over their injuries, in 
contrast to other less controllable aspects of their life, might be significant. Belinda 
also used the notion of control when discussing this – she said that she felt she had 
control over her injuries, which she contrasted with her uncontrollable emotions. I 
am not clear whether Craig was referring to uncontrollable emotions or situations, or 
possibly both. As with Anna’s narrative, Craig’s use of control was rather 
generalised, perhaps pointing to a broader understanding of control as a positive state 
or feeling.  
 
These narratives, where self-injury can be framed as being a method of doing 
emotion work call into question some of the existing literature on emotion 
management. As I argue above, some of this literature overlooks the embodied 
nature of emotions, but further, it tends to overlook the way that different methods of 
managing emotions actually work. However, in Hochschild’s (1983) study of air-
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hostesses, she describes a number of ways in which they physically managed their 
emotions (p. 25). The air hostesses’ training was designed to encourage them to use 
more cognitive methods. These cognitive methods were unseen (not displayed) and 
therefore were more socially acceptable. Similarities can be seen with self-injury. As 
I have argued, ‘hidden’ self-injury is viewed as ‘better’ (more acceptable) than 
displayed self-injury; perhaps because it is hidden, but also perhaps as a function of it 
being more successful as emotion work. Self-injury is often ‘private’ or carried out 
alone. However, that certainly does not fit for all cases. In some instances there is 
clearly an element where it is essential that the self-injury be witnessed, or at least 
that it might be witnessed – this is discussed further in section 8.3 on authenticity.  
 
8.2.3 Emotion work and the body 
 
Each of the examples above demonstrates the centrality of bodies in participants’ 
attempts to both explain their emotions and manage them. Participants drew upon 
bio-chemical models to explain why their attempts to manage their emotions through 
their bodies were successful. For instance, Justin attributed his ‘buzz’ to adrenaline; 
while Rease and Mark suggested endorphins and chemicals were responsible for the 
efficacy of their self-injury in improving their moods. These narratives lend support 
to arguments made by Rose (2003) regarding the importance of bio-chemical expert 
narratives in understandings of the body. Further, the idea that self-injury relieves or 
releases an emotion or feeling (tension, guilt) is again suggestive of the combined 
and inextricable body/mind. Doing something to the body is understood to release 
something which is more usually understood as mental or cognitive. However, this 
release is experienced as embodied, just as emotions are experienced, or felt, 
simultaneously through the ‘body’ and the ‘mind.’ 
 
8.3.1 Authentic pain: the body as an ‘authentic site’ for the 
expression of emotional pain. 
 
One of the key criticisms regarding the concept of emotion work/management is that 
is assumes that there are emotions which are not worked upon, and that these 
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‘spontaneous’ emotions are more authentic. This is most applicable to work which 
examines commercial emotion labour, and it is in her work on this area that 
Hochschild argued this most strongly (Hochschild, 2003 (1983)). However, the 
problem of authenticity applies equally for emotion work that is done outside of the 
workplace. Indeed, Duncombe and Marsden (1998) grapple with this issue in relation 
to their research on the emotion work done by heterosexual couples in order to 
maintain their relationships. Rather than attempt to add my own answer to this 
question, in this section I will look at the concept of authenticity in a rather different 
manner. My reasons for doing this are two-fold. Firstly, I would argue (following 
Duncombe and Marsden, 1998) that it is virtually impossible for us to know the 
‘authenticity’ of the emotions of other people – or even of ourselves – since it is 
impossible for us to be examined or to examine ourselves outside of any socio-
cultural context. Our emotions may always be being ‘worked upon’ in some manner, 
by our ‘selves’ or by ‘others’, in response to socio-cultural contexts. Secondly, the 
concept of authenticity itself is an important one with regard to late-modern social 
life. Others have commented upon the late-modern concern with ‘truth’, ‘reality’ and 
‘authenticity’ (Giddens, 1991; O'Connor, 2006). It is also argued that in these 
‘uncertain’ times, the body has increasingly become the only site where individuals 
are able to ‘be authentic’ (Benson, 2000; Sweetman, 2000).  
 
Authenticity here is taken to relate to ‘real-ness’ or ‘truth-ness’. In contrast to some 
existing work (e.g. Gubrium & Holstein, 2001), I do not want to suggest that an 
‘authentic’, ‘real’ or ‘true self’ actually exists. Rather, I wish to acknowledge that the 
existence of an ‘authentic self’ is generally held to be important by people in ‘late 
modern’ Britain (Giddens, 1991). This further affirms my aim in this section, which 
is to illustrate and demonstrate the way that participants can be seen to have used the 
concept of authenticity in their narratives, rather than making any claims as to the 
existence of any ‘authentic thing’ (whether self-injury, or ‘self’).  
 
I examine self-injury and authenticity in two, related ways. Firstly, self-injury can 
itself be understood as a way of doing ‘being in pain’ authentically. This is reflected 
in the narratives of those participants who stated that their self-injury was one of the 
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only methods they felt they had of being taken seriously. This was especially evident 
in Harriet’s narrative, but is also implied in the stories told by Belinda and Milly. I 
suggest that these arguments are related to a cultural tendency to devalue and dismiss 
‘emotional’ pain (Bendelow, 2009). 
 
Another perspective was raised in the narrative of Anna, who suggested that some 
people who self-injured were not being authentic. They were not ‘really’ self-
injuring. This was also raised by Belinda, who suggested that people with different 
motives might not ‘really’ be self-injuring. Further, the concern with practising a 
behaviour ‘authentically’ reflects similar concerns raised by theorists of youth 
subcultures (Riley & Cahill, 2005; Williams, 2006). 
 
Each of these issues raises the importance of the body and of morality. I suggest that 
bodies are central in participants’ attempts to create or present an ‘authentic’ self. 
Morality is significant since it is morally virtuous to be, and be seen as, authentic 
(Ashforth & Tomiuk, 2000). In this way, individual, embodied practices can be made 
culturally and socially understandable. An analysis of the moral nature of narratives 
about self-injury and authenticity serves to locate the participants securely within 
existing socio-cultural narratives and concerns.  
 
8.3.2 Self-injury and authentic pain 
 
As discussed in section 6.4.2, Harriet and Belinda were both quite clear that their 
practice of self-injury had sometimes been oriented toward other people. I would 
argue that part of the reason they felt that they needed to self-injure in order to get 
attention can be related to several inter-linking ideas around the issue of authenticity. 
For Harriet and Belinda, getting attention without self-injury was experienced as 
problematic. Belinda felt that she was not listened to, Harriet felt unable to speak. 
Importantly, both Belinda and Harriet suggested that their problems were not 
recognised or understood. Belinda described trying to talk about and communicate 
her problems, but being disregarded. She suggested that following this, she tried self-
injury as a way of signalling her distress in a way which could be ‘believed’: 
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“I wanted people to believe me […] wanted people to listen (A – mhm) or to notice 
or just to do acknowledge, or something! (A – mm) em, and that’s originally, why I 
started. […]I mean I, hehe if you try so many ways of getting people’s attention, like, 
you tell people at school and then, they call the meeting with the principle, […] and 
you tell them everything, and then they just disregard you. (A – mhm) How are you 
supposed to get people’s attention?! How are you supposed to tell them? Hehe. And, 
I guess, em, … I guess that’s what, you know, I saw, that Seb – everyone was like, 
worried about Seb” 
 
On seeing the attention that her friend Seb appeared to receive following his self-
injury, Belinda describes how she decided to try this method herself. The problems 
which Belinda was having at this time included her recovery from physical abuse at 
the hands of her father, and disturbing memories associated with this. A key question 
here is why Belinda, and Seb, had to ‘resort’ to inflicting physical injuries upon their 
bodies in order that their less visible distress be acknowledged. I would suggest that 
this might be related to the relative cultural importance accorded to physical versus 
emotional pain.  
 
Harriet talked about this in a slightly different, but related manner. She spoke about 
her experience of being someone who self-injures and the difficulty she then had of 
getting her distress recognised without resorting again to self-injury: 
 
“…its like sometimes it feels like, … you want, you go down and try and speak to 
somebody but its like – but you’ve not done anything so, they think, ‘oh you’re fine’ 
like, its like sometimes like, well, if I do something then maybe people’ll realise then 
that I’m hurting, inside (A – yeah) and then they’re like – but why didn’t you come to 
us before you did it? Its like, well I tried to! But you wouldn’t help me! (A – mm) so 
its like, quite difficult, to know what to do (A - yeah, yeah, ……) but I think, it, … if I 
can work out how to properly say what’s going on, they’re more likely to help me… 
but its sometimes you don’t’ know,… how to like express what you’re … what you’re 
going through without it like being, … sounding as if you’re threatening them [with 
self-injury]”  
 
Here Harriet describes a Catch-22 situation, whereby she has been encouraged to 
seek help before she self-injures, but feels that her requests for help are ignored or 
downplayed because she hasn’t “done anything.” Further, if she tries to communicate 
that she wants to injure herself, she is accused (or feels accused) of being  
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“threatening”. Ultimately, this can result in it being more straightforward for Harriet 
to not seek help for her (non-visible) anxiety, and simply seek and receive help once 
she has injured herself. In this case she would not be threatening anything, as she has 
already carried out the injury, and there can be no doubt that there is something 
wrong, since she has injured herself.  
 
Belinda’s and Harriet’s stories illustrate situations where emotional distress is either 
not recognised, or certainly not taken as seriously as physical injuries. There are 
several possible explanations for this. Firstly, it could be that if an individual self-
injures they are understood to be in greater mental anguish than a person who has not 
self-injured, because people who self-injure are understood to be irrational, crazy and 
even possibly dangerous. Secondly, physical injuries are more visible than emotional 
distress, they are, in Belinda’s words more ‘believable’ – others cannot dispute the 
existence of cuts, burns or bruises, whereas they could dispute the extent or severity 
of unseen emotional or mental pain. Thirdly, it has been argued that in general 
physical injuries, symptoms and conditions are taken more seriously than mental or 
emotional complaints (Bendelow, 2009). Thus, self-injury in this sense could be 
understood as a logical attempt by individuals in emotional distress to signal more 
clearly the pain they are in. Both Belinda and Harriet appeared to argue in this 
manner, suggesting that they felt that they had to injure themselves in order to 
properly communicate their emotional pain. In summary, in some cases, self-injury 
can be understood as a method of signalling to others the authenticity of the 
emotional pain that an individual is feeling. This reflects a general bias/preference 
towards visible, physical symptoms over and above unseen, emotional/mental 
symptoms. This analysis again highlights the continued preponderance of dualist 
understandings of mind and body, whilst also indicating their insufficiency in 
representing lived experience. 
 
8.3.3 Self-injuring authentically 
 
The idea that some people might self-injure in ways that were not ‘authentic’ was 
first raised by Anna, after our first interview and unfortunately after I had stopped 
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recording. She talked about the issue specifically in relation to the experience of pain 
during self-injury. She related a specific instance to me, whereby someone who had 
been in a psychiatric hospital with her had apparently ‘copied’ her self-injury. Anna 
said that she could not understand how they had been able to do this: surely the self-
injury must have hurt. Anna implied that, because the person was copying her, they 
could not possibly be in the same ‘mental state’ that Anna herself was in when she 
self-injured. It was this ‘mental state’ that, Anna suggested, explained her own lack 
of pain during self-injury. Several other participants presented ambivalent stories 
about ‘copying’ self-injury from other people, and I would suggest that this 
ambivalence reflected a concern with being seen as an ‘authentic self-injurer’. Both 
Milly and Belinda, for instance, were clear that they had ‘learned’ about self-injury 
from someone else, and both expressed some concern about this.  
 
Belinda suggested that the reasons she had self-injured gave her behaviour some 
credibility, contrasting this with other people at her school who had self-injured for 
less credible reasons - to be “cool.” “I hated to think that I was doing it for attention, 
even though I was doing it for attention. But I wasn’t doing it for attention to be 
cool.” Belinda’s narrative regarding attention seeking was discussed in section 6.4.2. 
However, it is worth reiterating here that for Belinda, as well as for other 
participants, attention seeking was viewed negatively, and there appeared to be some 
suggestion that people who self-injured and ‘displayed’ their self-injury were 
somehow being inauthentic. This would relate to wider socio-cultural attitudes 
regarding the appropriate expression of pain, and the suggestion that it should be 
done in ‘private’.  
 
Milly related how the girl from whom she had ‘learned’ about self-injury “turned 
round and told me that I was being an idiot because I was copying her.” Milly 
reacted to this accusation by emphasising earlier self-injurious behaviour she had 
engaged in. By locating her own self-injury in an earlier time, Milly claimed 
authenticity for her behaviour. Similarly, both Francis and Mark initially said that 
they had not come across self-injury at all prior to starting the behaviour themselves. 
For instance when I asked Mark about this he said: “have I ever come across self-
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harm before?( A – yeah) absolutely not.” . In both cases, throughout the course of 
our interviews, Mark and Francis worked out or realised that in fact they must have 
known about the behaviour before they started.  
 
8.4.1 Motivation, accounts and self-injury. 
 
In this section I will more fully draw out themes relating to motivation and morality. 
I follow Mills (1940), Scott and Lyman (1968) and Crossley (2006), in examining 
motives and accounts as social artefacts in and of themselves, rather than indications 
of internal/inner intentions
18
. As Crossley (2006: 27) has suggested, “motivation talk 
is a technique for organizing, controlling and judging action” – therefore talk of 
motivations incorporates moral messages regarding the action being discussed. 
Examining the vocabularies of motive associated with self-injury illuminates the 
social and moral nature of the behaviour, side-stepping the issues which more usually 
concern literature on self-injury, which tends to focus on internal and individual 
causes. I have raised the moral nature of participants’ descriptions and evaluations of 
self-injury at several points throughout the preceding chapters, this section will 
therefore consolidate and further emphasise the importance of this aspect of 
participants’ understanding of their behaviour.  
 
Mills argued that the “long acting out of a role, with it’s appropriate motives, will 
often induce a man (sic) to become what at first he merely sought to appear” (1940: 
908). This relates to his assertion that motives are not ‘merely’ stating reasons or 
describing action, but influencing the future behaviour of the self and often of others 
(ibid: 907).  
 
This frame of analysis also highlights the importance of the setting in which the 
account is given – in this case, interviews with someone else who participants knew 
to have also self-injured (see Monaghan, 2002 for a similar 'insider' study on steroid 
use among bodybuilders.). In this section I further consider the ways that this 
knowledge may have affected the accounts given.  
                                                 
18
 I use the terms account and motivation interchangeably here.  
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8.4.2 Accounting for self-injury 
 
I have demonstrated that self-injury was understood and explained by participants in 
a wide variety of ways. What I will now show is that although the differences and 
nuances between these explanations are important, there are some important 
similarities in terms of the way that the narratives were framed. Following Scott and 
Lyman, I will first examine those accounts that might be viewed as excuses – which 
they term “socially approved vocabularies for mitigating or relieving responsibility” 
(1968: 47). I then highlight those accounts which can be viewed more as 
justifications – whereby an individual accepts responsibility for an act, but attempts 
to re-frame the negative associations the act is understood to have (ibid). I note that 
justifications were far more commonly given than excuses, and I tentatively suggest 
that this may lead from my own position as someone else who had self-injured. Thus, 
participants may have been both reluctant to condemn a behaviour they knew I had 
also carried out, and also may have found it easier to justify the behaviour, and less 
likely to feel the need to excuse it. I further argue that the bodily marks that self-
injury so often leaves may also affect the types of accounts that participants were 




As I note above, excuses for self-injury were given far less frequently than 
justifications. Nevertheless, almost all participants provided me with excuses for 
their self-injury, and there were overlaps and similarities. These excuses were 
sometimes given rather glibly, and further, they occasionally directly contradicted 
justifications given by participants at other points in the interviews. I suggest that 
these contradictions indicate that participants will draw on a variety of both 





Biological mechanisms were noted by several participants in their attempts to 
explain, or I would argue, excuse their practice of self-injury. Harriet and Rease both 
implicated endorphins in their explanations of why self-injury did not cause much 
pain. Mark and Justin suggested that the efficacy of self-injury – why it worked – 
was related to bio-chemical mechanisms. Justin suggested that adrenaline was 
involved in the ‘buzz’ that he felt when he self-injured as a teenager.  
 
All of these accounts attempt to excuse self-injury by appealing to widely held 
beliefs regarding the biological mechanisms of the body. Importantly, each 
participant spent more time talking about various other explanations for the feelings 
that they got from self-injury. In Harriet’s case, she only mentioned the bio-chemical 
understanding of self-injury in the context of talking about her self-injury with 
school children: 
 
“its like, cos like when I was trying to explain it to a group of, of like school kids I 
was like, explaining about how like there was like, like all these chemicals in your 
brain that get released […] so that it acts as like as a pain killer” 
 
This episode was part of her involvement in ‘training days’ whereby people who had 
self-injured spoke to school children about their experiences in an attempt to increase 
awareness and help-seeking about the behaviour. It is perhaps suggestive of the 
greater esteem given to biochemical explanations that Harriet chose to emphasise this 
type of explanation in this context.  
 
It is important to contrast these biochemical explanations for self-injury with other 
possible interpretations, this emphasises further why participants might chose to use 
such explanations in favour of others. For instance, the claim that self-injury feels 
good because of endorphins might help to mediate against the charge of being 
‘masochistic’. This issue was also raised by Craig, Rease and Mark – in all cases to 
claim that they were not masochistic. There is something problematic about being 
seen to ‘enjoy’ pain, whether in a sexual or non-sexual manner, though it is likely 
that the sexual connotations of masochism play a large part in its negative framing. 
However, in order to explain their continued practice of self-injury, Rease, Mark, 
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Francis and Justin emphasised the pleasurable feelings associated with self-injury. It 
is possible that in order to excuse these feelings, bio-chemical explanations are 




Participants also drew on less biological, but nevertheless, authoritative 
clinical/medical terminology to excuse their behaviour. This was a problematic 
stance, however, given that mental illnesses are stigmatised. However, in some 
contexts such terminology may also provide an acceptable excuse for inappropriate 
or otherwise incomprehensible behaviour. For those participants who were heavily 
involved in psychiatric services – Anna, Emma and Harriet – these explanations were 
a key aspect of their broader narrative. Anna and Emma were both rather ambivalent 
and sometimes critical about their involvement in psychiatric services and with 
psychiatric diagnoses. In contrast, Harriet was less ambivalent, and seemed the most 
accepting of the explanations and treatment she had been given for her behaviour. 
Belinda, Dinah, Robert and Milly had all had much more limited involvement in 
psychiatric services, but nevertheless at times framed their self-injury in terms of 
psychiatric terminology. Belinda, for example, described her early self-injury as 
“impulsive”. Other participants talked of their self-injury in terms of “impulses” 
(Mark, Harriet) or “urges” (Harriet, Milly). These types of description can be seen as 
locating the motivation for self-injury outside of the conscious control of the 
participant. Similarly, Harriet said that she sometimes dissociated to such an extent 
that she did not even know she had self-injured until later.  
 
Although several participants talked about madness in relation to self-injury, few 
directly attributed their self-injury to insanity. Rather, most references to madness 
were in relation to participants’ suggestions about how other people might view their 
self-injury. In this sense, participants acknowledged what they understood to be 
wider cultural/social understandings about the type of people who injured 
themselves: mad people. There appeared to be some ambivalence regarding this issue 
 232 
however. Participants did not directly contradict or dispute this suggestion, though 
similarly, they did not tend to endorse it.  
 
None of the participants talked about addiction, which may be significant. I had 
expected at least some participants to frame their self-injury as an addiction, as this is 
a common explanation on some self-injury websites, for instance, one refers to self-
burning as “a huge addiction, just like any other form of self-injury” (Scar-Tissue, 
2009). However, Anna, Harriet, Emma and Justin did all describe their self-injury as 
being, at times, habitual. This could be seen as a comparable ‘excuse’ for their 




The accounts which can be viewed as justifications were those which sought to 
(re)frame self-injury in a more positive light, affirming and accepting the 
individual’s responsibility for the behaviour. This is in contrast with the accounts 
above, which tended to accept more readily the negative framing of self-injury as an 
undesirable behaviour, downplaying individual agency. 
 
Control and release 
 
One of the more dominant accounts, which I have returned to throughout the thesis, 
focuses around control and release. As I have already demonstrated, whether this 
control and release is bodily or emotional is unclear, what is important is that the 
concepts are recognisable. They are recognisable because they reflect wider concerns 
and discourse regarding the moral virtue of being ‘in control’ and the simultaneous 
need for ‘release’ in order to be healthy (Lupton, 1998b). This is a justification rather 
than an excuse, because the individual employing this account is accepting 
responsibility and agency in enacting the behaviour, and in order to legitimate this 
they are drawing on pre-existing understandings of emotion and health. The 
legitimacy of this account can be seen in that it is often accepted – it is certainly 
rarely questioned in the existing literature on self-injury.  
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Explaining self-injury as being a way of transforming emotional pain into physical 
pain is another of the more common accounts my participants gave me, and 
similarly, it can also be viewed as a justification rather than an excuse. In this case, 
participants draw on socio-cultural references regarding the primacy of physical pain 
over and above emotional pain (Bendelow, 2009). Again, with this explanation 
participants are drawing on existing socio-cultural understandings (of pain) to 
explain their behaviour, whilst simultaneously accepting responsibility for the 
behaviour.  
 
Self-injury as a coping mechanism 
 
Another, related, way in which self-injury was justified was to refer to it as a ‘coping 
mechanism’. Again, this explanation involves the individual accepting responsibility 
for their actions, but framing self-injury in a more acceptable manner – as an almost 
innocuous ‘coping mechanism’. This was expressed particularly strongly in Rease’s 
narrative, where she argued that self-injury could be seen as a successful coping 
mechanism, because otherwise she would have killed herself. Rease’s argument 
parallels one of the earliest explanations for self-injury, where it was understood as a 
‘proxy’ for suicide (Shaw, 2002): 
 
“I was very, em, kind of prone to suicidal thoughts, and, self-harm was, kind of a 
way, … to deal with that, and kinda, keep myself alive. I mean I’ve always said, if I 
hadn’t have self-harm I wouldn’t be here, I’d be dead. Em, and I don’t say that 
lightly, I mean that’s really true. ….. so, em, so it was a big deal. And even though 
like the self harm, obviously you can’t keep doing it, or using it as a coping 
mechanism, ahm, I do kinda see it as a positive thing” 
 
Rease explicitly states that her self-injury was a positive coping mechanism, though 
she accepts that it cannot be continued indefinitely. In this way Rease justifies her 
past behaviour, whilst acknowledging and partly explaining that she no longer carries 
out this ‘positive’ behaviour. Emma talked in a similarly ambivalent manner about 
her self-injury. In the following excerpt in particular, Emma struggles to reconcile 
her past behaviour, with the continued presence of the scars she created: 
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Evie once asked me, if, … if I could, go back again, … you know, if I was actually 
embarrassed by, … my scars and things and, … .. and if, it, …. Em, … … …. … …. 
You know if I would do it again if I went back (A – mm) and I said, I probably would, 
still do it but, .. .. I do kind of regret having done it, at the same time, em, … … … 
… …. .. but, … .. … ..regret having done it, at the same time, em, … … … … …. .. 
but, … .. … .. it was a part of my life for, … … a good, … 10 years, so, … em, …. … . 
well, a very bad 10 years actually not a very good 10 years (A – heheheh) hehe, em, 
… .. but em, … …. …. … … it was just a way of, … …. a way of coping, … … …. .. 
because I didn’t know how to, how to talk about it” 
 
Emma’s narrative here is complex. She simultaneously claims that she would still 
self-injure, even with hindsight, whilst also saying she regrets what happened. She 
concludes, however, by suggesting that what she did was “just” a way of coping. In 
doing this, Emma draws on a common cultural motif – the need to cope, and the need 
for mechanisms to enable this. Self-injury was “just” one possible method of doing 
coping. I would suggest that Emma’s scars play an important role in her struggle to 
reconcile her behaviour. The visibility and permanence of her scars make a 
justificatory account of their creation more desirable. Emma maintains that she 
would still “do it again”, it was “just” a coping mechanism – this account implies a 
level of agency, control and responsibility. However, she acknowledges wider socio-
cultural understandings by acknowledging some level of regret. 
 
Self-injury as ‘attention seeking’ 
 
Those participants who described their self-injury as ‘attention seeking’ can also be 
said to have provided justificatory accounts. These explanations for self-injury were 
complex and often detailed justifications regarding why the ‘attention seeking’ was 
necessary. These drew on, and sometimes challenged, broader socio-cultural 
understandings regarding emotions and display. Importantly, participants employing 
these types of account accepted responsibility for their actions.  
 
Belinda and Harriet in particular provided lengthy narratives regarding their 
‘attention-seeking’ self-injury. Belinda was clear that she had tried many other ways 
of seeking attention and help, but that these had been ignored. Similarly, Harriet 
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explained how she now struggled to be taken seriously unless she had self-injured. In 
each of these cases, the visible nature of self-injury (in contrast to in-visible 
emotional distress) was paramount. As I argued in Chapter 6, this appears to relate to 
more widely held understandings regarding the relative importance and believability 
of physical versus emotional pain. 
 
8.4.3 Considering the nature and contexts of accounts 
 
Justificatory vocabularies of motive for self-injury were more commonly expressed 
than excuses. As I noted above, this could be for several reasons. Firstly, given the 
context in which these accounts were given, participants may have been more 
inclined to provide justifications than excuses. Excuses are more likely to accept and 
reinforce negative judgements about the behaviour in question, and as participants 
knew that I had also self-injured, they may have been less inclined to discuss self-
injury in such a manner.  
 
Secondly, because self-injury often leaves permanent marks (and most of my 
participants had some permanent scars from their behaviour), the individual 
providing an account of their self-injury has to account for their continued and 
visible status as ‘someone who has self-injured’. This too may lead them to be more 
inclined to account for the behaviour in a manner which does not reinforce negative 
judgements. The importance of the continued corporeal visibility of self-injury in 
mediating the nature of accounts again emphasises the centrality of bodies and 
embodiment to an understanding of self-injury. 
 
Finally, justifications also allow the individual to present themselves as a coherent 
and active ‘self’. It may be significant that none of the participants excused their self-
injury entirely. Despite some having long histories of involvement with psychiatric 
services, narratives relating to madness were only ever referred to through ‘other’ 
people. In comparison then, excuses might indicate some moral weakness. This may 
be advantageous in some contexts, such as in a court of law defending oneself 
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This chapter has demonstrated three key sociological perspectives through which 
self-injury can be viewed. Each of these illustrates the necessity of accounting for the 
embodied and social nature of self-injury.  
 
A focus on self-injury as a method of emotion work highlights the ways in which 
self-injury can be seen to function within interpersonal social contexts. My 
discussion here demonstrated the variety of means through which self-injury can be 
seen to operate as a form of emotion work – eliciting, removing, distracting from and 
releasing emotions. Examining self-injury in this manner also serves to problematise 
the concept of emotion work as it is increasingly used, by clearly showing the ways 
that emotion work and emotions are experienced as embodied.  
 
The concept of authenticity was shown to be key in understanding both participants’ 
practice of self-injury and also the meanings they associated with their own and other 
people’s self-injury. Again, the body was central to this, as I argued that the self-
injured body could be viewed as a site upon which participants could demonstrate 
‘authentic’ pain. This was important whether the results of this were displayed or not. 
Indeed, I noted that participants’ views on the authenticity of others’ self-injury 
(especially when it was displayed) was problematic and contradictory.  
 
Finally, examining the nature of the accounts that participants gave for self-injury 
demonstrated the importance of the context in which they were given – the interview. 
Further, a focus on accounts in the form of both justification and excuses, highlighted 
the broader socio-cultural discourses that participants employed when narrating their 
experiences with self-injury. Many of these accounts were explicitly embodied, and 
thus incorporated socio-cultural understandings of bio-medical bodies with 
chemicals and hormones, and emotional bodies with ebbs and flows. 
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Overall, this chapter has demonstrated the importance of bodies and socio-cultural 
contexts to understandings of self-injury, as well as showing the usefulness of 










This thesis set out to explore the lived experience of self-injury. In particular, a focus 
on the embodied nature of self-injury has highlighted the importance of attempting to 
locate understandings of self-injury within biographical, interpersonal and socio-
cultural contexts. In this concluding chapter I will provide a final discussion of 
methodological and theoretical issues raised by the thesis. Following this, I discuss 
the implications of these findings for the practice of those working with people who 
self-injure. Finally, I make some suggestions regarding future avenues for research 
into self-injury.  
 
9.2 Exploring self-injured bodies: Methodological reflections 
 
9.2.1 Life stories and the lived experience 
 
This research began as an exploration into the lived experiences of people who had 
self-injured. I aimed to investigate the ways in which people narrated their self-
injury, and through this, to examine how self-injury was understood, the meanings it 
had. By focusing in the first instance upon the life-stories of participants, I was able 
to provide background biographical context in which to locate these meanings and 
understandings. This approach also allowed me to avoid exaggerating the importance 
of self-injury in participants’ lives. Reflecting the diverse sample, participants did 
indeed narrate widely different biographies and correspondingly different 
understandings of their self-injury. These differences were further reflected in the 
various self-injurious practices which participants described.  
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A narrative approach to both data collection and analysis has allowed me to critically 
investigate the understandings and meanings participants gave their self-injury. 
Throughout my analysis, I have attempted to acknowledge and attend to the 
constructed and situational nature of participants’ accounts. I have taken a subjective 
position within the research, whereby I have similarly acknowledged my part in the 
creation of the narratives of my participants. This reflected my ethical, feminist 
position in relation to the research, as a result of which I sought to conduct research 
in a collaborative and power neutral manner. Although my attempts at this were far 
from successful, I nevertheless retained some of the spirit of this approach in my 
analyses and treatment of the data. I make my truth claims tentatively, and readily 




As I have criticised previous research on self-injury for providing partial and limited 
interpretations of self-injury, it is appropriate that I acknowledge the limitations of 
my own work.  
 
9.2.2.1 The sample 
 
The research findings may have been strengthened had my sample been larger and 
more diverse. Practical and emotional constraints led to me ending data collection 
after recruiting 12 participants. Although some research has indicated this is the 
average number at which data saturation occurs (Guest et al., 2006), it would have 
been beneficial to include more participants. In particular, the sample would have 
benefited from a properly balanced gender ratio and from a more diverse spread of 
ages and socio-economic backgrounds. The voices of people from deprived 
backgrounds tend to be significantly absent from much existing research on self-
injury, which has tended to privilege educated and eloquent informants. Although my 
sample did include some people from less affluent backgrounds (Anna, Robert and 
Rease), the sample was certainly skewed towards those who had been educated to 
degree level (with the exception of Justin and Belinda, all participants had or were 
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studying for a degree). Further, research with much older people who self-injure is 
almost entirely absent, and I hoped to recruit a sample with a wide age range. 
However, my sample was relatively homogeneous in terms of age. Despite these 
limitations, however, the sample did include important and hitherto under-researched 
groups: males who had self-injured; and those who had not sought help for self-
injury. The sample was also diverse in terms of sexuality, household type, 
involvement in psychiatric services and methods of self-injury.  
 
9.2.2.2 Participation, ethics and safety 
 
I suggested in Chapter 3 that a participatory and collaborative style of research was 
the most ethical approach I could have taken, even if it was not entirely successful. 
Recent research has questioned the extent to which researchers should engage in this 
type of research, suggesting that more than any other style it may leave researchers 
open to emotional and psychological damage (Sampson et al., 2008). Whilst I accept 
these concerns, I remain convinced that the approach I took to the study was both 
appropriate and safe. By attending to my emotional safety at all stages of the 
research, I was able to successfully negotiate many potential problems that I faced 
when engaging with participants. Although the research was emotionally challenging 
and at times upsetting, with a strong supervision team, a good relationship with a 
therapist, along with invaluable interpersonal support from friends and family, 
helped me to ‘cope with’ these challenges, (thankfully) with no major psychological 
trauma.  
 
How far my research may have impacted upon my participants is less clear. I remain 
in contact with some of my participants, and I attempted to be open and accessible to 
all who wanted to maintain contact. Nevertheless, and reflecting the problems I faced 
when trying to involve participants in analysis, I am no longer in contact with most 
of the participants. Due to the two stage nature of the data collection, I was able to 
‘check up’ on participants’ well-being during and between the interviews. However, 
it is perhaps a limitation of my research design that I did not plan in a more formal 
checking back process following the second interview. This might have enabled me 
 242 
to assess the impact of the research, adjust my practice if any negative effects were 
identified, as well as allowing another chance for participants to challenge my 
analyses. Such an approach would then have strengthened the ethical foundations of 
the study even further. 
 
9.2.2.3 Researching bodies 
 
I did not begin this project with an intention to focus explicitly upon the embodied 
nature of self-injury. I was conscious from the start that previous research had not 
really engaged with the practical aspects of self-injury, generally overlooking what 
people who self-injured ‘actually did’. However, my concern with embodiment and 
self-injury arose organically through my ever deeper engagement with the topic, my 
conversations with my research participants, and my increasing interest in 
sociological approaches to the study of bodies and emotions.  
 
Leading from this later emergence of bodies as an explicit focus of analysis, my 
research practice was not as well designed or applied as it could have been. For 
instance, I took no comprehensive, rigorous notes regarding participants’ visible 
scars or methods of display. I did keep field notes, and these sometimes referred to 
participants’ scars, but I did not consistently attend to this aspect of my participants’ 
appearance. This omission is especially incongruous given my increasing concern 
with the visible aspects of self-injury, and indeed may well be reflective of the more 
general trends I discuss in this thesis: that is that visible signals of distress are 
simultaneously powerful and yet frequently ignored or overlooked.  
 
9.3 Discussion of findings  
 
9.3.1 The importance of practice 
 
Throughout the thesis, I have engaged with the embodied and practical nature of self-
injury. Previous work on self-injury has tended to overlook the matter of ‘what 
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people do’ when they self-injure, and after their injuries ‘what they do’ with the scars 
or wounds that are created. In contrast, this work has shown that an examination of 
individual narratives concerning ‘what they do’ can illuminate important aspects of 
how self-injury is understood. Participants’ narratives about how they started to self-
injure suggest that, for some, there is a need to claim authenticity for the behaviour 
by locating their early self-injury in a distant past. Whilst others (Adler & Adler, 
2005; Hodgson, 2004) have previously highlighted the importance of learning in the 
development of self-injury, my work had suggested that narratives about the learning 
of self-injury are difficult and morally complex. Participants expressed some 
ambivalence about having ‘learnt’ their behaviour from someone else. Others were 
adamant that they had ‘learnt’ the behaviour themselves, while some initially said 
this but later altered their narrative. This indicates the sensitive and morally charged 
nature of narratives around learning or self-learning self-injury, and mirrors other 
work on authenticity and subcultures (Riley & Cahill, 2005; Williams, 2006). 
 
A focus on the practical, material, corporeal nature of self-injury also provides 
important findings regarding the allure of self-injury. For many participants, 
although for different reasons, self-injury was intensely satisfying. How this was 
understood and experienced did appear to vary, though there were some common 
themes. Several participants’ narratives suggested that the sensations associated with 
self-injury were both satisfying and pleasurable. This appeared to relate to 
understandings of self-injury as a form of immediate control as well as a ‘release’ – 
of blood, emotions, tension or all three. These narratives of satisfaction tended to 
relate to an understanding of self-injury as effective. 
 
A detailed examination of participants’ understandings of pain associated with self-
injury further demonstrated the ways in which participants drew upon dominant, yet 
contradictory, socio-cultural understandings of bodies and emotions in their 
explanations for their behaviour. For many participants, self-injury was described as 
not causing physical pain. Despite this, some of these participants also said that self-
injury allowed them to deal with emotional pain by causing physical pain. My 
analysis of stories around pain and self-injury suggests that these narratives may 
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draw on dominant discourses regarding the functions of self-injury. In particular, 
describing self-injury as a way of transforming emotional pain into physical pain 
may be seen as a justification for self-injury. This draws on wider socio-cultural 
understandings regarding the appropriate management and expression of emotions. 
Participants’ stories around pain, emotions and expression suggested that self-injury 
did far more than ‘transform’ emotional pain into physical pain. Frequently, 
participants did not differentiate between emotional and physical pain. Some 
participants used self-injury to create sensations or feelings when they were feeling 
numb. Other participants used self-injury to ‘distract’ from emotional pain. Tying 
these explanations together was the importance of the embodied practice of self-
injury: the act of self-injury, of cutting, burning, or bruising the flesh, was framed as 
successful – either in distracting from, creating, or releasing problematic or absent 
emotional states.  
 
9.3.2 Attending to the wounds: the importance of visibility and 
feeling 
 
A key conclusion is that attending to the visible and sensate nature of self-injury 
should be central to any attempt to understand the behaviour in socio-cultural 
context. I have demonstrated that the visible and felt nature of both the initial injuries 
caused by self-injury, as well as any lasting marks or scars are important both to 
individuals’ understandings and interpretations of their behaviour, and how they then 
negotiate social life with these marks. These negotiations are closely related to 
understandings about the ‘assumptions’ of others. 
 
A key aspect of some participants’ practice of self-injury was the visual, material and 
felt nature of the wounds they created. The cuts, burns or bruises themselves were 
important in participants’ practice – for some they needed to be of a sufficient 
‘depth’ or ‘bad’ enough for the self-injury to ‘work’. For other participants, the 
healing of their wounds was an equally important aspect of the meaning that self-
injury had for them. Some emphasised that caring for and nurturing their wounds 
helped to distract them from negative mood states, or to symbolically heal emotional 
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wounds. Others indicated that wound interference was a way in which they exacted 
further control over their injuries: re-opening wounds and picking scabs enabled the 
immediate, bodily control of self-injury to be maintained over days, if not weeks.  
 
How and where self-injury was practised, and how wounds were concealed or 
revealed afterwards, was sometimes affected by participants’ attendance to the 
‘assumptions’ of others. Many participants attempted to limit their self-injury to 
areas of their bodies that could be easily covered. Others felt less able or willing to 
do this, and were happier to fend off comments about inappropriate clothing than 
they were to injure elsewhere. Understandings about this differed.  
 
Questions and comments about scars or marks, or the awareness that such questions 
and comments might arise were an integral part of the lived experience of being 
someone who has self-injured. How these were dealt with and experienced varied 
however. Some faced comments or questions defiantly, choosing not to hide their 
arms, and challenging negative comments and questions. Others preferred to avoid 
such questioning, either by hiding scars, lying about them, or fending off comments. 
Still others reported little direct questioning, yet nevertheless expressed concern 
regarding what they thought others must think about their scars.  
 
The sensate aspects of self-injury – how it felt, whether it was painful – were equally 
central to participants’ explanations for their self-injury. I have demonstrated that 
these understandings drew upon wider socio-cultural beliefs concerning bodies and 
emotions. In particular, I have suggested that bio-medical models of the body are 
used in participants’ narratives around pain and self-injury. The embodied, 
emotional, feeling elements of self-injury, following Lupton (1998a) and Williams’ 
(1998b) work, were described frequently in terms of release and control. My findings 
contrast with some interpretations of control as negative/denial, with several 
participants indicating that control was a positive state that self-injury helped them to 
achieve. The way in which several participants framed self-injury – as a way of 
gaining control through release – may relate to theoretical work on intoxication, 
which has similarly suggested that certain modes of intoxication might take the form 
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of controlled release. These theoretical strands need further development and 
exploration, but this work suggests that analyses of self-injury might make a useful 
contribution.  
 
9.3.3 Authenticity, self-injury, bodies and emotions 
 
Authenticity has emerged as a dominant theme in my analyses of participants’ 
narratives. Some participants claimed that self-injury might be more or less authentic 
depending upon how and when it was practised. The narratives of Milly, Dinah, and 
Mark each implied, in different ways, that self-injury could be a primordial aspect of 
a ‘self’, manifesting itself in early childhood initially, before gradually finding a 
different outlet in the form of ‘real’ self-injury. Anna and Belinda’s narratives 
suggested that some people self-injured for inauthentic reasons, with Anna further 
implying such people were not ‘really self-harmers’. Whether self-injury was ‘self-
learned’ or ‘other-learned’ (Hodgson, 2004) was another important way in which 
people might claim authenticity for their behaviour. The narratives of Francis and 
Mark, each of whom initially, and quite strongly, claimed to have ‘self-learned’ 
indicated this. A concern with authenticity was further evident in the narratives of 
Milly and Belinda, who were both clear that they had learned about self-injury from 
another person, but who struggled to justify this both to me and to themselves.  
 
Authenticity was important for different reasons in the narratives of Harriet and 
Belinda. Both explained in detail the lengths they felt they had to go (self-injury) in 
order to have their distress recognised and attended to. Harriet in particular 
illuminated the particular problems she faced trying to do this when she was known 
to self-injure, finding that she was not taken seriously unless she had ‘done 
something’. This only served to reaffirm the understanding that unseen emotional 
distress was not viewed as important as the more visible wounds caused by self-
injury.  
 
Some participants indicated, however, that people who ‘showed off’ their self-injury 
were not ‘real’ self-harmers. Belinda said that she ‘hated’ such people, though she 
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admitted that she herself had often not hidden her behaviour. This impression was 
also implied in Anna’s narrative, where she emphasised the secretive and hidden 
nature of her self-injury. Several other participants (Craig, Dinah, Emma, Justin and 
Mark) were at pains to suggest that their self-injury had been kept secret, at least 
when it was a recent activity.  
 
However, in several participants’ narratives their self-injury or other self-harm was 
described as being overlooked or ignored. This paints a particularly problematic and 
contradictory picture. Self-injury might be understood as a form of expressing and 
attempting to have recognised unseen or invisible emotional distress. However (and 
as previously noted by Crouch and Wright (2004)) if people are seen to display their 
injuries they may be understood as in-authentically trying to ‘seek attention’ (perhaps 
rather than ‘help’). Further, in many cases, even such an apparently explicit display 
of distress might be ignored, overlooked or minimised. Thus, wider socio-cultural 
understandings of emotions and self-injury could be seen to encourage hiding 
behaviour. A person who injures themselves discreetly and privately might be 
understood to be coping alone, and such behaviour might be seen as more valued 
than those who seek ‘attention’ (or help?) from others.  
 
9.4 Implications and future directions 
 
9.4.1 Implications for practice 
 
Leading from my conclusions, I make a number of suggestions for those working 




My research has demonstrated that judgemental, angry, negative reactions to an 
individual’s self-injury are experienced as extremely damaging and hurtful. Further, 
rather than inhibiting self-injury, such reactions are more likely to encourage people 
to hide their self-injury from others. Those working with people who self-injure 
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should certainly receive training to support them in providing reactions that are 
nurturing, supportive and caring. Such training should involve education and 
awareness-raising among staff regarding the problems associated with negative 
interpretations of self-injury. Indeed, some published work has suggested that 
medical staff who have received some educational training about self-harm are better 
able to respond to patients presenting with such behaviours (McCann et al., 2006). 
Such training should be developed and delivered with input from people who self-
injure. This recommendation supports the best practice guidelines by the Royal 
College of Psychiatrists (2006). I would suggest that such education and awareness-
raising should be extended to a wide range of professionals who might work with 
people who self-injure, including teachers, social workers and counsellors.  
 
Attending to self-injury appropriately 
 
My participants indicated that on many occasions, their self-injury was overlooked or 
ignored. While some felt this was appropriate, others did not. Self-injury should not 
necessarily be ignored: however, equally, it is not always appropriate to question 
someone who appears to have self-injured. Particularly where scars are evidently old 
there is perhaps less reason to address the matter. If a decision is made to attend to 
the self-injury this should be done sensitively and carefully. Again, educating 
professionals who come into contact with people who self-injure would help them to 
do this. Such education should focus upon the damaging effects of inappropriate 
attention, as well as providing better ways of responding to self-injury. As above, 
any training should be developed with the input of people who have self-injured. 
 
The importance of practice 
 
In clinical practice with people who self-injure, attention should be paid to 
developing diverse ways of doing emotion management. It should be recognised that 
self-injury can be powerfully effective and ‘substitutes’ – especially those that are 
largely cognitive – may be difficult to adopt. Thus, I would support ‘harm reduction’ 
strategies when working with people who self-injure, as opposed to ‘no-harm’ 
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contracts. However, any strategy should be discussed and negotiated with the 
individual concerned. My research found that ‘no-harm’ contracts could be 
experienced both positively and negatively. 
 
Motivations for self-injury 
 
Participants related a wide range of motivations for their self-injury. Their diverse 
stories suggest that assumptions regarding motivation should be avoided. 
Nevertheless, there were some important commonalities. Communication, especially 
regarding emotions, was implicated by most participants as being a factor in their 
self-injury. The person who has self-injured should then, above all else, be listened to 




Throughout this thesis I have suggested that wider socio-cultural understandings 
regarding emotional expression and pain are important in explaining how self-injury 
is interpreted. The stories of some of my participants show that these socio-cultural 
understandings can have potentially damaging effects. Some reported not being taken 
seriously unless they had injured themselves, pointing to the more general tendency 
to privilege visible, tangible ‘pain’ over invisible, emotional ‘pain’. Ironically, this 
may be a reason why some self-injure in the first place, as well as being a reason 
why self-injury may be experienced as effective. Self-injury works, in some cases, by 
either getting ‘attention’ or ‘help’, or by clearly signalling ‘pain’, whether to the self-
injuring individual or to ‘others’.  
 
However, self-injury was also described as ‘hidden’ and I have suggested that more 
often it is ‘ignored’. This may be related to the negative connotations attached to 
mental ill health. Although self-injury is ‘physical’, it is understood to signal 
‘emotional’ distress. Thus, people who have self-injured may be caught in 
complicated moral negotiations. Emotional pain is invisible, and easily ignored. 
However, by manifesting this emotional pain in the form of ‘physical’ self-injury, the 
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individual is (in some understandings) creating an ‘inauthentic’ physical injury. It is 
seen as inauthentic both because it is a ‘proxy’ for ‘emotional’ pain, and because it is 
‘visible’ and thus, ‘displayed’.  
 
It is essential that these socio-cultural assumptions and understandings around self-
injury, pain and emotions are addressed in training targeted at those working with 
people who self-injure. Indeed, although an ambitious project, challenging such 
assumptions should certainly be engaged with in any large scale attempt to reduce or 
prevent self-injury in general populations.  
 
9.4.2 Future directions for research 
 
This exploratory study can point to a number of possible future directions that could 
be taken by sociological research into self-injury. 
 
There is a need for better information regarding the prevalence of self-injury in non-
clinical, general adult populations. Very little is currently known about this, and 
research on clinical and adolescent populations continues to dominate. Research is 
especially needed to ascertain whether self-injury does indeed tend to cease in early 
adulthood (as is widely assumed). s 
 
This study has demonstrated the usefulness of taking a life-story, narrative approach 
to the study of self-injury. Future studies should apply such techniques with larger 
and more diverse samples. This might permit the development of a more 
comprehensive picture of the different ways that self-injury is used  and understood, 
including methods, length of time and type of involvement with self-injury, functions 
and meanings.  
 
More research is needed that addresses the potentially different ways that different 
methods of self-injury and self-harm are practised, and how these may relate to 
different meanings and understandings. Research is beginning to address this – for 
instance, some recent studies have begun to examine different methods of self-harm 
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separately; and this concern is also reflected in the calls for a distinction between 
suicidal and non-suicidal self-injury (e.g. Nock, 2009b). I would suggest, however, 
that this latter concern with motivation should be avoided. It would be more 
beneficial if attention were paid to material practices and understandings of self-
injury and self-harm, rather than the motivations which are (as I discussed in Chapter 
1) extremely liable to be influenced – and altered – by contextual factors. 
 
In particular, more research is needed which engages with the potentially diverse 
ways that self-injury is used by members of different social groups. As this research 
was based on a relatively limited sample, it was difficult to contribute to this topic. 
Future qualitative research should focus in particular on self-injury among older 
people, those from deprived socio-economic backgrounds, and people from more 
ethnically diverse geographical areas. This thesis has raised a number of different 
explanations and ways of accounting for self-injury. Further research is needed to 
ascertain how widespread these explanations and understandings are among different 
social groups.  
 
Research on the relationship between self-harm and suicide is currently limited. 
Further research is needed to ascertain whether different methods of self-harm are 
equally associated with increased risk of suicide. Currently, understandings tend to 
conflate all methods of self-harm and assume that all methods and modes of self-
harm increase the risk of suicide. These understandings are limited due to their 
reliance upon clinical samples, and clinically recorded cases of self-harm. Very little 
is known about a relationship between medically untreated self-harm and suicide. 
Further research would improve understandings and enable better targeted 
intervention and care. For instance, it is currently unknown whether any one method 
of self-harm is more likely to increase risk of suicide. Existing qualitative research 
into self-injury has suggested that self-injury may in fact be protective of suicide. 
Quantitative studies are needed to corroborate this. 
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Finally, research which examines the ways and means by which individuals stop self-
injuring is needed. Very little research engages with this at present. In particular, 
such research should involve non-clinical as well as clinical populations.  
 
9.5 An ending 
 
This thesis has demonstrated the possibility and necessity of an embodied, 
sociological perspective on self-injury. Through an exploration of the life-story 
narratives of people who self-injure, I have shown that the ways in which self-injury 
is described are mediated by wider socio-cultural understandings regarding emotions 
and bodies. In particular, I have highlighted the importance of pain and authenticity 
in participants’ narratives about their self-injury. Self-injury, in some cases, might be 
understood as a way of ‘being in pain’ ‘authentically’. This understanding only 
comes about through an engagement with the embodied nature of self-injury, and 
indeed, of social life. This engagement emphasises the importance of the visible and 
felt aspects of self-injury, each of which contributes to the lived experience of those 
who practise self-injury. Whether felt, seen, or both, self-injury, both to the 
practitioner and those observing, can be seen to represent pain, incarnate. In common 
with pain (Bendelow & Williams, 1995), self-injury highlights the importance and 
necessity of an embodied, anti-dualist perspective on lived experience. Examining 
these experiences and behaviours allows an interrogation of the inter-connected 
nature of emotions, bodies and social life. Pain, self-injury and indeed experience are 
all ‘incarnate’. Attending to this allows for a more nuanced, sensitive and socially 
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• Pain  - None at all? Different methods affect? 
• Privacy 
• Telling others - How soon after, at all, depends on severity of injury? 
• Copying 
• Transition from hitting to cutting 
• Have there been times when she wasn’t harming that much/that often? 
• Power 
• Control 
• Being taken seriously – by mother, especially when brother is taken seriously. 
Wanting acknowledgement – wanting to be noticed.  
• Suffering illness alone as a child – just get on with it 
• Feeling depersonalised – not knowing who I am.  
 
Belinda 
• Responsibility/feeling responsibility/guilt 
• Mood management 
• Self-harm: hiding it vs. attention seeking. 
Themes to explore: 
• Being heard/people not listening/people ‘not knowing’ when things are not 
OK. 
• Self-injury as punishment – self-injury as other things:- What does self-injury 
‘do’? 
• Experience of pain/no pain issue. 
• Self-injury and mental health and ill health. 
• Self-injury and emotions.  




• Drinking – how far this was implicated in the self-harm, drinking as a method 
of self-harm. With the people I’ve spoken to so far, about 50% drank to 
excess, and 50% don’t drink at all, so I think there might be something in 
this? 
• What it was like when you were self-harming – practical aspects e.g. how 
often, what you used – why and how cigarette burning happened! Only if you 
feel comfortable discussing it though – just let me know if not! 
• Anger seemed to come up a lot, and I wondered whether other emotions ever 
seem/ed relevant e.g. sadness/anxiety etc. Also, is anger less of a problem 
now, or do you deal with it better – or both?! 
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• Pain – not sure what to say on this, but it is a big part of how people talk 
about self-harm – some people feel it, some people don’t, some people like it, 




Responsibility – Self-blame - Caring 
Feeling responsible for other people/things seems to have been a theme that started 
from a young age. It seems almost like a double edged sword in that on one hand you 
feel more stable when you are busy, and have people to look after; but on the other 
hand, it seems people have taken advantage of this in the past – but then you have 
beaten yourself up for that – continued to feel responsible for a situation. This also 
seems to relate to the feelings you have had that you were to blame for everything, 
your good memory about all the things you had done that could have hurt other 
people. I felt a great sense of your responsibility for other people, which appears to 
have been both a positive and a negative presence in your life. 
 
Control/Body-control 
You mentioned a few times the issue of control, and often this related to your body – 
especially as regards training. We talked about how you have increasingly used 
training as a way of regulating your moods, especially when you are feeling ‘hyper’. 
In earlier years, you didn’t do this so much (?), and drank, often with consequences 
where you did something ‘silly’ which you then felt very guilty (responsible?) about.  
‘Control’ comes up in a lot of the existing literature, so it would be interesting to talk 
more about it. 
 
Thinking too much vs. keeping busy 
Body modification/tattooing 
The above themes aren’t really talked about in the literature, but they have come up 




• Other people who do it. 





• Drinking, a subject close to my own heart, as you know! This has also 
cropped up in other peoples interviews and is an issue I’d like to explore 
further, both as regards health, life etc. and self-harm more specifically. 
• Mental health and illness. 
• Not talking – this seemed to be a big issue when you were younger, and the 
theme of families not talking is one that’s come up a lot. 
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• Practicalities of self-harm – mundane aspects e.g. how often, how much, 




• Drinking; especially as you have stopped drinking now! 
• Responsibility/feeling responsible/guilt. 
• Mood management. 





• School/Bullying – did parents know? Did anyone know? Teachers/other 
students etc. If not, why not? If yes, how did they react? 
• Tension – how to explain self-harm to younger kids? Why the tension? Don’t 
want to encourage it? 
• People not knowing when everything isn’t OK.  – Related to people not 
listening?  
• What does she think about the hormone/chemical issue – does that describe 
her experiences? Does it fit? No pain? Perhaps introduce my story here, that I 
do feel some pain. 
• Relationship with parents/dad in particular – perfectionism. 
• (what do parents do??) 
• Status of self-harm as a mental health problem. Any other diagnoses? 
• What self-injury does – talked of relief, punishment – anything else, and how 
does it relieve? Punish? 
• What used to happen at school when she got suspended? Did she actually 
harm herself? Or did they find out she wanted to? And if so – how did they 
find out? 
• What was the therapy she was in for all those years – try to get a clearer 
picture of ‘help’ received and sought. 
• Ever been to A&E?  
• Practicalities – what, when, where, how often – different stages? 





• Responsibility/feeling responsibility/guilt 
• Mood management 
• Self-harm: hiding it vs. attention seeking. 
Themes to explore: 
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• Being heard/people not listening/people ‘not knowing’ when things are not 
OK. 
• Self-injury as punishment – self-injury as other things:- What does self-injury 
‘do’? 
• Experience of pain/no pain issue. 
• Self-injury and mental health and ill health. 
• Self-injury and emotions.  





Had you heard about SH before you did it? 
Themes to explore: 
• Being heard/people not listening/people ‘not knowing’ when things are not 
OK. 
• What does self-injury ‘do’? 
• Experience of pain/no pain issue. 
• Self-injury and mental health and ill health. 
• Self-injury and emotions.  
• Self-injury and the body/ practical issues (where, what with, rituals?) 
Francis 
• Times when self-injury happened – review. 
• Emotions and feelings about self-injury – at the time and around the time. 
• Talking to people about self-injury – friends, family, doctor. 
• Self-injury, the body and risk-taking. 
• Not having problems/reasons for self-injury. 






• Drinking/working – addiction? 
• Parents 
• Social aspects re. schooling -> later life/relationships/ 
• ‘emotional stuff’ 
Themes to explore: 
• Communication. 
• What does self-injury ‘do’? 
• Experience of pain/no pain issue. 
• Self-injury and mental health and ill health. 
• Self-injury and emotions.  
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• Self-injury and the body/ practical issues (where, what with, rituals?) 
• Self-injury and other people. 
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